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California Supreme Court Survey
August 1991 - May 1992
The CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey provides a brief synopsis of recent decisions by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the reader of

the issues that have been addressed by the supreme court, as well as to serve as a
starting point for researching any of the topical areas. The decisions are ana-

lyzed in accordancewith the importance of the court's holding and the extent to
which the court expands or changes existing law. Attorney discipline and judicial misconduct cases have been omittedfrom the survey.
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I.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
A.

Under California Code of Civil Proceduresection 904.1(a), a
superior court's denial of a petitionfor a writ of certiorari
directed at a municipal court contempt order is an appealable judgment: Bermudez v. Municipal Court.

In Bermudez v. Municipal Court,' the California Supreme Court was
faced with the issue of whether one may appeal a superior court's denial
of a writ of certiorari addressed at a municipal court contempt order.2
The court concluded that an appeal of the denial is a statutory right.' An
amendment to section 904.1(a) of the California Code of Civil Procedure,' which limited the availability of appeals in similar actions, did not
foreclose this right.6 Also, the nature of the underlying order does not affect the right to appeal the denial of a writ of certiorari.'

1. 1 Cal. 4th 855, 823 P.2d 1210, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 609 (1992). Chief Justice Lucas
delivered the unanimous opinion of the court in which Justices Mosk, Panelli,
Kennard, Arabian, Baxter, and George joined.
2. Id. at 856, 823 P.2d at 1210, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 609. In Bermudez, a municipal
court found a Los Angeles public defender in contempt when he was unable to make
a scheduled appearance. The public defender, Gustavo Bermudez, filed a petition for
a writ of certiorari in Los Angeles Superior Court, which was denied. Bermudez filed
an appeal of the superior court judgment, which the court of appeal summarily dismissed. The California Supreme Court granted review.
3. Id. at 863, 823 P.2d at 1214, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 613. See 9 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal § 78 (3d ed. 1985) ("When a municipal court makes an order
in a contempt proceeding, that order is reviewable in the superior court by certiorari.1).
4. Section 904.1 of the California Code of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part:
An appeal may be taken from a superior court in the following cases: (a)
From a judgment, except (1) an interlocutory judgment... , (2) a judgment
of contempt which is made final and conclusive by Section 1222, (3) a judgor (4) a judgment granting or
ment on appeal from a municipal court ....
denying a petition for issuance of a writ of mandamus or prohibition directed
which relates to a matter pending in the municito a municipal court ...
pal . . . court. However, an appellate court may, in its discretion, review a
judgment granting or denying a petition for issuance of a writ of mandamus
or prohibition . . . upon petition for an extraordinary writ.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 904.1 (West Supp. 1992). Subsection (4) was added by amendment in July 1983.
5. Bermudez, 1 Cal. 4th at 863, 823 P.2d at 1214, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 613. A July
1983 amendment to section 904.1(a) limited the types of judgments which one could
appeal. Id
6. Id. at 863, 823 P.2d at 1215, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 614. The court cited Burrus v.
Municipal Court, 36 Cal. App. 3d 233, 111 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1973), which discussed the
problems of applying section 904.1. The Burrus court noted that there was a loop-
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The supreme court rejected the decision of the court of appeal, which
concluded that the general right to appeal does not apply when the underlying issue behind the writ of certiorari is a contempt order.' The
court held that the statutory designation of an order, rather than the trial
court's characterization, controls when determining appealability.' Because the appeal in this case was, on its face, an appeal from the denial
of the writ of certiorari, rather than the contempt order, there was no
statutory bar.'
The court also dismissed the respondent's arguments that an amendment to section 904.1(a) suggests that appeals of writs of certiorari were
precluded." The court decided that the plain language of the statute did
not allow for such an interpretation because it only mentioned writs of
mandamus or prohibition." Furthermore, the legislative history did not
support the position urged by the respondent that the those writs were
intended to be illustrative."
This case allows for appeals in the narrow range of cases in which one
seeks review by the court of appeals for contempt orders." It also dem-

hole in the statutes which allowed intermediate appeals of contempt-type orders
through writs of mandate and prohibition. Id. at 239, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
7. Bermudez, 1 Cal. 4th at 861, 823 P.2d at 1214, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 613. Section
1222 of the California Civil Procedure Code states that "[t]he judgment and orders of
the court or judge, made in cases of contempt, are final and conclusive." CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 1222 (West Supp. 1992). The court of appeal characterized Bermudez'
appeal as an appeal of the contempt order rather than of the denial of the writ of
certiorari. Bermudez, 1 Cal. 4th at 861, 823 P.2d at 1214, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 613. See
also Arthur B. Broaddus, Note, Scope of Review of Contempt Orders in California,
37 CAL L REv. 301 (1949) (noting that writs of certiorari or habeas corpus are the
only way in which to obtain review of contempt orders).
8. Bermudez, 1 Cal. 4th at 862, 823 P.2d at 1214, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 613. The
court cited Peninsula Prop. Co. v. County of Santa Cruz, 106 Cal. App. 2d 669, 235
P.2d 635 (1951), which held that the statutory designation of an order as "final" determined the appealability question.
9. Bermudez, 1 Cal. 4th at 862, 823 P.2d at 1214, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 613. The
court pointed out that the underlying order in Burrus was also not appealable as a
matter of statutory right Id. Therefore, the discussion in Burrus concerning the problems of 904.1 appeals would have been superfluous if the court of appeal was correct in its reasoning.
10. Id. at 863, 823 P.2d at 1215, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 614. See 8 B. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Extraordinary Writs § 33 (3rd ed. 1985) (discussing the difference
between writs of prohibition and mandamus from certiorari in the context of appeals).
11. Bermudez, 1 Cal. 4th at 863, 823 P.2d at 1215, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 614.
12. Id. at 863-64, 823 P.2d at 1215, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 614.
13. The court noted that there have been only nine reported decisions -since 1925

onstrates the court's unwillingness to reach beyond a literal interpretation of a statute, even if the result would produce anomalies. 4
DAVID KNOBLOCK

B.

A forum non conveniens motion successfully thwartsforum
shopping by foreign plaintiffs against Californiacorporations; courts should not consider an alternativeforum's substantive law unless that forum provides no remedy: Stangvlk
v. Shiley, Inc.

California corporations have won an important battle in the "forum
shopping" war waged against foreign plaintiffs in the decision of
Stangvik v. Shiley, Inc.' In Stangvik, the California Supreme Court held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its application of forum
non conveniens in a prosthetic heart-valve tort liability case.2 Hence, the
order staying the case and forcing the foreign plaintiffs to sue a California corporate defendant in Scandinavia was upheld.' The high court
granted review" to clarify the doctrine of forum non conveniens and to

involving this set of circumstances. Id. at 858, 823 P.2d at 1211-12, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
610-11. Therefore, it does not appear that Bermudez will have a major impact on the
courts of appeal.
14. The court indicated that the decision produced a scheme that allows appeal in
municipal court contempt matters, but not in superior court contempt matters. Id. at
864, 823 P.2d at 1215, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 614. The court seemed to suggest that the
legislature close this "loophole." Id.
1. 54 Cal. 3d 744, 819 P.2d 14, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 556 (1991). Justice Mosk wrote for
a unanimous court composed of Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli, Kennard,
Arabian, Baxter, and George. See 10:47 Barclay's California Supreme Court Service,
Weekly Report, Nov. 26, 1991, at 507; 13:8 CEB Civ. Litig. Rptr. 390, Dec. 1991; 60
U.S.LW. 2382, Dec. 17, 1991. See also Stacey A. Gordon, California Ruling Limits
Many Foreign Lawsuits, Bus. INS., Dec. 23, 1991, at 1; Philip Hagar, ForeignersLimited in Ruling in State Courts, LA. TIMES (Home ed.), Nov. 22, 1991, at A3 (Home
edition) (also reported as Shiley Wins Case Limiting Foreigners'Right to Sue, at D5
(Orange County ed.)); Leslie Berkman, U.S. Lawsuits Against Shiley by ForeignersDenied, L.A. TIMES (Orange County ed.), Sept. 18, 1990, at D5; Leslie Berkman, Ruling
May Partially Shield Maker of Heart Valve From Foreign Litigants, L.A. TIMES (Orange County ed.), Aug. 30, 1988, at D9.
2. Stangvik, 54 Cal. 3d at 752, 819 P.2d at 18, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 560.
3. Id. at 763, 819 P.2d at 26, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 568.
4. Stangvik v. Shiley, Inc., 800 P.2d 858, 275 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1990), affd, 54 Cal.
3d 744, 819 P.2d 14, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 556 (1991). Chief Justice Lucas and Justices
Mosk, Broussard, Panelli, Kennard and Arabian voted to grant review. However,
Justice Broussard retired from the court before the case was argued. Justice
Eagleson did not sign the order to grant review because he planned to retire before
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resolve the newly created conflict between the decision of the court of
appeal below and two prior court of appeal decisions, Corriganv. Bjork
Shiley Corp. and Holmes v. Syntex Laboratories,Inc.'
Shiley Corporation has been plagued with products liability lawsuits in
both state and federal courts ever since it recalled certain prosthetic
heart valves manufactured in 1986.6 Shiley has often won these cases on

the case would be heard. His replacement, Justice Baxter, joined in the unanimous
opinion. See Philip Carrizosa, Heart-Valve Appeal to Get Hearing: California Supreme
Court Will Consider Scandinavians' Venue Issue, LA. DAILY J., Nov. 30, 1990, at 5.
5. Stangvik, 54 Cal. 3d at 749, 819 P.2d at 16, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 558. The court
of appeal decision, 230 Cal. App. 3d 1688, 273 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1990), rev'd and superseded by 800 P.2d 858, 275 Cal. Rptr. 380, affd, 54 Cal. 3d 744, 819 P.2d 14, 1
CaL Rptr. 2d 556 (1991), contradicted two other court of appeal cases: Corrigan v.
Bjork Shiley Corp., 182 Cal. App. 3d 166, 227 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1986), cert. denied,
Shiley, Inc. v. Corrigan, 479 U.S. 1049 (1987) (holding that Australian plaintiffs could
sue Shiley in California) and Holmes v. Syntex Lab., Inc., 156 Cal. App. 3d 372, 202
Cal. Rptr. 773 (1984), overruled by Stangvik v. Shiley, 54 Cal. 3d 744, 819 P.2d 14, 1
Cal. Rptr. 2d 556 (1991) (holding that British plaintiffs could sue biomedical corporation in California for personal injuries allegedly caused by oral contraceptives). See
Harry Litman, Considerations of Choice of Law in the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 74 CAL. L REV. 565 (1986) (discussing all key California and federal forum
non conveniens cases up to 1986, including Corrigan and Holmes).
Shiley previously attempted to reverse Corrigan and Holmes and to create other
favorable changes in forum non conveniens law through intense political lobbying in
the California Legislature and in the United States Senate and House of Representatives. Other multinational corporations and organizations that participated in Shiley's
lobbying efforts include Genentech, AT&T, The California Manufacturers Association,
and the California Chamber of Commerce. Shiley has also retained some of the
largest law firms in the nation, including Hughes, Hubbard & Reed; Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom; and Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, to draft proposed legislation
and to defend Its cases. Trial lawyer organizations and consumer groups opposed
Shiley's proposed bills. Most of Shiley's lobbying failed to achieve the intended goals.
See Tom Dresslar, Companies Seek Different Forum for Valve Suits: Foreign Parties
Involved, L.A. DAILY J., June 11, 1990, at 1 (discussing SB 1735); Tom Dresslar, Sentence in Bill Would Aid Pfizer in Valve Cases: Changes Forum for Suits, L.A. DAILY
J., Apr. 4, 1990, at 1 (discussing SB 1735; Pfizer Inc. bought Shiley Inc. in 1979);
Tom Dressar, Pfizer Seeks Protection from Heart Valve Suits, LA. DAILY J., May 5,
1988, at 2 (discussing SB 2683); Leslie Berkman, Shiley Seeks Law to Limit Damage
Suits by Foreign Litigants Over Heart Valves, LA. TIMES, May 3, 1988, at D5 (Orange County edition); Greg Rushford, Lacovara's Risky Cure for Pfizer's Heartburn,
LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 4, 1988, at 1 (discussing Shiley's federal lobbying).
6. A sampling of recent federal court of appeals cases includes the following unpublished memoranda dispositions: Murphy v. Shiley, Inc., 940 F.2d 668 (9th Cir.
1991) (Table); Pryor v. Shiley, Inc., 916 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1990) (Table) (consolidating 13 identical cases and granting summary judgment for Shiley); Sill v. Shiley, Inc.,
735 F. Supp. 337 (W.D. Mo. 1989), affd, 909 F.2d 508 (8th Cir. 1990) (Table);

summary judgment motions." The Stangvik case strongly resembles
these other cases, with the exception that here Shiley prevailed on procedural, rather than substantive, grounds.
In Stangvik, relatives of two deceased Scandinavian men implanted
with allegedly defective heart valves sued Shiley in California for
wrongful death and a plethora of accompanying torts.' Shiley moved to
dismiss the suit based upon forum non conveniens Although the trial

Brinkman v. Shiley, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 33 (M.D. Pa.), affd, 902 F.2d 1558 (3d Cir.
1989) (Table); Hagepanos v. Shiley, Inc., 846 F.2d 71 (4th Cir. 1988) (Table).
State cases include the following: Spuhl v. Shiley, Inc., 795 S.W.2d 573 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1990); Khan v. Shiley, Inc., 217 Cal. App. 3d 848, 266 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1990); Cart
v. Ducote, 490 So.2d 731 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Corrigan v. Bjork Shiley Corp., 182 Cal.
App. 3d 166, 227 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1986), cert. denied, Shiley, Inc. v. Corrigan, 479 U.S.
1049 (1987), overruled by Stangvik v. Shiley, Inc., 54 Cal. 3d 744, 819 P.2d 14, 1 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 556 (1991). The supreme court noted that approximately 235 cases regarding
Shiley's prosthetic heart valve are pending in California courts. Stangvik, 54 Cal. 3d
at 759, 818 P.2d at 28, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 565. For a criticism of the Khan case see
Robert F. Hanley, The Heart-Valve Cases: Is Pfizer the Next A. H. Robbins?, Legal
Backgrounder (Wash. Legal Found.), Feb. 15, 1991, arguing that Khan contradicts
established precedent in California. See also 6 B. WTKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW, Torts § 1304 (9th ed. Supp. 1992) (discussing Khan).
7. See supra note 6. Many cases are brought by living plaintiffs who still have
the valves implanted. American products liability law in nearly every state requires
product failure, malfunction, or a product-caused accident in order to recover. Plaintiffs in the prosthetic implant situation argue that, in cases involving life-sustaining
medical devices, the claimant must die, or at least risk death, before being able to
sue. Shiley argues that while the patient is alive, the implanted heart valve is not
harmful but rather keeps the patient alive, so there is no product failure, malfunction,
or product-caused accident. Emotional distress alone does not usually suffice as damage in products cases. Plaintiffs counter that under this reasoning, a heart valve recipient must die in order to maintain his case, since even the slightest defect in such
a device entails nearly instant death. Nevertheless, Shiley has precedent on its side
and it appears unlikely that products liability law will become any more liberal than
its present state. Khan, 217 Cal. App. 3d 848, 266 Cal. Rptr. 106, is one of the few
cases that allowed a heart valve plaintiff to proceed substantively solely on grounds
of emotional distress. See also supra note 6 for further information on Khan.
8. The plaintiffs consisted of the immediate families of the late Mr. Sigmund
Stangvik, a Norwegian, and the late Mr. Mikael Karlsson, a Swede. Both men underwent Shiley artificial heart valve implant operations in their respective countries. Both
men subsequently died from valve failure. Specifically, the plaintiffs in this suit, like
the claimants in the other numerous suits against Shiley, alleged that strut fractures
induced the artificial valve to collapse, causing death within minutes. The tort claims
included negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, fraud, loss of consortium, and
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Stangvik, 54 Cal. 3d at 749, 819 P.2d at 16,
1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 558.
9. Shiley based its forum non conveniens motion on section 410.30, subdivision
(a), of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides:
When a court upon motion of a party of its own motion finds that in the
interest of substantial justice an action should be heard in a forum outside
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judge sympathized with Shiley's position, he felt constrained to deny the
motion because of Corrigan." Shiley then filed writs for extraordinary
relief. The court of appeal issued an order criticizing Corrigan as wrongly decided1' and directing the trial court to reevaluate the motion. Upon
reconsideration, the trial judge granted Shiley's motion. When Stangvik
appealed, the court of appeal affirmed," agreeing that California was an
inconvenient forum. More than three years after the issue arose, a unani-

this state, the court shall stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on
any conditions that may be just.
CAL Civ. PROC. CODE § 410.30(a) (Deering 1991).
At first glance, it seems ironic for Shiley to claim that courts in Scandinavia are
more convenient than the Orange County Courthouse where the suit began, located a
mere five miles from Shiley's headquarters. In support of the motion, Shiley argued
that the courts in Sweden and Norway would be the most convenient forum, because
the plaintiffs reside in Scandinavia, the valves were marketed and sold there, the
decedents' received medical care there, and the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations
were made there.
The plaintiffs countered that Shiley is incorporated in California; the valves in
question were designed, manufactured, tested, and packaged in California; and that
hundreds of key witnesses lived in California. Additionally, more than one million pertinent documents existed in California which might have to be translated. Both sides
claimed their choice of forum contained a greater amount of relevant evidence.
10. Shiley, Inc. v. Superior Court, 250 Cal. Rptr. 793, 794-95 (1988) (Stangvik, real
party in interest) (ordered not published under CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT 976
(1977)). See 2 B. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Jurisdiction § 306 (3d ed. 1985 &
Supp. 1992) (discussing Holmes and Corrigan).
11. "Corrigan and several of its antecedents represent an unwarranted digression
from sound principles of the law of forum non conveniens and [we] direct the trial
court to reconsider in light of the discussion following." Shiley, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
"We believe [Corrigan and Holmes] invite forum shopping, needlessly burden California taxpayers and litigants, and may encourage the flight of high technology manufacturers to friendlier jurisdictions." Id. at 796-97. Also, Corrigan and Holmes rely
upon a Judicial Council comment written before the seminal federal cases. Justices
Crosby, Sonenshine, and Seymour of the Fourth District Court of Appeal issued this
order. Though these citations refer to the depublished opinion of 1988, the still valid
precedent of the 1990 case repeats the same arguments. Stangvik v. Shiley, Inc., 230
Cal. App. 3d 1688, 1703-04, 273 Cal. Rptr. 179, 190 (1990). Thus, this appellate court
effectively circumvented the depublication order by simply drafting a subsequent, but
substantively identical, opinion.
12. Stangvik v. Shiley, 230 Cal. App. 3d 1688; 273 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1990) (original
opinion previously reported at 223 Cal. App. 3d 1176). See 12:7 CEB Civ. LITIG. RPTR.
312, Nov. 1990 (discussing this court of appeal decision). Note that Justices Crosby
and Sonenshine, both members of the panel which had decided to allow the trial
judge to reconsider the case two years earlier, concurred in the opinion written by
Acting Presiding Justice Moore.

mous supreme court upheld the decision of the court of appeal. 3
After a brief history and definition of the forum non conveniens doctrine in California, the court set forth a two-part test to determine
whether such a motion should be granted. First, a court must evaluate
the "suitability" of the alternative forum. While the Holmes case addressed this issue as a balancing of conveniences, Stangvik reduces this
element to a "threshold inquiry" of "whether an action may be commenced in the alternative jurisdiction and a valid judgment obtained
there against the defendant."' It seems this element has lost most of its
significance, especially where the defendant requesting the transfer expresses a willingness to submit to foreign jurisdiction as Shiley did in
this case. 6
Second, and most crucial, a court must balance private and public
interests' and conclude that these concerns justify use of the doctrine
under the given facts. The seminal federal authorities in this area are
Piper and Gulf Oil,"' upon which the court in Stangvik and the courts

13. Stangvik v. Shiley, Inc., 54 Cal. 3d at 751, 819 P.2d at 17, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
559.
14. The first California case to employ forum non conveniens was Price v.
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 42 Cal. 2d 577, 268 P.2d 457, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 839
(1954). On the doctrine of forum non conveniens, see generally 16 CAL. JUR. 3D
Courts § 67 (1983 & Supp. 1992); 2 B. WrrmaN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Jurisdiction,
§§ 303-308 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1991); Martin J. McMahon, Forum Non Conveniens
Doctrine in State Court as Affected

by Availability of Alternative Forum, 57

ALR.4th 973 (1987 & Supp. 1992).
The court defines forum non conveniens as "an equitable doctrine invoking the
discretionary power of a court to decline to exercise the jurisdiction it has over a
transitory cause of action when it believes that the action may be more appropriately
and justly tried elsewhere." Stangvik, 54 Cal. 3d at 751, 819 P.2d at 17, 1 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 559. As seen in the remainder of the opinion and result of Stangvik, the court
strongly relied upon the equitable and discretionary nature of the definition.
15. Stangvik, 54 Cal. 3d at 752 n.3, 819 P.2d at 18 n.3, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 560 n.3.
16. Among other conditions imposed by the trial court, Shiley consented to jurisdiction in Norway and Sweden, and agreed to comply with all discovery orders there
(including the costs of transporting witnesses and documents).
17. Private interests include the ability to obtain an enforceable judgment quickly
and economically, as well as the ability to conduct discovery. Stangvik, 54 Cal. 3d at
751, 819 P.2d at 17-18, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 560-61 (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,
454 U.S. 235, 259-61; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-09 (1947)). Public interests include alleviating crowded court dockets, utilizing jurors to address cases
concerning their community, and the stake that California has in the matter compared
with the alternative forum. See also B. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Jurisdiction,§
304 (3d ed. 1985).
See supra note 8 for the facts of the case. The supreme court held that the
public interest factors undoubtedly favored Shiley. Stangvik, 54 Cal. 3d at 763, 819
P.2d at 26, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 568.
18. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330

U.S. 501 (1947).
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below understandably relied. The key impetus to a forum non conveniens
motion is forum shopping, or seeking to transfer a case to a jurisdiction
with more favorable law." Because the California Supreme Court felt
Piper ambiguously addressed the precise role that foreign substantive
law should play,' the court could have included this as a factor to consider. Indeed, the "substantive law analysis" of Holmes declared that
"substantial weight should be given to the fact that law in the forum
state is more favorable to a plaintiff than in a foreign jurisdiction."2
However, the supreme court reasoned that "the fact that an alternative
jurisdiction's law is less favorable... should not be accorded any
weight... provided... some remedy is afforded."' While this decision
places California forum non conveniens law back into accord with the
federal approach, it nevertheless seems ironic that courts will not consider as a major factor this crucial underlying motivation for forum non
conveniens motions.' Moreover, given that nearly every "suitable"
forum presumably has some remedy, this rule practically eliminates any
consideration of substantive law.
. The court also discussed the significance of residence to forum non
conveniens. Traditionally, the plaintiffs choice of forum carried a strong
presumption of convenience. The Holmes court then held that this deference applied to foreign plaintiffs as well as resident plaintiffs.' However, Stangvik modified this rule so that it now applies only to residents of
the forum state.' In reaching this conclusion, the court gave great sig-

19. The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs probably selected California to "enhance the possibility of substantial recovery." Stangvik, 54 Cal. 301 at 761, 819 P.2d
at 26, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 567. Neither Sweden nor Norway award punitive damages. Similarly, it seems likely that Shiley filed its forum non conveniens motion to avoid proplaintiff California substantive tort law and generous California juries. Id. See Philip
Carrizosa, Justices to Hear Forum Debate; Orange County Heart Valve Maker Wants
Trial Moved to Scandinavia, LA. DAILY J., Oct. 9, 1991, at 3.
20. The court observed that Piper did not clearly indicate whether the law of the
alternative forum should be given some weight or no weight. Stangvik, 54 Cal. 3d at
753-54 n.5, 819 P.2d at 19 n.5, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 561 n.5. "The possibility of a-change
in substantive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial
weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry." Piper, 454 U.S. at 247.
21. Stangvik, 54 Cal. 3d at 764, 819 P.2d at 26, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 568.
22. Id. at 754 n.5, 819 P.2d at 19 n.5, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 561 n.5 (citing Lockman
Found. v. Evangelical Alliance Mission, 930 F.2d 764, 768-69 (9th Cir. 1991)).
23. See Litman, supra note 5.
24. Holmes, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 391, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 785.
25. Stangvik, 54 Cal. 3d at 754-55, 819 P.2d at 20, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 562. Another
traditional presumption of forum non conveniens asserts the convenience of the state

nificance to the fact that this case and many others like it would further
congest the crowded dockets of California's courts.' Certainly this fact
alone does not warrant a change of forum, but in light of the numerous
heart valve suits brought by California residents, the court deemed these
sufficient to castigate Shiley and deter future wrongful conduct."
Finally, while the supreme court acknowledged that the defendant as
movant bears the burden of proof in a forum non conveniens motion,
especially in light of the presumption of convenience for a defendant's
state of incorporation, it also observed that a ruling on the motion rests
within the trial court's discretion. Upon review, this decision deserves
"substantial deference" to preserve the flexibility of the doctrine.'
Stangvik disapproved of Corrigan and Holmes, and made clear that
the principal underlying goal of the forum non conveniens doctrine is to
assure trial in the most convenient forum without regard to substantive
law.' However, as Stangvik illustrates, the doctrine serves as an indispensable tool in the battle to win a forum with the most advantageous
law. Under the precedent of Stangvik,' California corporations have a
potent weapon with which to fend off forum-shopping foreigners, and
indeed, to "reverse forum shop" themselves.
BENJAMIN GROSS SHATZ

II.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A.

A statutory voting plan that conditions the right to vote on
commercial land ownership and allots votes and levies assessments on unequal bases upholds the constitutionalassurances of equal protection where the voting plan is reasonably related to the purpose of the statute: Southern California Rapid Transit District v. Bolen.

of incorporation or the principal place of business of a corporate defendant. The
court of appeal maintained that a 1986 amendment to section 410.30 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure nullified this rule, but the supreme court disagreed with this
interpretation and reaffirmed the validity of the presumption. Id. at 755-56, 819 P.2d

at 21, 1 CaL.Rptr. 2d at 583.
26. 1d. at 758, 819 P.2d at 22-23, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 564-65.

27. Id.
28. Id. at 751, 819 P.2d at 18, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 560.

29. Id. at 763-64, 819 P.2d at 26-27, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 568-69.
30. Shiley's victory in Stangvik has carried over to other successful transfer motions. See Pfizer Releases Statement on California Court of Appeal Decision, PR
Newswire (Fin. News), Mar. 10, 1992 (noting Alsup v. Shiley and Moore v. Shiley).
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In Southern California Rapid Transit District v. Bolen,' the California Supreme Court considered whether the equal protection assurances
of the state and federal Constitutions were preserved by a statute that
made commercial land ownership a prerequisite to voting at a referendum regarding proposed "special benefit assessment districts"' created
by the Southern California Rapid Transit District (SCRTD).' In addition,
the court considered whether allotting votes based on assessed value and

levying benefit assessments based on land size contravened the equal
protection assurances.' In a five-to-two decision, the court held that the

voting plan complied with the constitutional guarantees of equal protection under the narrow facts presented in this case.'

1. 1 Cal. 4th 654, 822 P.2d 875, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843 (1992), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 3031 (1992). Justice Arabian wrote the majority opinion, with Chief Justice Lucas
and Justices PaneUi, Baxter, and George concurring. Justice Kennard wrote a separate
dissenting opinion with Justice Mosk concurring.
2. See 8 B. WrrIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, ConstitutionalLaw §§ 591, 593
(9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1992) (United States Constitution's equal protection provision);
8 B. WrrIaN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 603 (9th ed. 1988 &
Supp. 1992) (California Constitution's equal protection provision); see also 51 CAL.
"JuR. 3D Public Improvements § 10 (1979) (constitutional requirements of special assessments); 18A MCKINNEY, CALIFORNIA DIGEST OF OFFICIAL REPORTS, Property Taxes
§§ 3, 36 (3d & 4th ed. 1992) (relevant authority defining special assessments and
applying constitutional requirements of special assessments).
3. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., I Cal. 4th at 660, 822 P. 2d at 877, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 845; see CAL PUB. UTIL CODE §§ 33000-33020 (West Supp. 1992); see also
51 CAL. JUR. 3D Public Improvements §§ 47-51 (1979 & Supp. 1992) (background and
source material on improvement and assessment districts); 19 MCKINNEY, CALIFORNIA DIGEST OF OFFIcIAL REPORTS, Public Improvements §§ 1-9 (3d & 4th ed. 1992) (digesting
relevant authority on improvement and assessment districts).
4. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., I Cal. 4th at 659-60, 822 P. 2d at 877, 3
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 845-46. For a general discussion of transit districts and pertinent
background information on the SCRTD, see 52 CAL. JUR. 3D Public Transit §§ 11-19
(1979 & Supp. 1992) and 19 MCKINNEY, CALIFORNIA DIGEST OF OFFICIAL REPORTS, Public Transit § 2 (3d & 4th ed. 1992).
5. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 1 Cal. 4th at 677, 822 P. 2d at 888-89, 3
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 856-57.
6. Id. at 681, 822 P.2d at 891, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 860. See 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Constitutional Law §§ 225-26 (9th ed. 1988) (citing valid and
invalid provisions of special benefit district elections and referenda).

I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The controversy in Southern California Rapid Transit District v.
Bolen involved the SCRTD's statutorily authorized' creation of two benefit assessment districts encompassing planned rail stations along the
introductory segment of a proposed citywide mass transit system.' The
statute, which authorized the imposition of the benefit districts by the
SCRTD, mandated that a "referendum must be held if requested by the
owners of at least twenty-five percent of the assessed value of real property within a proposed assessment district."9 The statute limited voting
at the referendum to the landowners who would be subject to the proposed assessment.'0 Because residential property owners were exempt
from the assessment," residential landowners, as well as
non-landowning residents, in the proposed benefit districts were denied
the opportunity to vote at any referendum seeking approval of the benefit districts. 2
Furthermore, the statute instructed that the number of votes a com-

7. See CAL PUB. UTIL. CODE § 33000(b) (West Supp. 1992). That section provides
in relevant part. "The Board of Directors of the [SCRTD] shall be the conclusive
judge of the proportion of special and general benefits produced by the facilities and
of the distribution of the special benefits among parcels of property within the benefit assessment district." Id,
8. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 1 Cal. 4th at 660, 832 P.2d at 877, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 846. The citywide transit system is known as "Metro Rail." Id. The introductory segment is known as the "Red Line." Id. at 660 n.1, 822 P.2d at 877 n.1, 3
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 845 and n.1.
9. Id. at 660, 822 P.2d at 877, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 845 (citing CAL PUB. UTIL. CODE
§ 33002.2 (West Supp. 1992)).
10. Id. (citing CAL. PuB. UTIL. CODE § 33002.3(a) (West Supp. 1992)). Properties to
be assessed include "improvements used as offices, commercial, retail, hotels, motels
and free-standing commercial parking garages not used to meet zoning requirements."
RTD Board Approves Plan for Metro Rail Benefit Assessment Districts at Lower
Rate; Hollywood Unit Split Into Two Parts, PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 12, 1990.
11. When the proposed benefit district was submitted to the Los Angeles City
Council for approval pursuant to the statute, the city council amended SCRTD's original proposal and excluded residential property from assessment consistent with statutory authority. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 1 Cal. 4th at 662, 822 P.2d at
878-79, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 846-47; see CAL. PuB. UTIL. CODE § 33001.5(b)-(d) (West
Supp. 1992).
12. Southern CaL Rapid Transit Dist., 1 Cal. 4th at 660, 822 P.2d at 877, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 845; see CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 33002.3(a) (West Supp. 1992).
Non-commercial properties excluded from assessment include "residential properties,
including that portion of residential hotels, motels and other similar residential uses
with long term residents . . . [and] property that is publicly or non profit-owned and
publicly or nonprofit-used." RTD Board Approves Plan for Metro Rail Benefit Assessment Districts at Lower Rate; Hollywood Unit Split Into Two Parts, PR NEWSWIRE,
Mar. 12, 1990.
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mercial landowner would receive at the referendum was to be based on
the assessed value of the landowner's property.'3 However, if the proposed benefit districts were approved, any assessments actually levied
would be calculated not according to land value, but would be based on
the size of the land or whether the land was improved."
The SCRTD brought suit against its secretary, Helen Bolen, seeking to
judicially sanction its formation of two benefit districts prior to issuing
bonds that would be secured by proceeds from the assessments.'5 The
trial court held that the voting plan's requirement of commercial land
ownership did not violate equal protection guarantees." The appellate
court reversed, citing two constitutional shortcomings in the statute."
First, it proclaimed that the voting plan authorized by the statute infringed upon equal protection assurances by arbitrarily excluding
non-landowners from the franchise. 8 The appellate court reasoned that
the costs and benefits of the assessments-without which the institution
and upkeep of the mass transit system would not be possible-should be
placed equally upon all citizens within the benefit districts because they
all are affected by public transportation. The appellate court further
reasoned that because the "one-person, one-vote"' principle was triggered by the indiscriminate nature of the assessments, a compelling state
interest (of which the court found none) warranted the inclusion of
non-commercial landowners.' Second, the appellate court stated that
13. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 1 Cal. 4th at 660, 822 P.2d at 877, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at F45; see CAL. PUB, UTIL CODE § 33002.3(b) (West Supp. 1992).
14. Southern CaL. Rapid Transit Dist., 1 Cal. 4th at 660, 822 P.2d at 877, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 845; see CAL PUB. UTIL CODE § 33002(a) (West Supp. 1992).
15. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 1 Cal. 4th at 663, 822 P.2d at 879, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 847. A "few" commercial landowners and one commercial lessee were
granted permission to intervene in the action on Bolen's side. Id. The board of directors of the SCRTD filed this suit in part to test the legal validity of collecting taxes
from the assessment districts to secure a bond issue to finance the construction of
Metro Rail. California: Rail Line On Track Due to Court Ruling, PUB. FIN.-WASH.
WATCH, Feb. 10, 1992, at 2.
16. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 1 Cal. 4th at 663, 822 P.2d at 879, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 847.
17. Id. at 663-64, 822 P.2d at 879-80, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 847-48. In addition to its
conclusion that the statute was constitutionally flawed, the appellate court further
concluded that the statute authorizing the SCRTD to create the districts did not authorize the SCRTD to except residential property from assessment. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. The principle of "one-person, one-vote" was espoused by the United States
Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that an equal voice
in government is a fundamental right).
20. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 1 Cal. 4th at 663-64, 822 P.2d at 879-80,-3

the statute's disproportionate scheme of assigning votes according to
assessment value while levying assessments according to size was fundamentally unfair and thus undermined the equal protection assurances."
The appellate court insisted that in order to satisfy equal protection, the
number of votes allotted to a landowner would need to be functionally
tied to the assessment that would be imposed upon him.' The court of
appeals concluded that the statute was unconstitutional' and SCRTD
appealed to the California Supreme Court.'
III.
A.

TREATMENT OF THE CASE

The Majority Opinion

In determining whether equal protection assurances are undermined by
a voting plan conditioned on land ownership, the court must first determine whether to apply the "one person, one vote" principle strictly or to
apply a more moderate equal protection examination.' If the standard
of "one-person, one-vote" applies to the assessment district referendum,
the state needs to show a "compelling justification" for excluding a class
of voters.'6 However, if an exception exists and the standard of
"one-person, one-vote" does not apply, then one class of voters may be
afforded greater influence in the election than other classes as long as
the classification is not "wholly irrelevant" and is "reasonably related" to
the purpose of the statute.2" The moderate level of protection applies

Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84748.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. For a treatment of the appellate court decision, see 52 CAL. JUR. 3D Public
Transit § 16 (Supp. 1992).
24. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 1 Cal. 4th at 664, 822 P.2d at 879-80, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 857-48.
25. Id. at 664-65, 822 P.2d at 880, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 848; see 8 B. WrrIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 602 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1992) (explaining the "two-tier test of classification"); see also 4 MCKINNEY, CALIFORNIA DIGEST
OF OFFIcIAL REPORTS, ConstitutionalLaw § 75 (3d ed. 1988) (digesting case authority
that demonstrates application of both levels of the "two-tier test of classification" in
equal protection inquiry).
26. Southern Cal Rapid Transit Dist., 1 Cal. 4th at 665, 822 P.2d at 880, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 848; see supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text..
27. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 1 Cal. 4th at 665, 822 P.2d at 880, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 848. This "narrow exception" was first formulated in Avery v. Midland
City, 390 U.S. 474, 483-84 (1968) (providing an exception to the Reynolds standard of
.one-person, one-vote" where "a special purpose unit of government [is] assigned the
performance of functions affecting definable groups of constituents more than other[s]."); see also Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 728-30 (1973)
(holding property-based voting plan not subject to the Reynolds standard of
"one-person, one-vote" when "special purpose unit of government" is involved and its
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when two requirements are satisfied.2 First, the public entity must be
created in order to carry out limited governmental tasks.' Second, the
limited tasks that the public entity performs must affect voters' interests
disproportionately.'
First, the court considered the breadth of governmental authority vested in the benefit districts. " The court held that the benefit districts possessed very little governmental authority and certainly not enough power
to implicate the standard of "one-person, one-vote. " 1 It reasoned that
the benefit districts' purpose was limited to defining the areas where
land values were increased due to the proximity of the rail stations.'
The court noted that the inherent limitations of the benefit districts were
evidenced by the voting plan itself because only commercial landowners
would be assessed and because they are the ones who would also reap
the largest gains from the rail stations. ' In light of the nexus between
the voters who would reap the benefits and those who would be charged
with the assessments, the court was satisfied that the benefit districts
lacked the necessary authority to mandate the "one-person, one-vote"
standard.' Thus the court deduced that the narrow circumstances of
this case warranted the "reasonable relation" level of equal protection

decisions "primarily affect[] or interest[]" one class of voters more than others).
28. Southern CaL. Rapid Transit Dist., 1 Cal. 4th at 665, 822 P.2d at 881, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 849.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 666, 822 P.2d at 881, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 849.
31. Id. at 665, 822 P.2d at 881, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 849. The court emphasized that
the public entity at issue was the benefit assessment -district and not the SCRTD
itself. Id. at 670, 822 P.2d at 884, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 852.
32. Id. at 669, 822 P.2d at 883, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 852.
33. Id. The purpose of the special benefit assessment is to compensate for the
eventuating "windfall" that otherwise would be bestowed without cost upon commercial landowners in the districts where the subway stations would be located. The
windfall is due to the influx of business activity that would result from the creation
of the mass transit system compared with the system's huge start-up cost. The money
received from the assessments levied on surrounding commercial landowners would
be used to meet the principal and interest payments on bonds that the SCRTD issued
to pay for constructing the mass transit system. Id. at 661, 822 P.2d at 878, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 846. See also David J. Hayes, Rapid Transit Financing: Use of the Special Assessment 29 STAN. L. REV. 795 (1977) (discussing in depth the use of special
assessment to finance rapid transit systems in California and other states).
34. Southern CaL Rapid Transit Dist. at 670, 822 P.2d at 884, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at

852.
35. Id.

scrutiny.8
The second requirement of the moderate level of equal protection
scrutiny is met when the limited tasks that the public entity performs
affect class interests disproportionately.37 In determining whether the
voting or non-voting constituents were disparately affected to a sufficient
degree by the outcome of the referendum, the court considered the relationship between the voting and non-voting classes.'
The court evaluated on the one hand whether the commercial landowners were affected more by the outcome of the referendum than those
excluded by the voting plan, and on the other hand whether those excluded by the voting plan were considerably less interested in the outcome of the referendum.' The court decided that the benefit districts
would impact the commercial landowner class more than the excluded
class, and moreover, that the excluded class was less interested in the
outcome of the referendum.' The court reasoned that while the commercial landowners would benefit in the form of increased land values
and commercial activity,"' the beneficial impacts of the assessment district on the excluded class were no different than the benefits to people
served by the mass-transit system citywide. Furthermore, affirmation of
the benefit districts in the referendum would have a direct impact on the
included class while having only an indirect or remote impact on the
non-voting class.' If the benefit assessment district were approved, the
assessments would only be levied on the commercial landowners.' An
affirmative vote by the excluded class would therefore carry no risk of
assessment to that class, thereby rendering them substantially less interested in the outcome." The court concluded that the classes were
dissimilarly affected to a sufficiently substantial degree by the outcome
of the referendum, thus the second requirement of the exception to the

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id at 671, 822 P.2d at 884-85, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 852-53.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 673-74, 822 P.2d at 886-87, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 854-55.
41. Id. at 674, 822 P.2d at 887, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 855. At this point the court acknowledged that commercial lessees would be affected by the assessments more than
other non-landowning residents outside the districts because many of the leases in
the districts contained "pass through" agreements which would hold the commercial
landowner harmless in the event of any assessment placed on the land. However, the
court disposed of this issue by determining that the commercial lessees were not
affected to a "sufficiently substantial" degree to invoke the principle of "one-person,
one-vote." Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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principle of "one-person, one-vote" was satisfied." Since both requirements for the more moderate level of equal protection inquiry were
met, the court concluded that the SCRTD did not need to show a "com4
pelling justification" for the classification and exclusion of voters.
After the court determined the level of judicial inquiry to be the
"wholly irrelevant" or "reasonably related" standard, the court applied
this standard to the facts of the case.4 ' The court noted that its task was
not to determine whether it would have excluded the same voters under
the voting plan.' Instead, the court was to determine whether any logical support existed for the statutory plan's classification and exclusion of
voters, or conversely, whether the plan was wholly irrelevant to the legislative purpose. ' The court found that the plan was reasonably related
and not wholly irrelevant to the purpose of the statute.w The court reasoned that the Legislature could have reasonably determined that allowing one class of voters to endorse an assessment placing all of the financial burden of that endorsement on another class would be unfair.5
Likewise, the court reasoned, with regard to commercial lessees, the Legislature coudd have reasonably permitted their exclusion in light of the
administrative difficulties that would have arisen if they were included.'
The court concluded that the exclusion of non-commercial landowners
did not violate the equal protection requirement because the principle of
"one-person, one-vote" did not apply, and the classification and exclusion
of voters was reasonably related to the purpose of the statute."
The court then considered the second constitutional issue raised by
the appellate court: whether equal protection was undermined by the
statute's disproportionate scheme of assigning votes based on the taxassessed value of land while actually assessing landowners based on the
size and condition of the land.' The court held that while a more equi-

45. Id at 675, 822 P.2d at 887, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 855.
46. Id. at 675, 822 P.2d at 887-88, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 855-56.
47. Id. at 675, 822 P.2d at 888, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 856.
48. Id. at 675-76, 822 P.2d at 888, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 856.
49. 1d
50. Id. at 677, 822 P.2d at 888, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 856.
51. Id. at 676, 822 P.2d at 888, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 856.
52. Some difficulties that the court listed include "identifying those commercial
leases with 'pass through' provisions and those without, the percentage of the assessment passed to particular tenants, whether partial 'pass throughs' are permitted, the
duration of the commercial leases, and other electoral minutiae which have not occurred to us." Id.
53. Id, at 675-77, 822 P.2d at 887-88, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 855-56.
54. This was an ancillary claim brought by the interveners. Id. at 677, 822 P.2d at

table method of assigning votes and levying assessments may have been
possible, the plan chosen by the Legislature did not infringe on equal
protection assurances.' The court reasoned that the small size of the
benefit districts made it reasonable for the Legislature to assume that the
tax assessed value of the land would be fairly proportional to the land's
size.' The court considered whether the different bases of vote and
assessment calculation chosen by the Legislature were reasonably related
to the voting plan." The court maintained that the two different bases
of calculation were reasonably related to the purpose of the statute,
because the allocation of votes based on tax assessment value was more
convenient, inexpensive and verifiable than an allocation based on size
and condition.' The court reasoned that the approved voting scheme
would allow benefit districts to be approved at referendum before undertaking the inconvenience, expense and difficulty of verifying calculations
based on square footage necessary for assessment purposes.' Therefore, the court concluded that the two different bases used for allotting
votes and charging assessments were neither unreasonably disproportionate to one another nor "wholly irrelevant" to the purpose of the statute
and thus satisfied the court's more moderate level of equal protection
inquiry.'

888-89, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 856-57.
55. Id. at 677-78, 822 P.2d at 889-90, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857.
56. Id.; see also CAL PUB. UTIL. CODE § 33001(b) (West Supp. 1992) (defining the
outer limits of any benefit district as not more than one mile from the centerpoint of
an actual or proposed rail transit station within the central business district of the
City of Los Angeles and not more than one-half mile from the center point of a rail
station located anywhere else).
57. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 1 Cal. 4th at 678, 822 P.2d at 889, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 857-58.
58. Id at 679, 822 P.2d at 890, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 858.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 678-79, 822 P.2d at 889-90, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 857-88; see supra note 18. The
court also considered the appellate court's holding that the SCRTD lacked statutory
authority to exempt residential landowners from assessment. The court based its
conclusion on express statutory language supporting the residential landowner exemption. Section 33001.5(b) authorizes the Los Angeles city council to review the SCRTD
plan with the ability to amend and approve it. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 33001.5(b)
(West Supp. 1992). Section 33001.5(c) requires the SCRTD to approve or disapprove
the plan with the city council revisions. CAL PUB. UTIL. CODE § 33001.5(c) (West
Supp. 1992). In this case, the city council insisted on the exemption of residential
landowners and resubmitted the plan as amended to the SCRTD. Therefore, the court
held that the exemption of residential landowners was expressly authorized by the
legislature in the statute. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 1 Cal. 4th at 680-81, 822
P.2d at 891, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859.
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B.

The Dissenting Opinion

Justice Kennard maintained that the voting plan violated the equal
protection assurances of the United States Constitution." Justice
Kennard focused on the SCRTD and its purposes in contrast to the
majority's focus on the benefit districts and their limited purposes.' He
found that although assessments would be imposed only on commercial
landowners, this alone does not justify excluding all other potential voters.' All residents in the benefit districts would be affected by the rail
stations.' Increased commercial activities would have an impact, be it
positive or negative, on residential land values.' Whereas the increased
commercial activity could raise the value of residential property, land
values in an exclusively residential neighborhood might suffer.' Furthermore, Justice Kennard believed that the assessments would be redistributed throughout the benefit district because commercial landowners
would increase rents to commercial lessees, who in turn would charge
higher prices for goods, thereby impacting both commercial lessees and
all residents who shop in their stores, both of whom were excluded by
the voting plan.'7 Justice Kennard thus concluded that the SCRTD benefit district referendum was an election of general interest.' As an election of general interest, the principle of "one-person, one-vote" presumptively applied, and the SCRTD would need to show a compelling state
interest for an exception.' Because Justice Kennard concluded the voting plan was constitutionally invalid on its face, the other challenges
lacked merit.'

61. Id. at 681, 822 P.2d at 892, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 860 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
62. Id, at 685, 822 P.2d at 894, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 862 (Kennard, J., dissenting); see

supra note 32 (the majority noted that had the SCRTD been its focus, the plan
would have failed the court's equal protection inquiry).
63. Soutkrn Calif. Rapid Transit Dist. at 686, 822 P.2d at 894-95, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 863 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 687, 822 P.2d at 895, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 863 (Kennard, J.,dissenting).
65. Id. at 687 n.1, 822 P.2d at 896 n.1, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 864 n.1 (Kennard, J.,dis-

senting).

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 687, 822 P.2d at 896, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 864 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
Id. at 687-88, 822 P.2d at 896, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 864 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 688, 822 P.2d at 896, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 864 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
Id. (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).

III.

CONCLUSION

In Southern CaliforniaRapid Transit Districtv. Bolen, the California
Supreme Court considered whether the equal protection assurances of
the state and federal Constitutions were respected by a statutory plan
conditioning the right to vote on commercial land ownership. The court
also considered the equal protection implications of the two different
bases of vote and assessment calculations. The court, by focusing on the
benefit district itself, concluded that the limited circumstances of this
case preserved the equal protection assurances. Furthermore, the court
concluded that the Legislature's different methods for allocating votes
and levying assessments offended neither the state nor federal
Constitutions' equal protection sensibilities. In her dissenting opinion,
Justice Kennard maintained that the majority's focus on the benefit district was misplaced and instead focused on the Southern California Rapid Transit District, finding that the voting plan did violence to the equal
protection guarantees.
The majority's focus on the benefit district itself rather than the
SCRTD as a governing body permitted the court to declare that equal
protection assurances had been satisfied by the plan, thus upholding the
constitutionality of the special benefit assessment districts. This decision
represents the California Supreme Court's determination to allow legislative bodies and local governments to use innovative methods to raise
funds for development of public transit systems. Other transit districts
may now seek private means of alternative financing for large projects
that may otherwise have appeared unfeasible because of the districts'
lack of available public funds. In return, commercial landowners in the
areas benefited by the transit system will profit from greater accessibility
and increased foot traffic. In terms of public policy, the majority's opinion seems appropriate and justified regarding emerging technologies in
rail transit and the public's increasing need for these developments in
everyday life.
MICHAEL EMMET MURPHY

B.

Statutes conditioning distribution of state benefits on California residency at a fixed point in the past violatedfederal
constitutionalright to equal protection; limiting benefits to
veterans who were Californiaresidents at the time they entered active military service was not rationally related to
legitimate state interest: Del Monte v. Wilson.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In Del Monte v. Wilson,' the California Supreme Court considered
whether statutes requiring California residency at a fixed point in the
past for distribution of state veterans' benefits violated the federal constitutional right to equal protection.! The court concluded that the laws
violated the Equal Protection Clause when viewed in the light of the
United States Supreme Court holdings.3
This action was brought by veterans of World War II, the Korean War,
and the Vietnam War and their dependents.4 All of the veterans enlisted
in military service while residents of other states and later moved to
California. The state denied the plaintiffs benefits because they did not
fall within the definition of "veteran" under California Military and Veterans Code section 980.' The code cites the date of enlistment into military

1. 1 Cal. 4th 1009, 824 P.2d 632, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 826 (1992). Justice Mosk was
joined in the unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Lucas, and Justices Panelli,
Kennard, Arabian, Baxter, and George. This case was previously entitled Del Monte v.
Deukmjian.
2. The statutes in question, from the California Military and Veterans Code, provided benefits for tuition and living expenses of students, farm and home loan assistance, and disaster indemnity. CAL MIL & VET. CODE §§ 980-980.5, 981-981.7, 985989.5, 987.50, 989.4 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992). Del Monte, 1 Cal. 4th at 1011, 824
P.2d at 632-33, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 826.
3. The language of the opinion indicates the court felt "constrained by recent
decisions of the United States Supreme Court. . . ." Del Monte, I Cal. 4th at 1011,
824 P.2d at 632, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 826. However, the court declined to grant the
defendant's rather extreme request to waive the "policy of stare decisis." Id. at 1023,
824 P.2d at 641, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 835.
4. The plaintiffs were Charles Del Monte, a veteran of the Korean War, and his
sons Nicholas and Andrew who applied for educational assistance; Michael Gureckas,
a veteran of the Vietnam War, denied home purchase assistance; Clyde McCown, a
World War 11 veteran, who was a resident of California since 1946; Karl Seuthe, a
Korean War veteran, who moved to California in 1952; and John Rigney, a World
War H veteran, who moved to California in 1950. Del Monte v. Deukmejian, 1 Cal.
App. 4th 1213, 1217-18, 281 Cal. Rptr. 380, 382-83 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
5. Del Monte entered the service from New York. Gureckas entered the service
from Connecticut. McCown entered the service from Louisiana. Seuthe entered the
service from New York. Rigney entered the service from Georgia. Id.
6. Defining eligibility for benefits under the chapter as a whole, section 980 provides in pertinent part:
(a) As used in this chapter, 'veteran' means any of the following:
(1) Any citizen of the United States who served in the active military,
naval, or air service of the United States on or after April 6, 1917, and

service as the fixed point in time for determining whether a person is
eligible for state provided veterans' benefits.
The trial court found that the plaintiffs had standing, but that the code
sections in dispute were constitutional.8 The court of appeal reversed the
trial court's decision because it concluded that precedents of the United
States Supreme Court have established that conditioning state benefits
on state residency at a fixed time violates the Equal Protection Clause.'
The supreme court affirmed."0
I. TREATMENT
The sole issue before the supreme court was whether the statutes in
question violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution." Applying traditional notions of constitutionality, the court found that the

prior to November 12, 1918; received an honorable discharge or was
released from active duty under honorable conditions; was, at the time
of entry into active duty, a native of or a bona fide resident of the
state or, if a minor at that time, entered active duty while in this
state; and had lived in this state for six months immediately preceding
entry into active duty.
(2) Any person who served in the active military, naval, or air service
of the United States for a period of not less than 90 consecutive days
or was discharged from the service due to a service-connected disability within that 90-day period; received an honorable discharge or was
released from active duty under honorable conditions; was at the time
of entry into active duty a native of or bona fide resident of this
state or, if a minor at that time, entered active duty while in this state
and had lived in this state for six months immediately preceding entry
into active duty; . ..
(3) Any member of the reserves or National Guard who is called to,
and released from, active duty, regardless of the number of days
served; called during any period when a presidential executive order
specifies the United States is engaged in combat; received an honorable discharge or was released from active duty under honorable conditions; was at the time of entry into active duty a native of, or bona
fide resident of this state or, if a minor at that time, entered active
duty while in this state and had lived in this state for six months
immediately preceding entry into active duty.
CAL. MIL & VET. CODE § 980 (West Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
7. Id.
8. The trial court also held that the statutes did not violate the constitutional
right to travel or the single-subject rule of the California Constitution. Due to these
findings the trial court did not rule on plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Del
Monte v. Deulanejian, 1 Cal. App. 4th at 1219, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
9. Id. at 1229-30, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
10. Del Monte v. Wilson, 1 Cal. 4th 1009, 1026, 824 P.2d 632, 643, 4 Cal. Rpt. 2d
826, 836-37 (1992).
11. Id. at 1014, 824 P.2d at 634, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 828.
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plaintiffs' claims involved no impairment of a fundamental right nor involved any inherently suspect classification. 2 The court acknowledged
that in such cases the "legislation is presumed to be valid and will be
sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to
a legitimate state interest." 3 Although this is normally a fairly easy standard for a legislative enactment to pass, 4 there have been several recent
United States Supreme Court cases which have struck down statutes that
distinguish between short-term and long-term state residents. The court
relied upon four Supreme Court cases, each of which found that statutes
which discriminated on the basis of residency were unconstitutional
because its very purpose of favoring established residents was not
viewed as a legitimate state interest."
The first case analyzed by the court was Zobel v. Williams.6 Zobel
involved Alaska residents who challenged a state dividend distribution
plan that distributed income from natural resources based on length of
residency. 7 The state argued that the statute served the legitimate objective of attracting potential new residents to Alaska.'8 The Supreme
Court found that such a purpose was not served by the statute since it
gave greater benefits to those people who had migrated into the state
twenty-one years before the statute .was even enacted. 9 The other significant argument advanced by the State of Alaska was that it awarded
residents for past contributions.' The Burger Court rejected this argu-

12. Id. Later in the opinion, the court addressed the issue of the right to travel, a
fundamental right, but did not base its decision on that ground. Id. at 1018, 824 P.2d
at 637, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 831.
13. Id. (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)).
14. See 13 CAL. Jue. 3D Constitutional Law § 45 (1981) (in general, laws are presumed to be constitutional).
15. Del Monte, I Cal. 4th at 1014-15, 824 P.2d at 635, 4 Cal. Rptr 2d at 829.
16. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
17. The dividend program was enacted in 1980 and distributed earnings to all residents over 18 years old. The distribution was based on a one share interest for each
year of residency after 1959, when the state was incorporated into the union. Id. at
57.
18. Id. at 61.
19. 'Even if we assume that the state interest is served by increasing the dividend
for each year of residency beginning with the date of enactment, is it rationally
served by granting greater dividends in varying amounts to those who resided in
Alaska during the 21 years prior to enactment? We think not." Id. at 63.
20. Alaska also argued that the law ensured prudent management of the distribution funds and prevented newcomers from plundering the state's natural resources.
The Court rejected this argument as well. Id. at 61.

ment as not being a legitimate state interest.2 Upon these determinations, the Court found that the dividend plan violated the Equal Protection Clause by granting different benefits based on the term of residen2
cy.
Next, the California Supreme Court turned to Hooper v. Bernalillo
County Assessor.' In Hooper, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a New Mexico statute that granted a tax exemption to Vietnam
veterans who resided in the state before a specified. date.' New Mexico
put forth two justifications for the statute. The first was that the statute
encouraged veterans to settle in the state.' The Court countered that
the statutory scheme was more likely to discourage veterans from settling in New Mexico because they would not be eligible for the benefits.' The second rationale was that it served "as an expression of the
State's appreciation to its 'own citizens for honorable military service.'"2
Burger's opinion did acknowledge the state's desire to assist veterans as
a legitimate state interest and accepted the idea that awarding veterans
certian benefits was consistent with this interest.' The problem with
the statute resulted from the state's desire to give special treatment to
"its own" established veterans, a goal which the Court did not consider

21.
If the states can make the amount of a cash dividend depend on length of
residence, what would preclude varying university tuition on a sliding scale
based on years of residence-or even limiting access to finite public facilities,
eligibility for student loans, for civil service jobs, or for government contracts
by length of domicile? Could states impose different taxes based on length of
residence? Alaska's reasoning could open the door to state apportionment of
other rights, benefits, and services according to length of residency. It would
permit the states to divide citizens into expanding numbers of permanent
classes. Such a result would be clearly impermissible.
Id. at 64 (footnotes omitted).
22. Id. at 65. For an excellent discussion on the Burger Court's treatment of residency cases, see Katheryn D. Katz, More Equal Than Others: The Burger Court and
The Newly Arrived State Resident, 19 N.M. L. REV. 329 (1989).
23. 472 U.S. 612 (1985).
24. Id. at 614-15 n.2.
25. Id. at 618.
26. Id. at 619-20.
27. Id. at 618-19 (quoting Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 679 P.2d 840, 844
(N.M. Ct. App. 1984)).
28. Id. at 620.
IT]he State may award certain benefits to all its bona fide veterans, because
it then is making neither an invidious nor irrational distinction among its
residents. Resident veterans, as a group, may well deserve preferential treatment, and such differential treatment vis-&-vis non-veterans does not offend
the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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to be a legitimate state interest.' Thus, the New Mexico statute did not
protect a legitimate state interest and was therefore in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause?'
The third case the court examined was Williams v. Vermont.3 Vermont law required car buyers who bought and registered vehicles outside
of the state before becoming Vermont residents, to pay the full tax in
order to register their car in Vermont.' The stated purpose of the use
tax was to "improve and maintain the state and interstate highway systems ... ." The Court first stated that a great deal of deference should
be given'to state taxation schemes.' However, the Court went on to
find that the statute furthered no legitimate purpose since the distinction
bears no rational relation to the purpose of raising revenue nor does it
encourage business with local merchants.' Thus, Vermont followed
Alaska and New Mexico in passing a law that violated the Equal Protection Clause.'

The final and most recent case analyzed by the Del Monte court was
Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez.37 In Soto-Lopez, New York
established a system granting preference points to civil service employment examination scores to veterans who entered active military service
while residents of the state, served during wartime, and received an honorable discharge.' New York presented four potentially legitimate state
purposes for the statute.' The analysis by the court in Del Monte of the
constitutionality of these interests was complicated by the fact that a
higher standard of review was necessary since the plurality found that
the statute violated the right to travel as well as the right of equal protec-

29. The Court noted that "[sitripped of its asserted justifications, the New Mexico
statute suffers from the same constitutional flaw as the Alaska statute in Zobel." Id.
at 622.
30. Id. at 624.
31. 472 U.S. 14 (1985).
32. Id. at 15. Vermont would give credit towards use tax charged at the time of
registration for sales tax paid on a car purchased in another state "if that state
would afford credit for taxes paid to Vermont in similar circumstances," and if the
owner was a resident of Vermont at the time the car was purchased. Id.
33. Id. at 18 (quoting VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 8901 (1981)).
34. 1& at 22 (citing Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359
(1973)).
35. Id. at 24-25.
36. Id. at 28.

37. 476 U.S. 898 (1986).
38. Id. at 900.
39. Id. at 909.

tion.' Burger and White concurred only on the basis of the equal protection issue."' Since the court in Del Monte focused on the Equal Protection Clause, they looked to the Supreme Court's treatment of this
area.
In Soto-Lopez, the Court rejected New York's argument that the statute
served the purpose of encouraging residents to enlist in the armed services because the statute applied to both inductees and enlistees.' New
York also attempted to justify the statute as a means of compensating
residents for service in time of war by helping them reestablish themselves at home.' The Court was not persuaded that the statute was intended to serve this purpose because the eligibility for bonus points was
not limited to the period immediately following a veteran's return." The
state further argued that the law served the purpose of inducing veterans
to return to New York after service, and of enabling the state to employ
a "uniquely valuable class of public servants."'" The Court conceded that
rewarding veterans was a legitimate state 'interest; however, the Court
felt that even if the state interest were compelling, no valid reason existed for distinguishing between long-term resident veterans and recent migrants to the state." Thus, a divided court found that New York's statute
violated the Equal Protection Clause. 7
After this detailed analysis of Soto-Lopez, the California Supreme Court
in Del Monte turned to a determination of whether the residency classification in the California statutes was rationally related to a legitimate
state purpose.' The first argument set forth by the respondents was
that the state may chose to "take care of its own."" The court concluded that this is not a legitimate state purpose because "once a citizen
becomes a bona fide resident of this state, he or she becomes the state's
'own' to the same extent as a longer-term resident. "' Next, the respondent also asserted that the law was justified because it compensates

40. Del Monte v. Wilson, 1 Cal. 4th 1009, 1017-18, 824 P.2d 632, 637, 4 Cal. Rptr.
2d 826, 831 (1992).
41. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 912 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 916 (White, J.,

concurring).
42. Id. at 910. Note, that the same criticism could be made of the California statutes in question. See supra note 6.
43. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 909.
44. Id. at 910.
45. Id. at 909.
46. Id. at 910-11.
47. Id. at 911-12.
48. Del Monte v. Wilson, 1 Cal. 4th 1009, 1020, 824 P.2d 632, 638, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d
826, 832 (1992).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1020, 824 P.2d at 639, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 833 (citing Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S.
at 911; and Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 623 (1985)).
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those who were residents when they entered into military service.' The
court adopted the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in
Hooper, which was that no rational basis existed for finding that residents of other states at the time of entry into service suffered more than
those who resided in the state at the time of entry. The Court futher
determined that the benefits provided by the law did not bear directly
upon the problem of transition to civilian life.' The defendant requested
that the court give the state wide deference because the laws constituted
economic legislation.' The court agreed that deference in matters of
economic legislation was normally the case, but concluded that in residency cases the high court instead focuses upon the central objective of
the statutes, which is to give illegitimate preference to long-term residents." Finding that the same concerns were present in the instant case,
the California court likewise rejected the defendant's argument in favor
of deference for economic legislation.' California attempted to distinguish its laws from those in Zobel and Hooper on the basis of provisions
that extend benefits to current and future residents who join the military,
rather than limiting benefits to previous residents who provided past
contributions.' Therefore, California argued that a veteran who entered
service in another state could always reenter active service upon relocation to California, in order to avail himself of the veterans' benefits."
The court took a practical approach and pointed out that it would be
absurd to suggest that a veteran of World War I or World War II would
find it feasible to reenter the service in order to collect the benefits offered under the law.'
51. The defendant's claim was that
the scheme compensates those whose careers and lives are disrupted "while
they are working and living in the state, and who choose to return to their
home state after their military service where they must begin the difficult
task of resuming those interrupted careers and lives, ill-prepared and to begin
anew in a society and economy which may have changed dramatically during
their absence and which may have left them far behind."
Id. at 1020, 824 P.2d at 639, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 833.
52. Id. at 1020-21, 824 P.2d at 639, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 833 (citing Hooper, 472 U.S. at
621-22).
53. Id. at 1022, 824 P.2d at 640, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 834.
54. Id. See Bryan H. Wildenthal, Note, State Parochialism, the Right to Travel, and
the PriviJeges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1557 (1989) (arguing for standardized treatment of cases based upon uniform standards of review).
55. Del Monte, 1 Cal. 4th at 1022, 824 P.2d at 640, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 834.
56. Id. at 1022-23, 824 P.2d at 640, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 834.
57. Id. at 1023, 824 P.2d at 640, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 834.
58. As the court pointed out, this is particularly true when two of the plaintiffs

Since the California statutes were so closely analogous'to those reviewed by the United States Supreme Court in Hooper and Soto-Lopez,
and because in those cases the Court rejected the rationale set forth by
the states, the California Supreme Court concluded that the California
laws were not rationally related to a legitimate state interest, and thus,
violated the Equal Protection Clause.'
III.

CONCLUSION

The most immediate impact of the holding in Del Monte will be upon
veterans who were not formerly eligible for benefits. This means that
approximately 300,000 veterans living in California will be eligible for
new benefits.' The ruling should not affect the state's budget because
the program is funded by special bonds.' However, it is possible that
the new broadening of benefits will cause these statutes to suffer the
same fate as the property tax exemption previously granted to veterans
under the California Constitution that was deleted by Proposition 93
because it violated the federal constitution.'
Del Monte will have a more generalized impact on all California statutes that predicate benefits upon residency at a fixed point in time, or
that discriminate in any other way against bona fide residents. As the
court stated, "We can only conclude that it has been the role of the four
Supreme Court cases discussed above to dismantle a provincial view of
citizenship."' The significance of this case is amplified by the recent
increase in migration to California. As a higher percentage of the population becomes first generation Californians, there will be greater conflicts
over the distribution of the state's scarce resources. Del Monte makes it
clear that the state will not be able to create a second class of newly
arrived citizens in order to allocate those resources.
DAN O'DAY

and many other veterans had received debilitating injuries during their period of ser-

vice. Id,
59. Id. at 1025, 824 P.2d at 642, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 836.
60. Harriet Chiang, Court Rules That All Veterans Are Eligible for State Benefits,
S.F. CHRON., Feb. 25, 1992, at A15.
61. Id.
62. Del Monte, 1 Cal. 4th at 1014 n.4, 824 P.2d at 634 n.4, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 828
n.4. Note that the voters could have just as easily expanded the definition of veteran,
but instead chose to eliminate the benefits altogether.
63. Id. at 1022, 824 P.2d at 640, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 834.
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C.

Medically indigent adults lack standing under articleXIIIB,
section 6, of the CaliforniaConstitution to challenge the
state's transfer of financialresponsibility to counties for
providing health care to medically indigent persons: Kinlaw

v. State.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Kinlaw v. State,' the California Supreme Court never reached the
issue of whether the state was obligated to reimburse the County of
Alameda for the cost of providing health care for medically' indigent
adults who had been included in the state Medi-Cal program until 1983,
when the state transferred health care responsibility for these individuals
to the counties.2 The plaintiffs, medically indigent adults and taxpayers,3
were found to lack standing under section 6 of article XIIIB of the California Constitution which provides that administrative procedures established by the legislature are the exclusive means by which the State's

1. 54 Cal. 3d 326, 814 P.2d 1308, 285 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1991). Justice Baxter delivered the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli, Kennard,
and Arabian concurred. Justice Broussard wrote a separate dissenting opinion, in
which Justice Mosk concurred.
2. As aresult of ASSEMBLY BILL No. 799, which became effective January 1, 1983,
Medi-Cal no longer covered medically indigent adults. A.B. 799, Reg. Sess. (1981-82),
reprinted in 1982 Cal. Stat. 1568, ch. 328, §§ 1-64. Under Article XIIIB, Section 3 of
the California Constitution, the state may transfer the financial responsibility for a
program to a county. CAL CONST. art. XIIIB, § 3. Under article X11IB, section 6 of
the California Constitution, when a state agency or the legislature mandates a new
program or responsibility on any local government, the state is obligated to reimburse
the local agencies for the cost of those programs if the local government was not already bound to fund it under a pre-existing duty. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIB, § 6. This
provision was intended to preclude the state from shifting financial responsibility for
carrying out governmental functions onto local entities that were ill-equipped to handie the task See County of Los Angeles v. State, 43 Cal. 3d 46, 729 P.2d 202, 233
Cal. Rptr. 38 (1987) (stating that article XIIIA [proposition 13] severely restricted the
taxing ability of local governments; hence, section 6 was included in article XIIIB to
protect local government revenues from state mandates).
3. Kinlaw, like similarly situated plaintiffs, is a 60-year-old woman with diabetes
and hypertension who has no health insurance and who has allegedly received inadequate health care. Kinlaw, 54 Cal. 3d at 340-41, 814 P.2d at 1318, 285 Cal. Rptr. at
76 (Broussard, J., dissenting). In addition, plaintiff King is an epileptic who has not
been able to acquire medication from county clinics. Id at 341, 814 P.2d at 1318, 285
Cal. Rptr. at 76 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
4. Section 17551 of the Government Code provides: "The Commission . . . shall
hear and decide upon a claim by a local agency or school district that the local

obligations under section 6 are to be scrutinized and enforced.'
The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief compelling the
state to restore coverage for medically indigent adults under Medi-Cal or
to reimburse the County of Alameda for the cost of providing similar
care to these persons.6 Although the superior court acknowledged that
the plaintiffs had shown irreparable injury,7 the court denied their request for a preliminary injunction "on the grounds that they could not
prevail in the action," " and subsequently granted summary judgment for
the defendants solely on the issue of standing.' The court of appeal held
that the plaintiffs had standing independent of the administrative remedies prescribed by section 6, because shifting the responsibility for these
services to Alameda County created a state-mandated program under the
provisions of article XIIIB, which, in turn, required state subsidization of
those costs assumed by the county.'"
The supreme court reversed, affirming the superior court's decision on
the standing issue." In addition, the supreme court noted that section 6
of article XIIIB did not provide for the remedy of reinstatement of state
funding for medically indigent adults to Medi-Cal. 2 Such a remedy was
available only when there was a declaration that the state mandate was
unenforceable based upon a finding that the legislature had failed to
include its costs in a local government claims bill. 3

II.
A.

TREATMENT OF THE CASE

Majority Opinion

The supreme court in Kinlaw stated that the legislature clearly expressed its intent that local agencies and school districts retain exclusive
power to file claims for reimbursements of state-mandated costs."

agency or school district is entitled to be reimbursed by the state for costs mandated
by the state." CAL GOV'T CODE § 17551 (West Supp. 1992).
5. Kinlaw, 54 Cal. 3d at 328, 814 P.2d at 1310, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 68. Article XIIIB,
section 6 provides: "Whenever the Legislature or any state agency mandates a new
program or higher level of service on any local government, the state shall provide a
subvention of funds to reimburse such local government for the costs of such program or increased level of service . . . ." CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 6.
6. Kinlaw, 54 Cal. 3d at 330, 814 P.2d at 1310, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
7. Id. at 338, 814 P.2d at 1316, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 74 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
8. Id. (Broussard, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 328, 814 P.2d at 1309, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
10. Id. at 338-39, 814 P.2d at 1316, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
11. Id. at 328, 814 P.2d at 1310, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
12. Id. at 335, 814 P.2d at 1314, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
13. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 17612 (West Supp. 1991).
14. California Government Code section 17500 states that "[i]t
is the intent of the
Legislature in enacting this part to provide for the implementation of section 6 of
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These procedures are only activated when the local agency or school
district files a "test claim" for reimbursement of state-mandated costs
with the Commission on State Mandates (hereinafter the Commission)."'
The supreme court, relying on the specificity of legislative intent, concluded that the plaintiffs' attempt to circumvent the available procedures
as independent individuals was unpersuasive.'
In the alternative, the plaintiffs sought reinstatement of the state-funded Medi-Cal program." The supreme court asserted that addressing the
merits of the plaintiffs' claim in this proceeding would be procedurally
inappropriate, 8 because such relief can only follow a Commission determination that a mandate exists and that the legislature has failed to include the cost in a local government claims bill."9 An effective determination by the Commission requires the inclusion of the Controller, the
Director of Finance, and the Treasurer and Director of the Office of Planning and Research, none of whom were included in plaintiffs' present
cause of action.' Further, if the Commission determined that the state
article XIIIB of the California Constitution and to consolidate the procedures for
reimbursement of statutes specified in the Revenue and Taxation Code with those
identified in the Constitution." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 17500 (West Supp. 1991). Additionally, section 17552 of the Government Code provides: "This chapter shall provide the
sole and exclusive procedure by which a local agency or school district may claim
reimbursement for costs mandated by the state as required by section 6 of article
XIIB of the California Constitution." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 17552 (West Supp. 1991).
15. Kinlaw, 54 Cal. 3d at 332, 814 P.2d at 1312, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 70. "Process" requires a prompt public hearing after such a filing, where the claimant along with any
other department, agency, interested organization, or even interested individuals, may
participate. CAL GOV'T CODE § 17553 (West 1980). Section 17553 also designates the
Sacramento County Superior Court as the venue for judicial actions to declare unfunded mandates invalid. When this opinion was handed down, a "test claim" filed by
Los Angeles County on the same issue was before the court of appeal, which the
majority determined to be evidence that the process was operative. Moreover, Los
Angeles County refused to allow Alameda County to join in the action because the
two counties' systems of documentation are so similar that the result would be
cumulative. Kinlaw, 54 Cal. 3d at 332 n.4, 814 P.2d at 1312 n,4, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 70
n.4.
16. Id. at 334-35, 814 P.2d at 1314, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
17. Id. at 335, 814 P.2d at 1314, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
18. Sections 17500-17630 of the Government Code, enacted four years after article
XIIB, created the Commission on State Mandates in order to implement section 6 of
that article. Kinlaw, 54 Cal. 3d at 342, 814 P.2d at 1319, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 77. The
Commission consists of the State Controller, State Treasurer, State Director of Finance, State Director of Planning and Research, and one member of the public. CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 17525 (West Supp. 1991).
19. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 17525 (West Supp. 1991).
20. Kinlaw, 54 Cal. 3d at 336 n.9, 814 P.2d at 1315 n.9, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 73 n.9;

mandate was unenforceable, the subsequent judicial remedy to either pay
the extant claims or include estimated costs in the state budget, would
be derived from no source of funds other than the appropriations for the
Department of Health Services (DHS).' The concomitant payments
would merely be at the expense of another program that DHS is obligated to fund, and thus, the court held that public policy did not support
such a result.'
B.

Dissenting Opinion

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Broussard claimed that the plaintiffs
had standing to challenge the state action as citizens, independent of the
procedures provided in section 6, and that the supreme court had jurisdiction to reach and dispose of the merits of the plaintiffs' claim.' First,
Justice Broussard noted that plaintiffs have traditionally been afforded
standing when seeking a writ of mandate to compel public officials to
perform their duties where plaintiffs are "beneficially interested" in the
issuance of the writ.' Justice Broussard stressed the detrimental impact
on the plaintiffs in the present action and, hence, their beneficial interest
in the issue's resolution.' Second, relying on the supreme court's decision in Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors,' Justice Broussard

qf. Dix v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 3d 442, 807 P.2d 1063, 279 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1991)
(holding that only the prosecutor, not the victim of the crime, had standing to recall
a sentence under Penal Code section 1170, but also considering and resolving the
victim's questions concerning the trial court's authority to recall a sentence under
Penal Code section 1170(d)). Justice Broussard, on the other hand, claimed that the
issue in the present case deserved review because it was more important than the
issue in Dix and merely asked for declaratory relief. Kinlaw, 54 Cal. 3d at 347, 814
P.2d at 1322, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 80 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
21. Kinlaw, 54 Cal. 3d at 336, 814 P.2d at 1315, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 337, 814 P.2d at 1315, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 73 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 340, 814 P.2d at 1317, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 75 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1086 (West 1980) (stating that a writ of mandate can be
afforded to any person "beneficially interested"). See also Carsten v. Psychology Examining Comm., 27 Cal. 3d 793, 614 P.2d 276, 166 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1980) (explaining
that a person is "beneficially interested" in the writ if a special interest is served or
a right is preserved).
25. Kinlaw, 54 Cal. 3d at 340-41, 814 P.2d at 1318, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 76
(Broussard, J., dissenting). Justice Broussard noted that all the plaintiffs are "personally dependent upon the quality of care of Alameda County's MIA [medically indigent
adult] program." Id. at 341, 814 P.2d at 1318, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 76 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
26. 49 Cal. 3d 432, 777 P.2d 610, 261 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1989). In Common Cause, the
court held that since section 304 of the California Elections Code provided the attorney general with the right of action, to infer a limitation on a citizen's remedy
.would contradict our long-standing approval of citizen actions to require governmen-
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claimed that section 6, on its face, placed no limitation on the right of
private citizens to bring independent actions, and to construct such a
limitation from the plain language would be contrary to the beneficially
interested citizens' right to compel public duties. 7 Thus, Justice
Broussaxd concluded that standing to compel such action should be
given to those harmed by its violation, rather than to local agencies who
have no personal interest at stake.'
In addition to the resolution of the standing issue, Justice Broussard
felt the court should have addressed the merits of the plaintiffs' claim.'
Section 17000 of the Welfare and Institutions Code requires every county
to "relieve and support" all indigent or incapacitated residents, except to
the extent that such persons are supported or relieved by other
means.' Justice Broussard found the critical question regarding the
furnishing of health services for the medically indigent did not involve an
analysis of the traditional and exclusive roles of the county and state, but
rather an analysis of who was responsible for funding the program when
article XIIIB went into effect on November 6, 1979." ' Broussard concluded that section 17000 obligated the state to provide the necessary financial assistance for the medically indigent.' Last, Justice Broussard cited
the state's consistent use of approximately one billion dollars in spending

tal officials to follow the law." Id. at 440, 777 P.2d at 614, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
27. Kinlaw, 54 Cal. 3d at 344, 814 P.2d at 1320, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 78 (Broussard,
J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 346, 814 P.2d at 1321, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 79 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
29. Id, at 337, 814 P.2d at 1315, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 73 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
The majority contended that if the county fails to provide adequate health care, the
plaintiffs could compel compliance with the obligations imposed on the county by
Welfare and Institutions Code sections 17000 and 17001. Id. at 336 n.8, 814 P.2d at
1314 n.8, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 72 n.8. However, Justice Broussard noted that the plaintiffs have already attempted to obtain such relief only to be met with the circular
response that the county is unable to provide adequate health care because the state
has provided inadequate subvention funds. Id. at 338 n.1, 814 P.2d at 1316 n.1, 285
Cal. Rptr. at 74 n.1 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
30. Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000 provides that "[elvery county . . .
shall relieve and support all incompetent, poor, indigent persons, and those incapacitated by age, disease, or accident, lawfully resident therein, when such persons are
not supported and relieved by their relatives or friends, by their own means, or by
state hospitals or other state or private institutions." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
17000 (West 1991).
31. Kinlaw, 54 Cal. 3d at 351, 814 P.2d at 1325, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 83 (Broussard,
J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 354, 814 P.2d at 1328, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 86 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
See supra note 29-30 and accompanying text.

authority as a component of its spending limit under sections 1 and 3 of
article XIIIB, as additional support to hold the state accountable for the
programs to which it ascribes dollar authority.'
III.

CONCLUSION

In Kinlaw, the supreme court gave great deference to the specificity
with which the legislature outlined the available procedures involving
reimbursement claims for state-mandated costs.' Thus, the court found
that the state-to-county transfer of responsibility for medically indigent
health services was not susceptible to attack from the medically indigent
plaintiffs in this case,' because the prescribed remedy is expressly limited to local agencies and school districts.' Moreover, the court stated
that the reinstatement of medically indigent health services to the state
Medi-Cal program would be imprudent without a proper determination
by the Commission."
Ultimately, as the court wrestled with the appropriate process to be
afforded harmed individuals, the gravamen of Kinlaw, whether adequate
health care is available to the medically needy, was lost. Quashing this
action on procedural grounds sends a message to the people that solutions must travel through the legislatively prescribed channels, and the
existence of alternative channels for such actions is a question for the
ballot and not the bench.
DEAN THOMAS TRIGGS

mH.

COURTS AND PROCEDURE
Provided the partiesagree to have their action heard by a
temporaryjudge and the provisions of Article VI, Section 21
of the California Constitution are otherwise satisfied, the
written stipulation required by CaliforniaRule of Court 244,
is directory ratherthan mandatory: In re Richard S.

In In re Richard S.,' the California Supreme Court considered whether

33. Kinlaw, 54 Cal. 3d at 355, 814 P.2d at 1328, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 86 (Broussard,

J., dissenting).
34.
35.
36.
37.
1.

See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
Kinlaw, 54 Cal. 3d at 326, 814 P.2d at 1309, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
Kinlaw, 54 Cal. 3d at 335, 814 P.2d at 1314, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
In re Richard S., 54 Cal. 3d 857, 819 P.2d 843, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2 (1991). Jus-
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a referee acting as a temporary judge lacked jurisdiction to enter a final
order in superior court when the requirements of Article VI, Section 21,
of the California Constitution are otherwise met,2 but the provisions of
Rule 244 of the California Rules of Court are not strictly followed.' In
this case, the parties agreed to have the action heard by a "Judge Pro
Tempore," but the written stipulation required by rule 244 lacked a signature by a superior court judge approving the referee.4 Lori S., the mother
of the minor, appealed the final order, which declared the child a ward
of the court and gave custody to the father, claiming that noncompliance

tice Mosk wrote the opinion for a unanimous court, in which Chief Justice Lucas and
Justices Panelli, Kennard, Arabian, Baxter, and George joined.
2. Article VI, Section 21 of the California Constitution provides: "On stipulation of
the parties litigant the court may order a cause to be tried by a temporary judge
who is a member of the State Bar, sworn and empowered to act until final determination of the cause." CAL CONST. art. VI, § 21. See generally 40 CAL JUR. 3D Judges
§ 87 (1978 & Supp. 1992); 2 B. WrrKiN, CAUFORNIA PROCEDURE, Courts §§ 278, 279,
282 & 284 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1991).
3. Section 244, California Rules of Court provides in full:
The stipulation of the parties litigant that a case may be tried by a temporary judge shall be in writing and shall state the name and office address of
the member of the State Bar agreed upon. It shall be submitted for approval
to the presiding judge or to the supervising judge of a branch court. The
order designating the temporary judge shall be endorsed upon the stipulation,
which shall then be filed. The temporary judge shall take and subscribe the
oath of office, which shall be attached to the stipulation and order of designation, and the case shall then be assigned to the temporary judge for trial.
After the oath is filed, the temporary judge may proceed with the hearing,
trial, and determination of the case. A filed oath and order, until revoked,
may be used in any case in which the parties stipulate to the designated
temporary judge. The stipulation shall specify the filing date of the oath and
order.
CAL R. CT. 244 (West 1991). See generally 40 CAL. JUR. 3D Judges §§ 87-88 (1978 &
Supp. 1991); 2 B. WITIUN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Courts §§ 279, 283 (3d ed. 1985 &
Supp. 1991).
4. In re Richard S., 54 Cal. 3d at 860, 819 P.2d at 845, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 3.
On May 20, 1988, counsel signed a form stipulation to allow referee McCarthy to
hear the present action as "Judge Pro Tempore." McCarthy signed the stipulation that
she subscribed to the oath of office. However, this stipulation did not contain the
signature of a superior court judge approving the referee's appointment. On November 10, 1988, another form stipulation was signed by counsel, a superior court judge
approving McCarthy's appointment, and McCarthy's signature indicating she had taken
the oath of office. This form was stamped -as filed on November 22, 1988, but the
dispositional order was entered on November 21, 1922. Id. at 860-61, 819 P.2d at 84445, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 3-4.

with rule 244 was jurisdictional error.' The California Court of Appeal
for the Sixth Appellate District affirmed the holding of the superior court
and concluded that the requirements of Article VI, Section 21 were met
and that the lack of compliance with rule 244 was waived when not addressed during the proceedings below.6 The California Supreme Court
affirmed, stating that, provided the constitutional requirements are met,
the provisions of rule 244 are directory rather than mandatory
Initially, the court disposed of the mother's contention that the clerk's
failure to fie the written stipulation prior to the issuance of the jurisdictional order constituted constitutional error." The court reasoned that
Article VI, Section 21 of the California Constitution permitting temporary
judges to hear causes of action were satisfied when the parties agreed to
allow the referee to act as a temporary judge and the court then assigned
the cause of action to that judge.' Further, the mother did not persuade
the court that the use of the word "shall" in the rule constituted the
requisite legislative intent to make the rule jurisdictional. '° They reasoned that one must examine the statute in its entirety to determine the
actual legislative intent involved, rather than focusing on one word." No

5. Id, at 862 n.4, 819 P.2d at 846 n.4, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 4 n.4.
6. In re Richard S., 229 Cal. App. 3d 1341, 1349, 270 Cal. Rptr. 411, 416 (1990),
qfd, 54 Cal. 3d at 866, 819 P.2d at 849, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 7-8. There was a split
between the appellate district courts as to whether noncompliance with rule 244 constituted jurisdictional error. Compare In re Lamonica H., 220 Cal. App. 3d 634, 270 Cal.
Rptr. 60 (1990) (fourth appellate district held that knowing participation in the proceedings without complying with the requirements of rule 244 did not constitute juris207 Cal. App. 3d 316, 254 Cal. Rptr. 774 (1989) (first
dictional error), In re P.I.,
appellate district held that objection must be at the trial level otherwise the error is
not jurisdictional) and In re Robert S., 197 Cal. App. 3d 1260, 243 Cal. Rptr. 459
(1988) (first appellate district held that express stipulation on the record was sufficient and the error not jurisdictional) with In re Heather P., 203 Cal. App. 1214, 250
Cal. Rptr. 468 (1988) (fifth appellate district held that oral stipulation was not enough
and the error was jurisdictional) and In re Damian V., 197 Cal. App. 3d 933, 243 Cal.
Rptr. 185 (1988) (the fifth appellate district held that the temporary judge's failure to
subscribe to the oath of office constituted jurisdictional error).
7. In re Richard S., 54 Cal. 3d at 865, 819 P.2d at 848, 2 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
8. Id. at 862, 819 P.2d at 846, 2 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 863, 819 P.2d at 847, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 5. Contra Averill v. Lincoln, 24
Cal. 2d 761, 764, 151 P.2d 119, 120-21 (1944) (noting that a rule stating that a party
"shall" serve certain notice on appeal is not jurisdictional).
11. In re Richard S.,54 Cal. 3d at 865-66, 819 P.2d at 848, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 7.
In the absence of express language, the intent must be gathered from the
terms of the statute construed as a whole, from the nature and character of
the act to be done and from the consequences which would follow the doing
or failure to do the particular act at the required time.
Id. (quoting Morris v. County of Marin, 18 Cal. 3d 901, 909-10, 559 P.2d 606, 611-12,
136 Cal. Rptr. 251, 256 (1977)).
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other authority was presented to indicate that rule 244 should be considered a jurisdictional requirement. Additionally, the court noted that,
while a statute can require the state to act in a certain way, noncompliance does not necessarily void the governmental action. 3 By examining
the appellate courts' decisions, the supreme court determined that the
provisions of rule 244 were directory rather than mandatory to the extent
that the rule imposes greater protection than the constitution. 4 Moreover, the court noted that the purpose behind rule 244 is to prevent disagreement among the parties as to what was actually stipulated." The
court then held that failure to strictly comply with the written stipulation
6
requirement of rule 244 does not constitute jurisdictional error."
Finally,
the court dismissed the mother's assertion that the parties cannot consent to jurisdiction, by stating that the court had subject matter jurisdiction before the case proceeded with a temporary judge. 7
Therefore, this decision eliminates the division among the appellate
courts on whether noncompliance with rule 244 constitutes jurisdictional

error and allows the courts to apply a uniform standard in the future.'8
Moreover, the supreme court eliminated, as a ground for appeal, an error
in the written stipulation explained in Rule 244 of the California Rules of
Court as long as no constitutional rights are violated. In disposing of this

12. Id at 863, 819 P.2d at 846, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 5.
13. Id. at 865-66, 819 P.2d at 848, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 7.
This distinction is generally expressed in terms of calling the duty
'mandatory' or 'directory.' [T]he 'directory' or 'mandatory' designation does
not refer to whether a particular statutory requirement is 'permissive' or
'obligatory,' but instead simply denotes whether the failure to comply with a
particular procedural step will or will not have the effect of invalidating the
governmental action to which the procedural requirement relates.
Id, (quoting Morris v. County of Main, 18 Cal. 3d at 908, 559 P.2d at 610-11, 136 Cal.
Rptr. at 255-56).
14. In n? Richard S., 54 Cal. 3d at 865, 819 P.2d at 848, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 7. The
court was persuaded by the reasoning of the first district in In re Lamonica H., 220
Cal. App. 3d 634, 642, 270 Cal. Rptr. 60, 65 (1990).
15. In n. Richard S., 54 Cal. 3d at 866, 819 'P.2d at 848, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 7.
16. Id, at 866, 819 P.2d at 849, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 7-8.
17. Id at 866-67, 819 P.2d at 849, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 8.
18. The supreme court agreed with the decisions in In 7-e Lamonica H., 220 Cal.
App. 3d 634, 270 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1990), In re P.I., 207 Cal. App. 3d 316, 254 Cal. Rptr.
774 (1989 3, and In re Robert S., 197 Cal. App. 3d 1260, 243 Cal. Rptr. 459 (1988). However, the court disapproved of In re Heather P., 203 Cal. App. 3d 1214, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 468 (1988) and In re Damian V., 197 Cal. App. 3d 933, 243 Cal. Rptr. 185
(1988).
I

issue, the supreme court has provided a forum in which temporary judges can perform their tasks effectively without the possibility of being
overturned on a technicality.
CHAD JEFFERY FISCHER

IV. CRImNAL LAW
A.

A finding of gross negligence, requiredfor conviction of gross
vehicular manslaughterwhile intoxicated,may be based on
overall circumstancesof intoxication: People v. Bennett.

In People v. Bennett,' the California Supreme Court once again declared its support for the nation's crackdown on drunk driving.2 In a
unanimous opinion,3 the court held that the finding of gross negligence'

1. 54 Cal. 3d 1032, 819 P.2d 849, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 8 (1991). Mr. Bennett was convicted of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, following an auto accident
in which one passenger was killed. Id. at 1034, 819 P.2d at 851, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 910. The afternoon of the accident, the defendant and two friends, who were minors,
began drinking beer from a keg. Id. After about an hour, they drove to the beach in
the defendant's pickup truck where they met another friend. Id. They finished the
keg at the beach and then drove inland. Id. The defendant driver drifted off the road

and over the center line a number of times, and eventually lost control of the truck
at the bottom of a hill. Id. The truck rolled over five or six times, ejecting all three
passengers, and killing one of them. Two hours after the accident the defendant's
blood alcohol level was measured at 0.20 percent. Id.
2. The ruling in Bennett is consistent with the court's past anti-drunk driving
decisions. See, e.g., Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 743 P.2d 1299, 241 Cal. Rptr.
42 (1987) (upholding the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints); Anthony J. Ellrod,
California Supreme Court Survey, Ingersoll v. Palmer, 15 PEPP. L REv. 450 (1987).
See generally James R. Acker, A Report on America's War Against Drunk Driving,
25 CRiM. L. BULL. 376, 376-94 (1989); H. Lawrence Ross, The American War on
Drunk Driving; A Constructionist Oritique, 18 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 1, 1-8 (1987).
3. Justice Mosk wrote the unanimous opinion of the court in which Chief Justice
Lucas, and Justices Panelli, Kennard, Arabian, Baxter, and George concurred.
4. "Gross negligence is the exercise of so slight a degree of care as to raise a presumption of conscious indifference to the consequences." Bennett, 54 Cal. 3d at 1036,
819 P.2d at 852, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 10-11 (citing People v. Watson, 30 Cal. 3d 290,
637 P.2d 279, 179 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1981)). The defendant's state of mind is "I don't care
what happens." Id. (citing People v. Olivas, 172 Cal. App. 3d 984, 988, 218 Cal. Rptr.
567, 569 (1985)). The consequences of the act must have been reasonably foreseeable,
and not the result of inattention or mistake, but of a reckless act. 1 CALJIC 3.36
(5th ed. 1988); People v. Watson, 30 Cal. 3d 290, 637 P.2d 279, 179 Cal. Rptr. 43
(1981). See generally 1 B. WrrIUN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Elements

of Crimes § 113 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1991) (criminal negligence); 17 CAL. JUR. 3D
Criminal Law § 277 (1984 & Supp. 1991) (gross negligence); Annotation, What
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required to convict a defendant of gross vehicular manslaughter while
intoxicated5 may be based on the overall circumstances of the
defendant's intoxication, without a showing that the defendant's driving
itself was grossly negligent.6 The court reasoned that the circumstances
surrounding a defendant's intoxication are an integral aspect of the "driving conduct" to which the element of gross negligence is related
In Bennett, the defendant was convicted of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. The only issue at trial was whether the defendant was grossly negligent. The trial court instructed the jury in accordance with CALIC number 8.94, that gross negligence is "determine[d] from the overall circumstances of the defendant's intoxication or
the manner in which he drove, or both."8 The defendant challenged the
instruction on appeal claiming the instruction erroneously allowed a
finding of gross negligence based on the circumstances of intoxication

Amounts to Negligence Within Meaning of Statutes Penalizing Negligent Homicide
by Operation of a Motor Vehicle, 20 A.L.R.3D 473 (1968 & Supp. 1991); Annotation,
What Amounts to Reckless Driving of Motor Vehicle Within Statute Making Such a
Criminal Offense 52 A.L.R.2D 1337 (1957 & Supp 1991); 57A Am. JUR. 2D Negligence
§§ 243-54, 289 (1980 & Supp. 1991) (gross negligence in vehicular manslaughter context).
5. Section 191.5(a) of the Penal Code provides:
Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is the unlawful killing of a
human being without malice aforethought, in the driving of a vehicle, where
the driving was in violation of section 23152 or 23153 of the Vehicle Code,
and the killing was either the proximate result of the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, and with gross negligence, or the
proximate result of the commission of a lawful act which might produce
death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 191.5(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1992). The crime carries with it a
penalty of four, six, or ten years' imprisonment. CAL PENAL CODE § 191.5(c) (West
1988 & Supp. 1992). See generally CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 23152-53 (West 1988 & Supp.
1992) (establishing as unlawful a blood alcohol level of 0.08% while driving a vehicle);
1 B. WrmN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Crimes Against the Person § 528
(2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1991) (gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated); 17 CAL.
JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 247, 252, 276-77, 281 (1984 & Supp. 1991) (elements of gross
vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated); Randy R. Koenders, Annotation, Alcohol Related Vehicular Homicide: Nature and Elements of Offense, 64 A.L.R. 4TH 166 (1988 &
Supp. 1991); 7A Am. JUR. 2D Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 330 (1980 & Supp.
1991) (driving while intoxicated).
6. Bennett, 54 Cal. 3d at 1040, 819 P.2d at 854, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 13.
7. Id. at 1038, 819 P.2d at 853, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 12.
8. 1 CALJIC 8.94 (5th ed. 1988) (jury to consider overall circumstances-driving
and intoxication).

alone, without regard to the defendant's manner of driving.! The court of
appeals held the instruction was correct. 0
The supreme court upheld the instruction as valid, concluding that a
finding of gross negligence from the overall evidence of the defendant's
intoxication alone was consistent with legislative intent." Early cases
interpreted the gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated statute to
require gross negligence in the manner of the defendant's operation of
the vehicle itself. 2 However, People v. Von Staden,3 the case from
which the challenged jury instruction was derived, suggested gross negligence could be shown by the level (as opposed to the mere fact) of the
defendant's intoxication, since "one who drives with a very high level of
intoxication is indeed more negligent, more dangerous, and thus more
culpable."' The supreme court in the instant case agreed, concluding
the gross negligence finding is directed at the "driving conduct" of the
defendant, and a driver's level of intoxication is an integral aspect of
such conduct." This interpretation is consistent with the legislative intent to severely punish all drunk drivers, not only those who commit a
reckless traffic violation. 6 Thus, the jury instruction was not erroneous,

9. Bennett, 54 Cal. 3d at 1038, 819. P.2d at 853, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 12.
10. Id. at 1035, 819 P.2d at 851, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 10.
11. Id. at 1038-40, 819 P.2d at 853-54, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 12-13.
12. The defendant relied on these cases in his attempt to establish error. People v.
McNiece, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1048, 266 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1986) (finding of gross negligence may not be based solely on fact of driving under the influence), and People v.
Stanley, 187 Cal. App. 3d 248, 253, 232 Cal. Rptr. 22, 25 (1986) (holding the degree
of intoxication could not alone be used to establish gross negligence; the defendant
must be grossly negligent "in the manner of his operation of the vehicle"). Accord
People v. Soledad, 190 Cal. App. 3d 74, 235 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1987) (unlawful act must
be in addition to driving under the influence).
The defendant had a strong argument, since states usually require both intoxication and reckless driving for a gross vehicular manslaughter felony. Gail Diane Cox,
No Proof of Recklessness is Needed; DUI Homicide, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 23, 1991, at 3
(quoting Donald H. Nichols, editor of Drinking/Driving Law Letter).
13. 195 Cal. App. 3d 1423, 241 Cal. Rptr. 523 (1987). In Von Staden, the court
agreed with McNiece that gross negligence could not be established by the mere fact
of driving under the influence. Id, at 1428, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 527. However, the court
concluded gross negligence could be shown by the overall circumstances of vehicle
operation, including the level of the defendant's intoxication. Id. The evidence was
sufficient to find gross negligence where the defendant's blood alcohol level was 0.22,
he ignored host's urgings not to drive home, and he drove 30 miles over the speed
limit in poor weather. Id.
14. Id.
15. Bennett, 54 Cal. 3d at 1038, 819 P.2d at 853, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 12.
16. Section 1 of the act adding 191.5 stated there was a "compelling need for
more effective methods to penalize" those who drink and drive. 1986 CAL. ADV. LEGIS.
SERV. 1106, § 1 (Deering). The court determined the most effective means of carrying
out this intent was to tie the gross negligence inquiry directly to the question of the
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and the jury could have reasonably found that the defendant's high- level
of intoxication led to his grossly negligent driving conduct.
To prevent future objections to the wording of the jury instruction, the
court recommended that it should read: "You must determine gross negligence from the level of the defendant's intoxication, the manner of
driving, or other relevant aspects of the defendant's conduct resulting in
the fatal accident."9 This makes it clear that the trier of fact should
consider all the relevant circumstances, including the level of intoxication, to determine whether the defendant acted with gross negligence.
The ruling is a victory for state prosecutors. It will allow prosecutors
to proceed without having to make an evidentiary showing of traffic
violations amounting to recklessness." It will also be easier to find negligence from the surrounding circumstances than from the driving itself.
However, intoxication alone cannot be the basis of the gross negligence finding. The prosecution must show reckless behavior beyond the
mere fact of drinking and driving.' The manner of driving will remain
an important element. 2' In the future, the level of intoxication will become a focus when determining recklessness, since it alone may provide
evidence of recklessness, as it did in Bennett. Overall, the ruling should
aid greatly in the prosecution of drunk drivers involved in an accident resulting in the death of another. The increased prospect of punishment
should also help discourage many from driving drunk in the first place.
ADAM L. JOHNSON

defendant's intoxication. Bennett, 54 Cal. 3d at 1039, 819 P.2d at 853-54, 2 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 12. This way the statute would encompass a greater number of drunk drivers,
not only those who committed a reckless traffic offense.
17. Bennett, 54 Cal. 3d at 1040, 819 P.2d at 854, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 13.
18. Id. at 1039, 819 P.2d at 854, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 12-13.
19. Cox, supra note 12, at 3.
20. 1 CALJIC 8.94 (5th ed. 1988) ("The mere fact that a defendant drives a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and violates a traffic law is insufficient
in itself to constitute gross negligence"). But note that, as the court held in Bennett,
the leve of intoxication may constitute reckless behavior. See Bennett, 54 Cal. 3d at
1040, 819 P.2d at 854, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 13.
21. Note that, in the present case, witnesses testified that the defendant was
swerving and exceeding the speed limit by about 10 miles per hour. Bennett, 54 Cal.
3d at 1034, 819 P.2d at 851, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 9-10.

B.

Under the "goodfaith"exception to the exclusionary rule, if
no reasonablepolice officer of reasonable competence would
have believed that a search warrant establishedprobable
cause, then the court must exclude the resulting evidence
regardless of the fact that a neutral magistrate issued the
warrant:People v. Camarella.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In People v. Camarella,' the California Supreme Court resolved a split
of authority in the courts of appeal regarding the appropriate interpretation of the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule as established
by United States v. Leon.2 In Leon, the high court announced the landmark exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule3 by

1. 54 Cal. 3d 592, 818 P.2d 63, 286 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1991). Chief Justice Lucas
authored the majority opinion in which Justices Panelli, Arabian, Kennard, Baxter and
George concurred. Justice Mosk issued a separate dissenting opinion. Defendant
Carnarella was arrested and charged with possessing cocaine for sale and possession
of marijuana. Camarella sought to exclude the evidence, contending that sufficient
probable cause had not been demonstrated to justify the issuance of a search warrant. A neutral magistrate issued the search warrant based upon an affidavit submitted by Detective Addoms. Addoms, a deputy sheriff for the past five years, had received an anonymous phone call in which the informant claimed that Camarella was
selling cocaine. Based on this information, Addoms checked office records and discovered substantial corroborating evidence, including the fact that Camarella had
previously been arrested for the possession of cocaine. Addoms believed the preceding information, coupled with his experience and training, gave him reasonable and
probable cause to seek a warrant.
The superior court denied Camarelia's motion to set aside the evidence; although
probable cause was absent, the "good faith" exception was applicable because
Addoms had reasonably relied on the warrant. Id. at 597-600, 818 P.2d at 65-67, 286
Cal. Rptr. at 782-84. The court of appeals reversed based on its conclusion that it
was *objectively unreasonable" for Addoms to seek a warrant, and therefore the
"good faith" exception was inapplicable. Id. The supreme court granted review. Id.
2. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The Leon court held that "the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the use in the prosecution's
case-in-chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a
search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to
be unsupported by probable cause." Id, at 900. For an overview of when the
exclusionary rule is inapplicable, see 21 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3180 (1985).
See generaUy Recent Case, 98 HARv. L REV. 108 (1984) (discussing the implications
of the Leon decision).
3. The Fourth Amendment states in pertinent part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
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permiting the prosecution to present evidence which was obtained by a
search warrant unsupported by probable cause, so long as the officers
were acting in reasonable reliance on the validity of the warrant.' Problems arose, however, in determining what constituted "reasonable reliance" by the police and to what extent, if any, the issuance of the warrant by a neutral magistrate should impact the analysis.' In CamareUa
the California Supreme Court confirmed its general acceptance of the
"good faith" exception and clarified that in determining its applicability,
the sole focus should be on the objective reasonableness of the police
officer's conduct.' Accordingly, the court concluded that if a police offi-

U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See also CAL CONsT. art. I, § 13 (providing similar protection
from unreasonable searches and seizures as the Fourth Amendment). Interestingly, the
Fourth Amendment makes no explicit reference to the exclusion of unconstitutionally
obtained evidence. Therefore, the exclusionary rule is solely a judicial-based remedy.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (stating that the exclusionary rule is a judicial remedy designed
to protect Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent effect). However, although
Justice Brennan acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment does not expressly grant
the right to have illegally obtained evidence excluded from one's trial, he noted that
"many of the! Constitution's most vital imperatives are stated in general terms and the
task of giving meaning to these precepts is therefore left to subsequent judicial
decislonmaking in the context of concrete cases." Id. at 932 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
4. The Leon court noted four situations in which an officer's reliance on the
validity of a warrant would not be justified:
(1) the affidavit was misleading;
(2) the magistrate "wholly abandoned his judicial role";
(3) the affidavit is "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable"; and
(4) the warrant is so facially deficient that the officer cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. The CamareUa court analyzed its decision based on the third
factor.
5. Some courts have concluded that the mere fact that the magistrate signed the
warrant should be a critical factor in determining whether an officer's conduct was
reasonable. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1201, 1210-11, 274 Cal. Rptr.
432, 438 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a magistrate's issuance of a warrant should be
considered in determining reasonableness of officer); United States v. Corral-Corral,
899 F.2d 927, 939 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that officers should be allowed "to rely
upon the probable-cause determination of a neutral magistrate when defending an
attack on their good faith for either seeking or executing a warrant"). Other courts
have held to the contrary. See, e.g., People v. Maestas, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1208, 1215,
252 Cal. Rptr. 739, 743 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that no consideration should be
given to the fact that a magistrate signed the warrant in determining officer's reasonable conduct).
6. Camarela, 54 Cal. 3d at 605, 818 P.2d at 71, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 788.

cer should have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable
cause, the court must exclude the resulting evidence regardless of the
fact that a neutral magistrate issued the warrant.7
II.
A.

TREATMENT OF THE CASE

Majority Opinion
1. Probable Cause Analysis

The majority prefaced
ception was solely an
California's exclusionary
8! The court then began

its opinion by noting that the "good faith" exissue of federal constitutional law because
rule8 was effectively abrogated by Proposition
its analysis by setting forth the state of the law

7. Id.
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5 (West Supp. 1992). The relevant portions of the
California exclusionary rule provide as follows:
(a) Grounds. A defendant may move . .. to suppress as evidence any tangible or intangible thing obtained as a result of a search or seizure on either
of the following grounds:
(I) The search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable.
(2) The search or seizure with a warrant was unreasonable because (i)
the warrant is insufficient on its face; (ii) the property or evidence
obtained is not that described in the warrant; (iii) there was not probable cause for the issuance of the warrant; (iv) the method of execution of the warrant violated federal or state constitutional standards;
(v) there was any other violation of federal or state constitutional standards ....
(d) Effect of granting motion. If a search or seizure motion is granted pursuant to the proceedings authorized by this section, the . . . evidence shall
not be admissible against the movant at any trial or other hearing unless further proceedings authorized by this section . . . are utilized by the people.
Id.
9. Proposition 8 added the "Right to Truth-in-Evidence" to article I, section 28,
subdivision (d) of the California Constitution, which states in pertinent part:
Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two thirds vote of the
membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be
excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post-conviction
motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile conduct for a
criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court.
CAL CONST. art. I, § 28(d) (emphasis added). See In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694
P.2d 744, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985) (interpreting the Truth-in-Evidence provision of
Proposition 8 to abrogate California's exclusionary rule). See also Mark Dyer Klein &
Randall A. Cohen, Note, Proposition 8: California Law after In re Lance W. and People v. Castro, 12 PEPP. L. REV. 1059, 1064 (1985) ("The passage of Proposition 8 was
therefore 'a clear repudiation by the people, of state law embellishments on federal decisions which operate to exclude relevant from criminal proceedings.'") (quoting Wilson
v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. App. 3d 173, 212, 185 Cal. Rptr. 671, 699 (Ct. App. 1982),
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regarding the establishment of probable cause. " The court focused on
the "totality of the circumstances" test adopted under Illinois v. Gates,"
which listed several factors to be assessed in a probable cause analysis,
such as the "informant's 'veracity,' 'reliability' and 'basis of knowledge.'" 2 Furthermore, the majority posited that the Fourth Amendment
does not necessarily bar anonymous informants so long as there is "'corroboration through other sources.' "" Although the majority hesitated to
accept the absence of probable cause in Camarella, they deferred to the
superior court and court of appeal's finding that no "substantial basis"
existed for issuing the search warrant. 4
2.

The "Good Faith" Exception Under Leon

The majority relied heavily on the rationale of Leon in reaching its
conclusions." The Leon court proffered that because

rev'd, 34 Cal. 3d 777, 670 P.2d 325, 195 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1983)). However, the In re
Lance W. court determined that section 28(d) did not repeal article I, section 13 of the
California Constitution. Instead, it retained the "substantive" scope of these provisions
and only eliminated the "remedy" of excluding evidence seized in violation of the California, but not the federal, Constitution. In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 887, 694 P.2d at
752, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 639. Therefore, the court concluded that
although section 1538.5 [exclusionary rule] continues to provide the exclusive
procedure by which a defendant may seek suppression of evidence obtained
in a search or seizure that violates 'state constitutional standards,' a court
may exclude the evidence on that basis only if exclusion is also mandated by
the federal exclusionary rule applicable to evidence seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.
Id, at 896, 694 P.2d at 759, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 646.
10. CamaWea, 54 Cal. 3d at 600-01, 818 P.2d at 67, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
11. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). Gates established a "fluid concept" of probable cause as
opposed to the "two-pronged" test set forth in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964),
and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). SpineUi held that a tip from an
informant will support probable cause only if the police establish the informant's reliability and the informant discloses the basis for the information. SpinwUi, 393 U.S.
at 414-15.
12. Camarella, 54 Cal. 3d at 600-01, 818 .P.2d at 67, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 784 (quoting
Gates, 462 U.S. at 230). For a general discussion of probable cause, see 20 CAL JUR.
3D Criminal Law § 2509 (1985).
13. CamareUa, 54 Cal. 3d at 601, 818 P.2d at 68, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 785 (quoting
Gates, 462 U.S. at 244-45).
14. Id. at 602, 818 P.2d at 68, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 785. The majority believed that at
the time the warrant was issued there existed a "fair probability" that contraband
would be discovered at Camarella's home. Id. (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 239).
15. Id. at 602, 818 P.2d at 68-69, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 785-86.

"the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the
law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.""

In determining the standard by which courts should evaluate police conduct, the majority also considered the holding in Malley v. Briggs.7 The
Malley court rejected the contention that an officer's conduct is "per se
objectively reasonable'" by virtue of the issuance of a warrant. 8 Furthermore, the Malley court reasoned that because busy magistrates will inevitably make errors in issuing warrants, an officer should not simply be
allowed to claim that a magistrate's mistake supersedes his own incompetence in seeking an unsupported warrant. 9
The Camarellamajority concluded that the mere issuance of a warrant
was irrelevant, and the "good faith" exception should focus exclusively
on the reasonableness of an officer's decision to submit an affidavit to a
magistrate.' Using this guideline, the majority determined that the officer in CamareUa did not act unreasonably in seeking a warrant because
there was "a close or debatable question on the issue of probable
cause."' Although the court noted that a reasonable officer might have
sought additional corroborating evidence, this was not the standard set
forth in Leon.' Instead, the majority concluded that in order to abrogate
the "good faith" exception, it must be determined that no reasonable
officer would have sought a warrant based on the information at the
time he submitted his affidavit.'
B.

DissentingOpinion
In his vocal dissent, Justice Mosk indicated his general disapproval of

16. Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (1974)) (emphasis added).
However, Justice Brennan argued in his dissent that the rationale behind the
exclusionary rule was not merely to deter police misconduct, but to encourage the
cooperation of the entire judicial system in upholding the Fourth Amendment. Leon,
468 U.S. at 923 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
17. 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
18. CamareUa, 54 Cal. 3d at 604, 818 P.2d at 70, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 787 (quoting

Malley, 475 U.S. at 345).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 605, 818 P.2d at 71, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 788. The majority reasoned that
"[b]ecause issuance of a warrant is a constant factor in these cases, it cannot logically serve to distinguish among them." Id.
21. Id. at 606, 818 P.2d at 71, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 788 (citations omitted).
22. Id. But see People v. Johnson, 220 Cal. App. 3d 742, 750-51, 270 Cal. Rptr. 70,
74 (Ct. App. 1990) (intimating that an officer is required to exhaust every possible
source of corroborating evidence in order to satisfy "good faith" reasonableness standard).
23. Camarelta, 54 Cal. 3d at 606, 818 P.2d at 71, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 788.
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the Leon decision and his prediction that it will inevitably be overturned.' To this end, he cited several state court decisions in which the
courts refused to apply the Leon "good faith" exception.' Furthermore,
Justice Mosk believed that even working within the ambit of Leon, the
majority had improperly analyzed the reasonableness of the officer's conduct.' Justice Mosk reasoned that the presence of probable cause was
not in doubt because "[t]here was no effective corroboration."27
Therefore, he concluded that a reasonably well-trained officer should
have known no adequate basis for a warrant existed, and thus the "good
faith" exception was inapplicable.'
III.

CONCLUSION

Although the supreme court carefully worded the CamareUa decision
so as not to convey the court's unbridled support of the "good faith"
exception to the exclusionary rule, this appears to be the majority's underlying philosophy. Ostensibly, the mere issuance of a warrant by a
neutral magistrate fails to demonstrate an officer's objective reasonableness in seeking a warrant. However, realistically, it seems difficult to
imagine many situations in which an officer's conduct will be deemed so
unreasonable as to abrogate the "good faith" exception, considering that

24. Id. at 609, 818 P.2d at 73, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 790 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See
generallyStephen Duke, Comment, Making Leon Worse, 95 YALE L. J. 1405 (1986) (criticizing Leon as a weak decision). It is interesting to note that one study concluded that
the exclusionary rule has minimal costs in terms of lost indictments or convictions.
Specifically, in California only 0.8% of all felony arrests do not lead to convictions
because of an illegal search or seizure. See Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What
We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the Costs of the Exclusionary Rule: the
NIJ Study and Other Studies of Lost Arrests, 1983 Am. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 611,
617 (1983).
25. Specifically, Justice Mosk listed Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania as states that have not adopted the Leon rationale.
26. Camarella, 54 Cal. 3d at 609, 818 P.2d at 74, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 791 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). Justice Mosk stressed that "[tlhere was a bare accusation by an anonymous and untested tipster that defendant was then selling cocaine." Id (Mosk, J., dissenting). Furthermore, he believed that "[t]he 15-month-old statement from the confidential and untested tipster and the 3-1/2-year-old crime report were stale." Id. (Mosk,
J., dissenting).
27. Id, at 610, 818 P.2d at 74, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 791 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
28. Id. C(Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk concluded by stating, "'When constitutional rights are implicated, the end cannot justify the means.'" Id. at 611, 818 P.2d
at 74, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 791 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d
873, 910, 694 P.2d 744, 770, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 657 (1985) (Mosk, J., dissenting)).

a neutral magistrate has reviewed the evidence and concluded that probI
able cause exists.
Although Justice Mosk steadfastly opposes the "good faith" exception,
the majority recognizes its necessity both practically and philosophically.
From a practical standpoint, excluding evidence creates the likelihood
that the guilty might go free. From a philosophical standpoint, penalizing
an officer for his reasonable mistake cannot logically accomplish the goal
of deterring Fourth Amendment violations.
ANDREA L. WILSON
C.

The reciprocal discovery provisions in criminal cases authorized by CaliforniaProposition 115 are valid under both the
state and federal constitutions when properly construed and
applied: Izazaga v. Superior Court.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Izazaga v. Superior Court,' the California Supreme Court resolved
interpretive issues presented by Proposition 115, the "Crime Victims
Justice Reform Act."2 Proposition 115 added language to the California
Constitution authorizing reciprocity in the discovery process in criminal
cases.' In addition, Proposition 115 added a new chapter on discovery to

1. 54 Cal. 3d 356, 815 P.2d 304, 285 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1991). Chief Justice Lucas
authored the opinion for the majority in which Justices Panelli, Arabian and Baxter
concurred. Justice Kennard wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice Mosk and
Justice Broussard each wrote separate dissenting opinions.
2. Id. at 363, 815 P.2d at 308, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 235. Proposition 115 was enacted
to provide "comprehensive reforms . . . in order to restore balance and fairness to
the criminal justice system." Proposition 115, § l(a) (1990).
California voters passed Proposition 115 on June 5, 1990, in the Primary Election. Section 23 of Proposition 115 added chapter 10 to title 6 of part 2 of the
California Penal Code, entitled "Discovery," comprising Penal Code sections 1054
through 1054.7. Id. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 1054-.7 (West Supp. 1991).
On June 6, 1990, Proposition 115 became effective. See CAL. CONST. art. II,
§ 10(a). Subsequently, the People charged petitioner Javier Izazaga and a co-defendant
with two counts of forcible rape and one count of kidnapping. Pursuant to section
1054.5 of the California Penal Code, the People served Petitioner with an informal

request for discovery. Izazaga refused the discovery request and the superior court
granted the People's motion to compel. The court of appeal denied Petitioner's application for a writ of mandate or prohibition. The supreme court then stayed the
discovery order and issued an alternative writ of mandate to consider important
constitutional and interpretive questions. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 363-64, 815 P.2d at
308-09, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 235-36.
3. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(a) (statutory provisions of Proposition 115); CAL
CONST. art. XVIII, § 4 (constitutional provisions of Proposition 115).
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the Penal Code, which provides the framework for both defense and
prosecutorial discovery as well as a mechanism for compelled discovery.6 Moreover, Proposition 115 repealed several discovery provisions
which required prosecutors to furnish defendants with police and arrest
reports.' In Izazaga, the California Supreme Court analyzed the constitu-

4. See CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 1054.1 (West Supp. 1991). This section provides that:
The prosecuting attorney shall disclose to the defendant or his or her attorney all of the following materials and information, if it is in the possession
of the prosecuting attorney or if the prosecuting attorney knows it to be in
the possession of the investigating agencies:
(a) The names and addresses of persons the prosecutor intends to call

as witnesses at trial.
(b) Statements of all defendants.
(c) All relevant real evidence seized or obtained as a part of the investigation of the offenses charged.
(d) The existence of a felony conviction of any material witness whose
credibility is likely to be critical to the outcome of the trial.
(e) Any exculpatory evidence.
(f) Relevant written or recorded statements of witnesses or reports of
the statements of witnesses whom the prosecutor intends to call at the
trial, including any reports or statements of experts made in conjunction with the case, including the results of physical or mental examinations, scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons which the prosecutor intends to offer in evidence at the trial.
Id California Penal Code section 1054.3 This section provides that:
The defendant and his or her attorney shall disclose to the prosecuting attorney:
(a) The names and addresses of persons, other than the defendant, he
or she intends to call as witnesses at trial, together with any relevant
written or recorded statements of those persons, or reports of the
statements of those persons, including any reports or statements of
experts made in connection with the case, and including the results of
physical or mental examinations, scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons which the defendant intends to offer in evidence at the trial.
Cb) Any real evidence which the defendant intends to offer in evidence
at the trial.

Id
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.5 (West Supp. 1991) (providing mechanics for
compelled discovery).
6. Proposition 115 repealed several discovery provisions, including former Penal
Code section 1102.5 (compelling defendant to disclose witnesses' prior statements to
defense counsel for impeachment purposes); former Penal Code section 1430 (requiring prosecutors to furnish defendants with police and arrest reports); and certain
provisions in Penal Code section 859 (requiring prosecutors to furnish defendants
with police and arrest reports).

tionality of Proposition 115 on three separate constitutional challenges:
(1) the privilege against self-incrimination; (2) the right to due process of
law; and (3) the right to effective assistance of counsel.7 Relying heavily
on recent federal trends allowing broad prosecutorial discovery' and on
the intent of the California voters,9 a majority of the court concluded
that Proposition 115 was valid under both the federal and state constitutions.' °

II.
A.

TREATMENT OF THE CASE

Majority Opinion
1.

Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

The court rejected the contention that the trial court violated Izazaga's
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by compelling the
disclosure of witnesses' names and statements." The court then set
forth the four requisite elements that trigger the privilege: The requested
disclosure must be (i) "incriminating"; (ii) "personal to the defendant";
(iii) "obtained by compulsion"; and (iv) "testimonial or communicative in
nature."" The court then noted that because the mere absence of special state interests in disclosure affects none of the four requirements,
that fact cannot in itself trigger the self-incrimination privilege.'3 The

7. Izazaga v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 356, 365-82, 815 P.2d 304, 309-22, 285 Cal.
Rptr. 231, 236-49 (1991). The court also analyzed the privilege against self-incrimination under the California Constitution. Id. at 369, 815 P.2d at 312, 285 Cal. Rptr. at
239.
8. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975) (upholding a trial court order
requiring the defense to disclose its investigator's records of statements made by
prosecutorial witnesses once the defense called its investigator as a trial witness);
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (holding that discovery of the names and addresses of a defendant's alibi witnesses does not implicate the self-incrimination
clause).
9. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 372, 815 P.2d at 314, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 241 ("The manifest intent behind the measure was to reopen the two-way street of reciprocal discovery."). See generally 7 B. WITN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law
§§ 120-21 (9th ed. 1989 & Supp. 1990) (analyzing the initiative process in California);
15 MCKINNEY, CALIFORNIA DIGEST OF OFFICIAL REPORTS, Initiative and Referendum
§§ 3, 6 (3d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1991) (same); Cynthia J. Emry, California Supreme
Court Survey, 18 PEPP. L. REv. 1084 (1991) (same).
10. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 383, 815 P.2d at 322, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
11. Id. at 366, 815 P.2d at 310, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 237. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12. .zazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 366, 815 P.2d at 310, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 237. The majority
deduced that "conversely, discovery of evidence that does not meet each of these requirements is not barred by the self-incrimination clause." Id.
13. Id. See also New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979) (holding that absence
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court determined that the discovery requests mandated by Proposition 115 were not "compelled" because they merely accelerated the divulgence of information which would necessarily surface at trial.' In addition, the court determined that compelled disclosure of the defendant's
witnesses' statements did not implicate the Fifth Amendment because
the statements were elicited from a third party and thus did not satisfy
the "personal to the defendant" requirement.'5
After determining that the compelled discovery enacted by Proposition 115 did not violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege, the
court measured Proposition 115 against the safeguards provided by the
California Constitution. 6 Similar to the Federal Constitution, the California Constitution also protects a defendant from compelled testimony
against oneself.'" Prior to the enactment of Proposition 115, state law
regarding prosecutorial discovery was "considerably more solicitous of
the privilege against self-incrimination than federal law," as illustrated by
the holding in Prudhomme v. Superior Court." In Prudhomme, the
court determined that a discovery order requiring a defendant to divulge
witness information to the prosecution was unconstitutional." Furthermore, the Prudhomme court announced that any compelled discovery
which tended to ease the burden on the prosecution or served as "a link
in the chain" was expressly forbidden.' Recognizing that the adoption

of special state interest is not sufficient in and of itself to trigger self-incrimination
clause).
14. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 367, 815 P.2d at 310, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 237. However,
the majority noted that the acceleration doctrine is not dispositive because "[siome
statements, of witnesses the defense intends to call might never be offered at trial by
the defense." Id. at 367, 815 P.2d at 311, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
15. Id. The majority relied on several high court decisions in which the application
of the self-incrimination clause has been limited to statements made by the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 234 (1975) ("[Tihe [F]lifth
[A]mendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, being personal to the
defendant, does not extend to the testimony or statements of third parties called as
witnesses at trial."); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (holding that the
privilege against self-incrimination "is a personal privilege: it adheres basically to the
person, not to information that may incriminate him").
16. Izavaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 369, 815 P.2d at 312, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 239. Article I,
section 15 of the California Constitution guarantees a defendant in a criminal case
various safeguards, including the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself.
CAL. CONsr. art. I, § 15.
17. CAL CoNsT. art. I, § 15.
18. 2 Cal. 3d 320, 466 P.2d 673, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970).
19. Id. at 327, 466 P.2d at 678, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
20. Id.

of Proposition 115 was inherently inconsistent with the Prudhomme line
of cases, the court in Izazaga concluded that it must interpret
Proposition 115 as abrogating Prudhomme to the extent that it impedes
reciprocal discovery in order to achieve the manifest intent of the California voters."'
2.

Right to Due Process of Law

a.

Reciprocity chalenge

Although the court noted that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause' does not directly address the constitutional requirements of
discovery, the court emphasized that the due process clause does "speak
to the balance of forces between the accused and his accuser."' The
court concluded that the addition of both article I, section 30(c) of the
California Constitution' and Penal Code section 1054 satisfied this "balanced" discovery requirement.' The court further concluded that any
imbalance in the discovery requirements properly favored the defendant.' The court readily dismissed Izazaga's argument that his right to
due process was violated because Proposition 115 does not require reciprocal discovery disclosure by the prosecution except "upon demand" by
the defendant." The court stated that Penal Code section 1054.5(b) requires either party to initially make an "informal request" to the opposing
party for information.' Therefore, the court concluded that because the
enforcement mechanism was identical for both the prosecution and the

21. Izazaga V. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 356, 371, 815 P.2d 304, 314, 285 Cal.
Rptr. 231, 241 (1991). The preamble of Proposition 115 states: "In order to address
these concerns [balance and fairness in the criminal justice system] and to accomplish these goals, we the people further find that it is necessary to reform the law as
developed in numerous California Supreme Court decisions." Proposition 115 § 1(b).
22. U.S. CONST. amend XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part:
"No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.
23. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 372, 815 P.2d at 315, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 242 (quoting
Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973)).
24. Id. at 373, 815 P.2d at 315, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 242. Article I, section 30(c) states
that "discovery in criminal cases shall be reciprocal in nature, as prescribed by the
Legislature or by the people through the initiative process." CAL. CONST. art. I

§ 30(c).
25. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 373, 815 P.2d at 315, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 242. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1054(e) (West Supp. 1991), which provides that "no discovery shall
occur in criminal cases except as provided by this chapter, other express statutory
provisions, or as mandated by the Constitution of the United States." Id.
26. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 374, 815 P.2d at 316, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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defense, Proposition 115 did not offend the due process clause.'
The court then refuted Izazaga's claim that Proposition 115 is insufficient because the prosecutor is not explicitly mandated to divulge any
rebuttal witnesses he intends to call in response to the defendant's disclosure.' Although the court acknowledged that Penal Code Section 1054.1 does not specifically mention rebuttal witnesses, a
"reasonable interpretation" of the section would logically include "all
witnesses" that the prosecution "reasonably anticipates it is likely to
31
call."
Finally, the court dismissed Izazaga's claim that Proposition 115
violates the due process clause in that it does not require the prosecution to disclose all evidence it may use to refute the defense's evidence.' Although the court agreed that Proposition 115 does not require
such disclosure, it also concluded that due process does not demand
such extensive disclosures, especially because the defense is not required
to do the same.'
b.

"Brady"evidence challenge

Although the court acknowledged the validity of Izazaga's assertion
that Proposition 115 does not require the prosecution to disclose all exculpatory evidence as mandated by Brady v. Maryland' and its progeny, it emphasized that "due process requirements are self-executing and
need no statutory support to be effective."' Thus, because federal constitutional requirements would necessarily preempt any statutory mandates regarding the disclosure of exculpatory information, the fact that
Proposition 115 does not address this issue is irrelevant.'
3.

Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel

The court also rejected Izazaga's final claim that a violation of his

29. Id. at 374, 815 P.2d at 315-16, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 24243.
30. Id. at 375, 815 P.2d at 316, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
31. Id. at 375, 815 P.2d at 316-17, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 243-44 ("A disclosure of witnesses under section 1054.3 thus triggers a defendant's right to discover rebuttal witnesses under section 1054.1.").
32. Id. at 376, 815 P.2d at 317, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
33. Id at 376-77, 815 P.2d at 317-18, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 244-45.
34. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
35. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 378, 815 P.2d at 318-19, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 245-46.
36. Id.

Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel 7 occurred as a
result of the prosecution's discovery of his witnesses' statements.' Initially, the California court noted that the United States Supreme Court
never determined that a mere discovery request violated the right to
effective assistance of counsel.' In addition, because Proposition 115
only requires the defendant to disclose those witnesses he intends to call
at trial, it logically follows that he would list only those witnesses
tending to help the defense.'
Finally, the court rejected the claim that the compelled disclosure
doctrine violates the attorney work-product privilege." The court firmly
believed there was no basis for a constitutional challenge because
"[t]here is no privilege for attorney work product in the California Constitution."' Therefore, protection of attorney work product must be
based on either state common law or a statutory provision.' The court
determined that section 2018 of the California Code of Civil Procedure
adequately protects attorney work product." Furthermore, the court
stated that Proposition 115 expressly provides for the protection of the
attorney work product under Penal Code section 1054.6." 5
B.

Justice Kennard's Concurring Opinion

In her concurring opinion, Justice Kennard disagreed with the
majority's conclusion that attorney work product is not constitutionally
protected.' Although Justice Kennard conceded that the United States

37. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the fight . . . to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense." Id.
38. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 379, 815 P.2d at 319, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 380-81, 815 P.2d at 320-21, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 24748.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 381, 815 P.2d at 321, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
44. Id. (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2018 '(West 1991)). Under this section,
attorney work product is nondiscoverable unless the court determines that the denial
of discovery will unfairly prejudice the party seeking discovery. CAL CIv. PROC. CODE
§ 2018(b) (West 1987). In addition, section 2018 also states that "any writing that
reflects an attorney's impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories
shall not be discoverable under any circumstances." Id. § 2018(c).
45. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 381-82, 815 P.2d at 321, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 248. Penal
Code section 1054.6 provides: "Neither the defendant nor the prosecuting attorney is
required to disclose any materials or information which are work product as defined
in subdivision (c) of Section 2018 of the Code of Civil Procedure." CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1054.6 (West Supp. 1991).
46. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 384, 815 P.2d at 323, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 250 (Kennard, J.,

concurring).
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Supreme Court has never expressly determined whether the atiorney
work product privilege is constitutionally grounded, she believes that
there exists a strong implication that the privilege is included in the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.47 However, Justice Kennard reasoned
that even if the protection afforded by the Sixth Amendment encompassed the attorney client privilege, in the present case the court would
uphold the discovery order on the basis of voluntary waiver.' Justice
Kennard determined that when a defendant calls witnesses to testify at
trial, the defendant impliedly waives the right to assert the attorney work
product privilege as to those witnesses' statements.49
C.

Justice Mosk's Dissenting Opinion

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Mosk believed that Proposition 115,
specifically Penal Code Section 1054.3 allowing prosecutorial discovery, 5° violates the privilege against self-incrimination of article I, section 15 of the California Constitution.' Justice Mosk stressed that the
compelled discovery provision would undoubtedly lessen the
prosecution's burden of proof, thus rendering it unconstitutional.' Justice Mosk posited'that even if Penal Code Section 1054.3 were severed,
the discovery scheme "would be facially offensive to new section 301(c)"

47. Id. at 384-85, 815 P.2d at 323-24, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 250-51 (Kennard, J., concurring). Justice Kennard based this interpretation on her reading of United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975) (emphasizing that the attorney work product privilege is an
essential part of a criminal defendant's right to effective assistance of. counsel).
Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 384-85, 815 P.2d at 323-24, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 250-51 (Kennard,
J., concurring).
48. Id. at 386, 815 P.2d at 324, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 251 (Kennard, J., concurring). Justice Kennard reasoned that pretrial discovery is necessary in order to allow the prosecution to investigate and respond to the defense testimony. Id. (Kennard, J., concur-

ring).
49. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring). Justice Kennard, however, believes that there
must be a "limitation" to the waiver to ensure that the prosecution does not take
advantage of this information at trial until the waiver actually occurs. Id. (Kennard,
J., concurring).
50. Id. at 397, 815 P.2d at 331, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 258 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See
CAL PENAL CODE § 1054.3 (West Supp. 1991).
51. Izaraga, 54 Cal. 3d at 397, 815 P.2d at 331, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 258 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). Article I, section 15 provides in pertinent part: "Persons may not . . . be
compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against themselves." CAL. CONST. art. I,

§ 15.
52. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 397, 815 P.2d at 331, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 258 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).

of Article I of the California Constitution, which mandates reciprocal
discovery.'
D.

Justice Broussard'sDissenting Opinion

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Broussard expressed his belief that
the majority misinterpreted the law regarding the constitutionality of
compelled discovery provisions." Consequently, Justice Broussard determined that Proposition 115 violates both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution.' Justice Broussard strongly
disagreed with the majority's determination that the Fifth Amendment is
not implicated when a compelled discovery order merely accelerates the
disclosure of the defendant's evidence at trial.' In addition, Justice
Broussard concluded that Proposition 115 violates the Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel because it has a chilling effect on
a defense attorney's ability and motivation to present the most effective
defense for his client."
III.

CONCLUSION

The majority's construction of Proposition 115 has the practical effect
of implementing reciprocal discovery in the California criminal justice
system. In addition, the majority has demonstrated a readiness to abrogate existing case law precedent in favor of the voter's initiative power.
The court's decision is desirable because it prevents a defendant from
developing a last minute alibi for which the prosecution has no opportunity to present rebuttal evidence. By determining that the reciprocal
provisions enacted by Proposition 115 are constitutionally valid, the Cali-

53. Id. at 401, 815 P.2d at 334, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 261 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Article I, section 30(c) provides: "[I]n order to provide for fair and speedy trials, discovery in criminal cases shall be reciprocal in nature, as prescribed by the Legislature
or by the people through the initiative process." CAL CONST. art. I, § 30(c).
54. Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 402, 815 P.2d at 335, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 262 (Broussard,
J., dissenting).
55. Id. (Broussard, J., dissenting).
56. Id, at 403, 815 P.2d at 335, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 262 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
Justice Broussard relied on the holding in Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972)
(establishing that a rule which requires a defendant to accelerate the disclosure of
witnesses can trigger the self-incrimination clause). Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 403, 815
P.2d at 335, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 262 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
57. Id at 409-10, 815 P.2d at 340-41, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 267-68 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
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fornia Supreme Court has definitively answered the public's request for
the restoration of "balance and fairness" to a criminal justice system
which too often fails in this objective.
ANDREA L. WILSON
D.

In a prosecutionfor lewd conduct with a child under Penal
Code section 288, a trial court does not abuse its discretion
by admitting expert testimony that it is not unusualfor a
parent to refrainfrom reporting a known child molestation,
and that there exists no recognized profile of a "typical" child
molester. Furthermore,prejudicialerrordoes not occur when
the trial court excludes testimony that the defendant is not a
"sexual deviant," has a reputationfor "normalcy in his sexual tastes," and is a person of "highmoral character": People
v. McAlpin.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The sexual abuse of children is of paramount concern in contemporary
society. 'The increase in the awareness and reporting of this social problem has made this a critical matter that courts have had to address with
greater frequency.' Unfortunately, difficulties with proof and credibility
have often clouded the issues and stymied the judicial process.' The
California Supreme Court addressed these concerns in People v.
McAlpin' when it considered a number of controversial evidentiary rulings in a prosecution for lewd conduct with a child under Penal Code
section 288, subdivision (a).5

1. See generally Michael Cerkovnik, The Sexual Abuse of Children: Myths, Research, and Policy Implications, 89 DicK. L. REV. 691 (1985); John E.B. Myers et al.,
Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 NEB. L. REV. 1 (1989).
2. Cerkovnik, supra note 1, at 691.
3. Myers, supra note 1, at 37.
4. 53 Cal. 3d 1289, 812 P.2d 563, 283 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1991). Justice Mosk authored
the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Kennard, Arabian, and
Baxter concurred. Justice Broussard authored a concurring and dissenting opinion, in
which Justice Panelli concurred.
5. CAL PENAL CODE § 288(a) (West 1988). Section 288(a) provides:
Any person who shall willfully and lewdly commit any lewd or lascivious act
including any of the acts constituting other crimes provided for in Part 1 of
this code upon or with the body, or any part of member thereof, of a child

McAlpin was charged with lewd conduct with the eight-year-old
daughter of a woman he had been dating.' Although the daughter immediately reported the incident to her mother, the authorities were not
contacted until a year later.7 The case became contingent upon the testimony of an expert witness for the prosecution, who dispelled some common myths concerning child molestation,' and upon the admissibility of
certain character evidence.' McAlpin contended that the trial court had
abused its discretion by allowing an expert witness to testify that (i) it is
not unusual for a parent to refrain from reporting a known child moles-

under the age of 14 years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of such person or of such child,
shall be guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned in the state prison for a
term of three, six, or eight years.
Id.
6. McAlpin, 53 Cal. 3d at 1296, 812 P.2d at 566, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 385. Interestingly, a point of controversy for the prosecution arose because Anita (the victim's mother) dated the defendant on one occasion after the occurrence of the incident. Id.
Anita also admitted to having further sexual relations with the defendant after the
event happened. Id. at 1301, 812 P.2d at 570, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
7. Id. at 1296, 812 P.2d at 566, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 385. The delay in reporting the
incident also became a controversial issue in the case when the prosecution elicited
expert testimony purporting that such a delay was not unusual. Id. at 1299, 812 P.2d
at 568, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 387. See generally Kathy L Hensley, The Admissibility of
"Ctild Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome" in California Criminal Courts, 17
PAC. LJ. 1361 (1986).
8. McAlpin, 53 Cal. 3d at 1302-03, 812 P.2d at 570-71, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 389-90.
See also Cerkovnik, supra note 1, at 692-94. In his article, Cerkovnik lists 11 myths
regarding the sex offender
(1) Tens of thousands of homicidal sex fiends stalk the land ....
(2) The
victims of sexual attack are ruined for life ....
(3) Sex offenders are usually recidivists . . . . (4) The minor offender, if unchecked, progresses to
more serious types of crime ....
(5) It is possible to predict the danger of
serious crimes being committed by sex deviates ....
(7) These individuals
are lustful and oversexed ....
(8) Reasonably effective treatment methods
to cure deviated sex offenders are known and employed . . . . (9) The sex
control laws passed are directed to the brutal and vicious sex criminal and
should be adopted generally to wipe out sex crime ....
(10) Civil adjudication of the sex offender does not involve human liberties or due process ....
(11) The sex abuse problem can be solved merely by passing a
law on it.
ld.
9. McAlpin, 53 Cal. 3d at 1304, 812 P.2d at 572, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 391. The defendant may introduce evidence of character traits inconsistent with those associated
with the crime with which he is charged. Id. See also B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EviDENCE, Circumstantial Evidence § 329 (2d ed. 1986). It has been recognized that
certain crimes "lend themselves easily to trait analysis." Lester Rosen, Have You
Heard? Cross Examination of a Criminal Defendant's Good Character Witness: A
Proposal for Reform, 9 U.C. DAVIS L REV. 365, 368-69 n.17 (1976). For example,
"[m]orality, chastity and virtue are inconsistent with a sexual crime." Id.
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tation' O and (ii) that no recognized profile exists of a "typical" child molester." Additionally, McAlpin claimed that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding character evidence that would have demonstrated
that he was not a "sexual deviant," that he had a reputation for "normalcy in his sexual tastes," and that he was a person of "high moral
character."' 3

Due to widespread public misconception and confusion about child
molestation, 4 the supreme court determined that the opinion testimony

10. McAlpin, 53 Cal. 3d at 1299, 812 P.2d at 568, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 387. The
prosecution's expert witness testified that a parent might delay reporting a case of
child molestation for numerous reasons. Id. These reasons included:
the fear of breaking up the marriage or harming relations with other family
members, a sense of shame or failure as a parent, a psychological refusal to
accept the fact of the molestation, or a reluctance to damage the reputation
of the alleged offender when the latter is someone of good standing in the
community.
Id.
11. Id. at 1302-03, 812 P.2d at 570-71, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 389-90. The prosecutor's
expert witness also testified that a child molester can be of any social or financial
status, any age or race, any occupation or geographical area, and any religious belief
or nonbelief. Furthermore, the expert testified that the child molester might have previously enjoyed an "impeccable" reputation. Id. at 1299, 812 P.2d at 568, 283 Cal.
Rptr. at -87. See also Myers, supra note 1, at 142 (concluding that no profile exists
of a "typical" child molester, given the most recent interpretation of scientific data).
12. McAlpin, 53 Cal. 3d at 1306, 812 P.2d at 573, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 392. The witnesses purported to show that the defendant was not a sexual deviant based on his
normal sexual relations with women and upon the witnesses' observation of the
defendant's conduct with children. Id. at 1306, 812 P.2d at 572, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
The trial court ruled that such testimony "violated the rule against proving a character trait of the accused by means of specific acts." Id. at 1308, 812 P.2d at 575, 283
Cal. Rptr. at 394. See also FED. R. EVID. 404 (stating that "[elvidence of a person's
character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that
he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion"); B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EviDENCE, Circumstantial Evidence § 339 (2d ed. 1986) (stating that specific acts are
inadmissible to prove either defendant's good or bad behavior).
13. Mal1pin, 53 Cal. 3d at 1310, 812 P.2d at 576, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 395. California
Evidence Code section 1101(a) (West 1988) prohibits evidence of character as circumstantial evidence. Section 1101(a) states that "evidence of a person's character or a
trait of his character . . . is inadmissible when offered to prove his conduct on a
specified occasion." Id. Nevertheless, certain exceptions exist under California Evidence Code section 1102(a) (West 1988), which allows such evidence in a criminal
action if it is "(a) offered by the defendant to prove his conduct in conformity with
such character or trait of character, (b) offered by the prosecution to rebut evidence
adduced by the defendant under subdivision (a)." Id.
14. McAlpin, 53 Cal. 3d at 1301-02, 812 P.2d at 570-71, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 389-90.

proferred by the prosecution's expert was admissible because it was not
a topic of common knowledge and would have assisted the jury in its
decision-making process. In addition, although the supreme court concluded that the trial court erred in excluding the relevant character evidence concerning the defendant's sexual nature," this exclusion did not
constitute prejudicial error as prescribed by the California Constitution, "' by statute, 8 and by controlling case law.'
II.

A.

TREATMENT OF THE CASE

Majority Opinion
1. Allowance of the Prosecution's Expert Opinion Testimony

Initially, the court found the prosecution's expert witness sufficiently
qualified to give opinion evidence because of his extensive background in
dealing with child molestation cases and their psychological ramifications.'
See Cerkovnik, supra note 1, at 692-94.
15. McAlpin, 53 Cal. 3d at 1302, 812 P.2d at 570, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
16. Id. at 1311, 812 P.2d at 577, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
17. Id. at 1311 n.16, 812 P.2d at 577 n.16, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 396 n.16. Additionally,
Article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution provides:
No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the
ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection
of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of pleading, or for any error
as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire
cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error
complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
CAL CONST. art. VI, § 13
18. California Evidence Code section 354 (West 1966) provides:
A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor .shall the judgment or decision
based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous exclusion of evidence
unless the court which passes upon the effect of the error or errors is of
the opinion that the error or errors complained of resulted in a miscarriage
of justice and it appears of record that: (a) The substance, purpose, and relevance of the excluded evidence was made known to the court by the questions asked, an offer of proof, or by any other means; (b) The rulings of the
court made compliance with subdivision (a) futile; or (c) The evidence was
sought by questions asked during cross-examination or recross-examination.
Id.
19. See People v. Stoll, 49 Cal. 3d 1136, 1161-63, 783 P.2d 698, 714-15, 265 Cal.
Rptr. 111, 127-28 (1989) (applying the Watson test of prejudicial error); People v.
Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 828, 836, 299 P.2d 243, 249, 254 (1956) (holding that it must be
reasonably probable that a verdict more favorable to the defendant would have been
reached in the absence of this error). Cf. People v. Jones, 42 Cal. 2d 219, 226, 266
P.2d 38, 43 (1954) (holding that reversible error existed where victim had a bad reputation for truth and veracity).
20. McAlpin, 53 Cal. 3d at 1298, 812 P.2d at 567, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 386. The
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a.

Testimony regardinga parent's reluctance to report a known
child molestation

In determining that the trial court did not abuse its discretion2 ' by

allowing opinion testimony that it is not uncommon for a parent to refrain from reporting a known child molestation, the supreme court
analogized to cases involving "rape trauma syndrome, " ' in which victims fail to give timely reports of their assault. The court noted that evidence of this syndrome is not admissible to prove that the victim had,

indeed, been raped; rather, it is admissible to reestablish the victim's
credibility.' Furthermore, the court explained that several court of appeal decisions had already extended the rule established in "rape trauma
syndrome" cases to child molestation cases in which the child delays
reporting the abuse ("child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome").

'

The court reasoned that "[s]uch expert testimony is needed to disabuse
jurors of commonly held misconceptions about child sexual abuse, and
to explain the emotional antecedents of abused children's seemingly selfimpeaching behavior. " ' Although the case at bar did not deal with the
child victim's failure to report the molestation, but rather with the
parent's failure, the court determined the foregoing rules should still

prosecution's expert witness' qualifications included "from 350 to 400 hours of specialized training in such topics as juvenile and adolescent psychology, physical, sexual
or emotional abuse of children, intervention in family crisis situations, investigation of
child abuse charges, behavioral responses of child abuse victims, and the dynamics of
child abuse offenders." Id. See generally 31 CAL. JUR. 3D Evidence §§ 489-516 (1976 &
Supp. 1992) (providing an overview of expert testimony).
21. McAlpin, 53 Cal. 3d at 1299, 812 P.2d at 568, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 387. The court
stated that the admission of expert testimony by a trial court would "not be disturbed on appeal unless a manifest abuse of discretion is shown." Id. (quoting People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 39, 549 P.2d 1240, 1250, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 154 (1976))
(emphasis added).
22. See People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 248-51, 681 P.2d 291, 298-301, 203 Cal.
Rptr. 450, 458-60 (1984) (holding that expert testimony regarding the delay of reporting a rape charge is inadmissible to prove that the victim had actually been
raped).
23. Ma4lpin, 53 Cal. 3d at 1300, 812 P.2d at 569, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 388. See also
supra note 22.
24. See, e.g., People v. Bowker, 203 Cal. App. 3d 385, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1988);
People v. Gray, 187 Cal. App. 3d 213, 231 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1986); People v. Roscoe,
168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1985).
25. MAlpin, 53 Cal. 3d at 1301, 812 P.2d at 569, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 388 (quoting
Myers, supra note 1, at 89 (footnote omitted)).

apply,' Focusing on the typical juror's lack of personal experience in
dealing with a sexually abused child, the supreme court concluded that
expert testimony was needed to dispel the misconception that a parent
would undoubtedly report the incident immediately had it actually occurred."
b.

Testimony regarding the nonexistence of a "typical" child
molester

In determining that the trial court did not err in allowing the
prosecution's expert witness to testify that no profile exists of a "typical
child molester," the court specified many commonly shared, but inaccurate or unsubstantiated, stereotypes of the child molester.' "'The
layperson imagines the child offender to be a stranger, an old man, insane or retarded, alcohol- or drug-addicted, sexually frustrated and impotent or sexually jaded, and looking for kicks.'"' Because the defendant
did not conform to the aforementioned stereotypical profile, the court
reasoned that the expert's testimony was relevant and would therefore
assist the jury in its deliberations.' The court also noted that the trial
court has broad discretion in determining relevancy."
2.

Exclusion of the Defendant's Character Evidence

In analyzing whether the exclusion of certain character evidence constituted prejudicial error, the court divided the defendant's offer of proof
into the following categories: (1) Evidence that the defendant was not a
"sexual deviant," (2) testimony that the defendant had a "reputation for
normalcy in his sexual tastes," and (3) testimony that the defendant was
a person of "high moral character."32

26. Id.
27. Id. at 1302, 812 P.2d at 570, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 389.

28. ld.
29. Id. at 1302, 812 P.2d at 571, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (quoting Groth, Patterns of
Sexual Assault Against Children and Adolescents, in SEXUAL ASSAULTS OF CHILDREN
AND ADOLESCENTS 3-4 (Burgess et al. eds. 1978)). According to the Groth report on
child molesters, there was "no significant difference in intelligence between child offenders and the general population." Id. See also supra note 8.
30. McAlpin, 53 Cal. 3d at 1303, 818 P.2d at 571, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 390. See FED.
R. EVID. 350 (testimony must be relevant to be admissible).
31. McAlpin, 53 Cal. 3d at 1303, 812 P.2d at 571, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (citing People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 19, 609 P.2d 468, 477, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 11 (1980)).
32. Id. at 1305, 1310, 812 P.2d at 572, 576, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 391, 395.
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a.

Evidence that the defendant was not a "sexual deviant"

The defendant's three character witnesses proposed to offer evidence
that he was not a sexual deviant. The two female witnesses would have
based their opinions on their own personal and sexual relationship with
the defendant, and on their observance of the defendant's normal conduct with their own daughters.' The male witness would have based his
testimony on his observance of the defendant's interaction with women
in general.' The trial court rejected all evidence regarding the
defendant's alleged lack of sexual deviance, reasoning that such a determination could only be rendered by an expert.'
The supreme court stated, however, that a criminal defendant may
introduce opinion or reputation evidence indicating that he defendant
was unlikely to have committed the offense so long as the testimony is
substantially related to the specific offense.' In addition, the court noted that People v. StoW7 allowed a defendant charged with child molestation to introduce expert opinion testimony regarding his lack of sexual
deviance.' However, because Stoll did not limit such testimony to expert witnesses, the McAlpin court determined that lay opinion testimony
was admissible if it satisfied Evidence Code section 800.' Accordingly,

33. Id. at 1305, 812 P.2d at 572, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
34. Id. Defendant's character witnesses consisted of two women who had "dated
the defendant for approximately six months, had been sexually intimate with him
during that period, and thereafter had continued their friendship with him; each also
had a daughter." Id. at 1304, 812 P.2d at 572, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 391. The defendant's
third witness was a male college friend who had observed defendant's conduct on
double-dates. Id.
35. Id. at 1304, 812 P.2d at 572, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
36. Id. (citation omitted).
37. 49 Cal. 3d 1136, 783 P.2d 698, 265 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1989).
38. McAlpin, 53 Cal. 3d at 1305, 812 P.2d at 573, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 392. "'I]n a
child molestation case (1) the fact that the defendant is not a sexual deviant is a
relevant character trait within the meaning of section 1102, and (2) the statute allows
a defendant to prove that trait by the opinion testimony of an expert witness.'" Id. at
1305-06, 812 P.2d at 573, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 392 (quoting People v. Stoll, 49 Cal. 3d
1136, 1152-55, 783 P.2d 698, 714-16, 265 Cal. Rptr. 111, 126-28 (1989)).
39. CAL. EVID. CODE § 800 (West 1988). Section 800 limits lay opinion testimony to
an opinion that is "(a) [r]ationally based on the perception of the witness; and (b)
[h]elpful to a clear understanding of his testimony." McAlpin, 53 Cal. 3d at 1306, 812
P.2d at 573, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 392. Many cases have admitted lay testimony when it is
based on -the witness' personal observation. See, e.g., People v. Ravey, 122 Cal. App.
2d 699, 7(13, 265 P.2d 154, 157 (1954) (allowing testimony as to whether the defen-

the court stressed that the lay testimony must be based on personal
perceptions of the defendant's conduct with children.' Therefore, the
testimony of the male character witness was inadmissible because it was
not based on his observation of the defendant's interaction with children.4 Likewise, the court limited the female character witnesses' testimony to direct observations of the defendant's behavior around their
daughters, excluding testimony concerning their own sexual relationships
with the defendant.'
b.

Evidence that the defendant had a reputationfor 'normalcy in
his sexual tastes" and was a person of "high moral character"

In analyzing the relevance of the defendant's reputation for sexual normalcy, the court stated that "[e]vidence that a defendant does not have a
bad reputation for a relevant character trait is admissible as tending to
show that he has a good reputation for that trait."' In addition, because
the definition of reputation testimony does not require that it be based
on the witness' own perceptions, the supreme court asserted that the
trial court should have admitted evidence concerning the defendant's
reputation for sexual normalcy." Similarly, the court determined that
the trial court should have admitted evidence that the defendant was a
person of high moral character, this evidence was relevant to the charge
because the court interpreted the term "moral" as referring to sexual
morality.'
3.

The Trial Court's Error in Excluding Certain Items of Good
Character Evidence

The supreme court concluded that although the trial court erred in

dant was intoxicated); Jordan v. Great Western Motorways, 213 Cal. 606, 612, 2 P.2d
786, 791 (1931) (allowing plaintiff to testify as to the speed of a bus and her driver's
car); Kline v. Santa Barbara Consol. Ry. Co., 150 Cal. 741, 750, 90 P. 125, 129 (1907)
(allowing witnesses to testify as to accident victim's pain and suffering); People v.
Manoogian, 141 Cal. 592, 598, 75 P. 177, 179 (1904) (allowing witness to testify as to
whether defendant was acting rationally).
40. McAlpin, 53 Cal. 3d at 1309, 812 P.2d at 575, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1310, 812 P.2d at 576, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 395. See also 1 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, CircumstantialEvidence § 335 (2d ed. 1986).
44. McAlpin, 53 Cal. 3d at 1311, 812 P.2d at 576, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 395. ("The rule
that lay opinion testimony must be based on the witness' personal observation thus
does not apply to reputation testimony, and indeed the Evidence Code imposes no
such requirement."). See generally 31 CAL. JUR. Evidence § 306 (1976).
45. McAlpin, 53 Cal. 3d at 1311, 812 P.2d at 576-77, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 395-96.
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excluding certain good character evidence relevant to the charge against
the defendant, this exclusion did not constitute prejudicial error per
se.' The court stated that an appropriate prejudice analysis for the exclusion of relevant character evidence includes a consideration of California constitutional provisions, the applicable statute, and controlling
case law.' 7 The court then determined that the exclusion of character
evidence did not offend the California Constitution because the challenged exclusion did "not remotely approach the gravity" of offenses
generally held to violate the constitution.'8 Furthermore, the court
analogized the present case to the prejudice analysis set forth in People
v. Stol.' In Stoll, the court illustrated that under certain circumstances
(contradictory testimony, motive to lie, et cetera), the exclusion of good
character evidence might constitute prejudicial error.' However, the
supreme court found that none of these circumstances was present in
the instant case."' Interestingly, the court never addressed the statutory
concerns of excluding relevant character evidence.'
B.

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justice Broussard

In his separate opinion, Justice Broussard agreed with the majority's
conclusion that the testimony proferred by the prosecution's expert witness was admissible.' However, Justice Broussard strongly disagreed
46. Id. at 1313, 812 P.2d at 578, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
47. Id. at 1311, 812 P.2d at 577, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 396. See also supra notes 17-19.
48. 1& at 1311 n.16, 812 P.2d at 577 n.16, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 396 n.16. See People v.
Bigelow, 37 Cal. 3d 731, 744-46, 691 P.2d 994, 1001-02, 209 Cal. Rptr. 328, 335-36
(1984) (holding prejudicial error existed where court did not appoint counsel to incompetent defendant in a capital case); People v. Joseph, 34 Cal. 3d 936, 946-48, 671
P.2d 843, 849-50, 196 Cal. Rptr. 339, 347-49 (1983) (holding that prejudicial error existed where a defendant's motion to represent himself in a capital crime was denied).
49. 49 Cal. 3d 1136, 783 P.2d 698, 265 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1989).
50. MaAlpin, 53 Cal. 3d at 1312, 812 P.2d at 577, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 396. The court
noted that in Sto/l, "four of the children contradicted key parts of each other's account of the event, four admitted they had lied at the preliminary hearing, two admitted they had lied at trial, and prior statements by five of the children contradicted
parts of their testimony." Id. (citing People v. Stoll, 49 Cal. 3d 1136, 1162, 783 P.2d
699, 623, 265 Cal. Rptr. 111, 135 (1989)).
51. 1& ("In the case before us there were no such contradictions or admitted untruths in Stephanie's testimony, nor did the defense suggest any persuasive motive for
Stephanie to lie repeatedly, over a period of more than two years, to her mother, to
the police, and to the jury.").
52. Id The court did note, however, that the Evidence Code recognizes reputation
evidence as being inherently unreliable. Id,
53. Id at 1313, 812 P.2d at 578, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 397 (Broussard, J., concurring in

with the majority's finding that the exclusion of good character evidence
was not prejudicial." Justice Broussard argued that in California "[t]he
defendant... is specifically authorized by statute to present good character evidence in any criminal case." ' Justice Broussard explained that
important policy concerns permit a defendant to offer good character
evidence because often the ultimate issue of guilt is contingent upon his
credibility and character.' In addition, the mere introduction of good
character evidence may be so convincing that it may "raise a reasonable
doubt of guilt."" Furthermore, Justice Broussard stressed the importance of admitting good character evidence in a child molestation case
because the very nature of the crime raises serious doubts as to the truth
and veracity of the defendant's general character.'
Justice Broussard was particularly critical of the majority's failure to
consider the defendant's good character evidence as a whole rather than
as separate and distinct offers of proof.L Justice Broussard believed that
the court should have interpreted the defendant's good character evidence as a mere affirmation from close friends that "the defendant's

part and dissenting in part).
54. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Given the nature
of the trial court's error and the state of the evidence, I believe that reversal is
clearly required.") Id,
55. Id. at 1314, 812 P.2d at 578, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 397 (Broussard, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). The California Evidence Code allows the defendant to
offer evidence of his "character or trait of his character," CAL EVID. CODE § 1102
(West 1986), the Federal Evidence Code speaks more narrowly of "evidence of a
pertinent trait of his character." FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
56. McAlpin, 53 CaL 3d at 1313, 812 P.2d at 578, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 397 (Broussard,
J., concurrring in part and dissenting in part). This is particularly true of cases involving only circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 42 Cal. 2d 219, 266
P.2d 38 (1954); People v. Anglopoulos, 30 Cal. App. 2d 538, 86 P.2d 873 (1939).
57. McAlpin, 53 Cal. 3d at 1314, 812 P.2d at 579, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 398 (Broussard,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Michelson v. United States, 335
U.S. 469, 476 (1948)). Some modem federal decisions have held that the jury should
not be instructed that the defendant's good character evidence "standing alone" may
be enough to raise a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt. See, e.g., United
States v. Marquardt, 786 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1986).
58. McAlpin, 53 Cal. 3d at 1313, 812 P.2d at 578, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 397 (Broussard,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Good character evidence has been held
to be of particular importance in cases involving lewd and lascivious behavior, where
the defendant's denial along with the impeachment of the child's testimony is often
the only defense. See People v. Adams, 14 Cal. 2d 154, 167-68, 93 P.2d 146, 158-59
(1939) (holding that errors which would ordinarily be trivial become of great importance in a child molestation case); People v. Anthony, 185 Cal. 152, 156, 196 P. 47,
49 (1921) (holding that a defendant's good character evidence may be the only defense to a charge of child molestation).
59. McAlpin, 53 Cal. 3d at 1319, 812 P.2d at 582, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 401 (Broussard,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

[Vol. 20: 257, 1992]

CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

general character was inconsistent with having committed the sexual
offense of which he was accused."' Furthermore, Justice Broussard
contended that even if one applied the majority's approach to the
defendant's good character evidence and interpreted the offers of proof
as being separate entities, the evidence should still have been admissible
because it was based on the witnesses' "own perception[s]."'
Finally, Justice Broussard argued that even if the majority's determination of the trial court's error was correct, the exclusion of certain
good character evidence clearly constituted prejudicial error.' Justice
Broussard relied on several California Supreme Court decisions that
emphasized the importance of good character evidence in a child molestation case because "in a sex case where the witness is the victim and
his story :is totally uncorroborated, almost any error is serious and is
likely to be prejudicial.' Moreover, Justice Broussard found the exclusion of good character evidence even more disturbing when coupled with
the "unusual" circumstances of this case.'
III.

CONCLUSION

In McAlpin, the California Supreme Court attempted to reconcile controversial evidentiary issues with the serious and disturbing crime of
child molestation. By expanding the scope of admissible expert testimony that dispels common myths regarding child molestation, the court

60. Id. at 1318, 812 P.2d at 582, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 401 (Broussard, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
61, Id. (Broussard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "Each of the witnesses had formed her or his opinion as to defendant's character on the basis of the
witness's personal experience with defendant in different settings over a considerable
period of time." Id. at 1319-20, 812 P.2d at 582, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 401 (Broussard, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
62. Id at 1321, 812 P.2d at 583, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 402 (Broussard, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
63. Id. at 1322, 812 P.2d at 584, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 403 (Broussard, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting People v. Stanley, 67 Cal.' 2d 812, 820, 433 P.2d
913, 919, 63 Cal. Rptr. 825, 833 (1967)). See supra note 58 (citing cases in which the
defendant's denial and impeachment of the child's testimony is often the only defense).
64. Id. at 1323, 812 P.2d at 584, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 404 (Broussard, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Justice Broussard illustrates several "unusual" circumstances surrounding the case: the fact that the molestation occurred in the mother's
presence; the mother's refusal to report the molestation; and the mother's continued
dating of and having sexual relations with the defendant. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

demonstrated a desire to eradicate prevailing misperceptions and perhaps to diminish the social stigma inherently attached to this crime.
Moreover, the court's conclusion that excluding certain good character
evidence of the defendant's sexual nature does not constitute prejudicial
error will increase the difficulty of defending against such accusations. A
defendant's only viable defense is often his good reputation in the community; absent this defense, a person charged with child molestation
might be at the mercy of the jury's interpretation of the child victim's
credibility. Finally, McAlpin illustrates the California Supreme Court's
growing trend of broadly interpreting the doctrine of harmless error,
resulting in the reversal of fewer criminal convictions.
ANDREA L. WILSON
E.

Section 872(b) of the Penal Code, allowing police officers to
relate hearsay evidence at a preliminaryhearing, is constitutional, but does not allow a finding of probable cause based
on a police report read by an officer on behalf of an investigating officer when the testifying officer was not involved in
the case and had no personal knowledge regarding the investigation:Whitman v. Superior Court.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Whitman v. Superior Court,' the supreme court once again addressed issues involving the constitutionality of Proposition 115,2 one

1. 54 Cal. 3d 1063, 820 P.2d 262, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 160 (1991). Chief Justice Lucas
wrote the majority opinion in which Justices Panelli, Arabian, Baxter, and George
concurred. Justice Mosk wrote a separate concurring opinion, and Justice Kennard
wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
2. Proposition 115, an initiative measure, was approved in the June 5, 1990 primary election and became operational June 6, 1990. Entitled the Crime Victims Justice
Reform Act, it was intended to protect crime victims and accelerate the criminal
justice process. It made numerous changes to the California Constitution and various
codes. See generally 1 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Introduction to Crimes § 10A (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1991) (discussing the principal changes
made); Special Alert, "Proposition115: The Crime Victims Justice Reform Act," CAL.
CENTER JUD. EDUC. & RES. J., June 1990 (setting out the changes in more detailed
form); Deborah Glenn, Proposition 115: The Crime Victims Justice Reform Act, 22
PAC. L.J. 1010 (1991); Lisa A. Lunsman, Proposition 115 - "The Crime Victims Justice Reform Act": Reformation of an Inept System or a Constitutional Disaster?, 22
U. WEST LA. L REV. 59 (1991).
Prior to Whitman, the court dealt with a variety of constitutional challenges to
Proposition 116. See, e.g., Izazaga v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 356, 815 P.2d 304, 285
Cal. Rptr. 231 (1991) (challenging reciprocal discovery provisions of Proposition 1151;
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provision of which added section 872(b) to the Penal Code, allowing
hearsay testimony' by qualified police officers at felony preliminary hearings." The court held that section 872(b) did not violate the defendant's
right of confrontation, did not deny him due process, and did not violate
the separation of powers doctrine.' The court limited the applicability of
872(b), however, by holding that the provision did not authorize a finding
of probable cause based on a police officer's report read by a fellow
officer when the "reader" had no direct knowledge of the crime or circumstances so as to assist in assessing the reliability of the statements. 6
This case arose out of an information that charged the defendant with
drunk driving. At the preliminary hearing, the People called only one
witness--a police officer who had not taken part in the arrest or investigation of the case and had no direct knowledge regarding the offense.7

Tapia v. Superior Court, 53 CaL 3d 282, 807 P.2d 434, 279 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1991)
(challenging retroactive application of Proposition 115); Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal.
3d 336, 801 P.2d 1077, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1990) (challenging Proposition 115 on
grounds that it violated single-subject and revision provisions of the California Constitution).
3. Hearsay testimony involves statements related by a second party, not the person who originally makes the statement. Section 1200 of the Evidence Code reads:
"Hearsay evidence is evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness
while testifying at the hearing that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated."
CAL EvID. CODE § 1200 (West 1966 & Supp. 1991). Such evidence is inadmissible
unless exceptions by law provide otherwise. Id. See generally 1 B. WrrUN, CALIFORNIA
EVIDENCE, The Hearsay Rule § 558 (3d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1991) (discussing the California hearsay rule); 31 CAL JUR. 3D Evidence §§ 215-26, 218 (1976 & Supp. 1991)
(hearsay rule); 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1362 (Chadbourn ed. 1974 & Supp. 1991)
(discussing hearsay rule in broader Anglo-American context).
4. Section 872(b) of the Penal Code provides that at a felony preliminary hearing,
a finding of probable cause may be based in whole or in part upon the
sworn testimony of a law enforcement officer relating the statements of
declanmts made out of court offered for the truth of the matter asserted.
Any law enforcement officer testifying as to hearsay statements shall either
have five years of law enforcement experience or have completed a training
course certified by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training
which includes training in the investigation and reporting of cases and testifying at preliminary hearings.
CAL PENAL CODE § 872(b) (West Supp. 1992). See generally 4 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN,
CAIFORNIA CRIMNAL LAW, Proceedings Before Trial § 1982 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1991)
(discussing section 872 and other changes regarding admissibility of evidence at the
preliminary examination).
5. Whitman, 54 Cal. 3d at 1071-83, 820 P.2d at 266-74, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 164-72.
6. Id. at 1072-75, 820 P.2d at 266-68, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 164-66.
7. In fact, the testifying officer had never even met the investigating officer, and

The officer simply read the report of the investigating officer to the
court. The defendant made repeated objections to the testimony as hearsay. However, over such objections, and based on the information in the
report, the defendant was held to answer on the counts charged.8

II.

TREATMENT

Before addressing the constitutional issues, the court examined the
defendant's argument that section 872(b) was not intended to allow the
type of hearsay involved in this case. According to the statutory language
and legislative materials,9 the provision was intended "to allow a properly qualified investigating officer to relate out of court statements by
crime victims or witnesses, including other law enforcement personnel,
without requiring victims' or witnesses' presence in court."'" The requirement that a testifying officer be properly qualified was intended to
ensure the reliability of any out-of-court statements." Since an officer
who simply reads a report with no knowledge of the circumstances under which the statements were made cannot assist in determining the
reliability of the statement, 2 such an officer's testimony is not autho-

first became aware of the investigation report the morning of the preliminary hearing
when the district attorney handed him a copy. Id. at 1068, 820 P.2d at 642, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 162.
8. Id. at 1068-70, 820 P.2d at 264-65, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 162-63. The defendant
applied to the court of appeal for a writ of mandate but was denied. The supreme
court issued an alternative writ of mandate to resolve the constitutional and interpretive issues involved. Id.
9. The court examined the ballot pamphlet, prepared by the legislative analyst,
which stated that the intent underlying the provision was to allow out of court statements to be "introduced through the testimony of certain trained and experienced
law enforcement officers." BALLOT PAMPHLET, Proposed Statutes and Amendments to
California Constitution; With Arguments to Voters; Primary Election June 5, 1990
at 33.
10. Whitman, 54 Cal. 3d at 1072, 820 P.2d at 266-67, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 164-65.
Justice Kennard's concurring and dissenting opinion takes issue with the majority's
inclusion of police officers in the class of those whose statements are admissible as
hearsay. See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
11. Whitman, 54 Cal. 3d at 1073, 820 P.2d at 267, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 165. Justice
Mosk's concurring opinion also focuses on the reliability of the evidence as disqualifying a reader, but bases his finding on the principles underlying the hearsay rule
exceptions instead of the intent of the statute, upon which the majority relies. See
intra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
12. In the instant case, the testifying officer did not know the terms or circumstances of the report's preparation or precisely which sobriety tests were conducted.
He was also unable to explain certain discrepancies in the report For example, the
report stated that the defendant's eyes were brown, but they were in fact green. The
testifying officer was even unsure of the amount of the investigating officer's experience, and whether the officer was male or female. Such problems actually undercut
the reliability of his testimony.
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rized under the statute.
The court emphasized that the testimony of non-investigating readers
could amount to double hearsay, since the reader might relate statements
of witnesses based solely on the investigating officer's report.'3 No
amendment was made to the statute covering the admissibility of double
hearsay, thereby suggesting that the legislature did not intend the provision to reach this type of hearsay.'4 Additionally, allowing double hearsay would raise "constitutional questions," which the court could avoid
by interpreting the statute as not encompassing such testimony.6
The first constitutional question the court dealt with was whether the
admissibility of hearsay by a testifying officer violated the defendant's
right to confront his accuser.'6 Article I, Section 15 of the California
Constitution guarantees the right "to be confronted with the witness
against the defendant."17 However, as part of Proposition 115, Section 30
subdivision (b) was amended to specifically allow hearsay testimony at
preliminary hearings. 8 Thus, the only constitutional objection possible
would be on federal constitutional grounds.
The federal constitution provides that "[iun all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses

13. Whitman, 54 Cal. 3d at 1074, 820 P.2d at 267-68, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 165-66.
14. Id. Section 872(b) created a specific exception to the basic hearsay rule in
Evidence Code section 1200, but did not create a similar exception for the multiple hearsay rule of Evidence Code section 1201. Id. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1200-1201 (West
1966 & Supp. 1991) (requiring both types of out-of-court statements to comply with
hearsay rule exceptions to be admissible).
15. Whitman, 54 Cal. 3d at 1074, 820 P.2d at 267-68, 2 Cal. Rptr: 2d at 165-66. The
"constitutional questions" would be those involving the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses., The court cited People v. Smith for the proposition that a court
should adopt the interpretation of a statute which avoids conflict with the Constitution rather than raise a constitutional issue. People v. Smith, 34 Cal. 3d 251, 667
P.2d 149, 193 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1983) (interpreting Proposition 8, the "Victims Bill of
Rights," to avoid constitutional conflict).
16. The defendant also challenged the amendment to Evidence Code section 1203.1,
which exempts such hearsay testimony from cross-examination. CAL. EVID. CODE §
1203.1 (West Supp. 1991). The same arguments regarding confrontation apply to
cross-examiration, and the court in its opinion discusses confrontation as encompassing the cross-examination right.
17. CAL CONST. art. I, § 15.
18. Article I, Section 30(b), added to the Constitution in 1990, provides: "In order
to protect %ictims and witnesses in criminal cases, hearsay evidence shall be admissible at preliminary hearings as prescribed by the Legislature or by the people through
the initiative process." CAL CON T. art. I, § 30(b).

against him."' The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that "[t]he right
to confrontation is basically a trial right. " ' The right does not require
confrontation at a probable cause hearing to justify significant pretrial
detention, "' and hearsay is admissible in federal indictment proceedings' or in findings of probable cause in a federal preliminary examination.' A state preliminary hearing is sufficiently analogous to the federal
procedures, and would not violate the federal confrontation clause because a preliminary hearing is not a "trial." '
The rationale underlying the federal cases is that probable cause determinations do not require "the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that
a reasonable-doubt... standard demands," and credibility determinations are not as crucial in reaching the reasonable belief standard.'
Such confrontation might increase reliability of out-of-court statements,
but the increase would be too slight to justify the inevitable increase in
cost and delay.' The California requirement that an officer be qualified
enhances such reliability even beyond federal guidelines.2" In addition,
the use of hearsay testimony applies only to the narrow probable cause
determination that a felony has been committed, and not for purposes of
discovery.'

19. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
20. Whitman, 54 Cal. 3d at 1079, 820 P.2d at 271, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 169 (emphasis
added) (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968).
21. Id. (referring to Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), which held that confrontation is not necessary for every pretrial probable cause hearing).
22. Id (citing Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1956)).
23. Id. at 1081, 820 P.2d at 272, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 170 (noting that Rule 5.1(a) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows hearsay to support a finding of probable cause). See FED. R. Civ. P. 5.1(a). See generally WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, Criminal § 85 (2d ed. 1982 & Supp. 1991) (discussing the rules involved
in federal preliminary hearings).
24. Whitman, 54 Cal. 3d at 1081-82, 820 P.2d at 273, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171.
25. Id. at 1080, 820 P.2d at 271, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 169 (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103, 121-23 (1975)).
26. Id. at 1080, 820 P.2d at 272, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 170 (relying on Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121-22 (1975)). The court noted that imposing the same rules of
evidence at the preliminary hearing as the trial would in many respects allow the
defendant a second trial, resulting in judicial waste and delay. Id. at 1081-82, 820
P.2d at 273, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171 (quoting Wilson v. State, 655 P.2d 1246, 1251
(Wyo. 1982)).
27. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text. There are no qualification requirements for hearsay testimony offered in the aforementioned federal procedures.
28. A further provision of Proposition 115, amending Penal Code section 866(b)
provides that "the [preliminary examination shall not be used for purposes of discovery." CAL PENAL CODE § 866(b) (West Supp. 1992). Prior to the amendment, the preliminary hearing was used for trial preparation and discovery of witnesses, in addition to the probable cause determination. The narrowing of the applicability of the
hearsay exception solely to the probable cause determination at preliminary hearings
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Addressing the second constitutional issue, the court dismissed the
defendant's contention that the hearsay exception denied him due process because, "impliedly," only the prosecutor is allowed to introduce
hearsay. However, the defendant made no showing of unfairness since he
did not seek to introduce hearsay testimony on his own behalf.'0 The
court concluded that the provision was a limited exception to the
exclusionary rule giving broad protection to the defendant, and that the
prosecution still had to meet the burden of proof for probable cause.'
The court discarded the defendant's argument that the hearsay exception violated the separation of powers doctrine by giving the prosecutor
excessive power over the evidence admissible at the hearing. With the
amendments, such power is specifically authorized by the California
Constitution, and since the magistrate retained full authority to rule on
the sufficiency of the evidence, there was no encroachment on the separation of powers."
Justice Mosk's concurring opinion emphasized that the principles underlying the hearsay rule were supported by the court's broad interpretation of section 872(b) allowing hearsay by an officer who had investigated the case.' The rule rejects out-of-court statements because they are
not deemed sufficiently reliable for admission.' Exceptions are made
for statements possessing indicia of trustworthiness.' The broad construction of section 872(b) requiring the testifying officer to actually
investigate the case possesses such indicia, is reliable, and thus admissible.'0 Justice Mosk also cautioned that an officer who does not have

brings the exception in line with the federal cases, and ensures the constitutionality
of the provisions.
29. Unfairness is an important element in such a due process claim, as is lack of
reciprocity. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973) (holding unfair a notice-ofalibi discovery allowance to the prosecution due to lack of reciprocity). In the instant
case, the court left open whether the defendant could introduce hearsay testimony by
a police officer under the hearsay exception. Since the defendant made no attempt to
introduce such evidence, he did not demonstrate unfairness.
30. Whitman, 54 Cal. 3d at 1082, 820 P.2d at 273, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171.
31. Id. at 1082-83, 820 P.2d at 273-74, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171-72.
32. Id. at 1086, 820 P.2d at 275, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 173 (Mosk, J., concurring). See
generally supra note 3.
33. Whitman, 54 Cal. 3d at 1084, 820 P.2d at 275, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 173 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
34. Id. at 1085, 820 P.2d at 275, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 173 (Mosk, J., concurring). See
generally 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1422 (Chadbourn ed. 1974 & Supp. 1991) (discussing trustworthiness as an essential element of hearsay exceptions).
35. Whitman, 54 Cal. 3d at 1085, 820 P.2d at 275, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 173 (Mask, J.,

direct knowledge of particular matters in an out-of-court statement
should not be deemed to have fulfilled the actual-investigation requirement.6
Justice Kennard, in her concurring and dissenting opinion, agreed that
the provision did not violate the constitution, and that the defendant
should not have been held to answer on the reader testimony.' However, Justice Kennard recommended that the hearsay exception should
apply to the out-of-court statements of private citizens only, and not
other police officers.' The argument was based on the express purpose
of the Proposition 115 amendment to the California Constitution, Article
1 Section 30(b), "to protect victims and witnesses in criminal cases." '
The hearsay exception allows victims to avoid undergoing the traumatic
experience of testifying and the possibility of harassment. Testifying is
part and parcel of an officer's job and officers do not require the same
protection. This indicates that the exceptions should apply to private citizens only.' Justice Kennard stressed the practicality of a bright line rule
over the difficulty in determining on a case-by-case basis whether an
officer has sufficient knowledge of the crime or circumstances so as to
assist the magistrate in determining reliability.4'

IH. CONCLUSION
The determination of whether an officer's outside knowledge is sufficient to aid in determining reliability will be a practical one, addressed
on a case-by-case basis. Unfortunately the court provides no guidance
other than stating that lack of outside knowledge disqualifies reader
testimony. By not stating outright that reader testimony is always inadmissible,c , the court leaves open the question whether a testifying offi-

concurring).
36. Id. at 1085 n.2, 820 P.2d at 275 n.2, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 173 n.2 (Mosk, J., con-

curring).
37. Id. at 1087, 820 P.2d at 276, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 174 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
38. Id. at 1088-89, 820 P.2d at 277, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 175 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
39. CAL CONST. art. I, § 30(b) (1990).
40. Whitman, 54 Cal. 3d at 1088-89, 820 P.2d at 277, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 175
(Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
41. Id. at 1089-90, 820 P.2d at 278, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 176 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting). The majority, in response to this argument, pointed out that
Kennard's rule would require a finding of the relationship between the officer and the
out-of-court statement. Id. at 1075, 820 P.2d at 268, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 166.
42. Most reviews of Whitman have implied that reader testimony is always inadmissible. See Richard Barbieri, Hearsay Evidence Restricted, THE RECORDER, December 10, 1991, at 15 ("the court . . . dispensed with the use of so-called reader officers"); William Carlsen, State Top Court Upholds Key Portion of Prop. 115, SAN
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cer may relate parts of a report in which the investigating officer states
events he witnessed himself.'
The logical interpretation would be to allow statements by the investigating officer made in his capacity as a witness, and strike out any
double hearsay. The court would presumably do this with civilian witnesses in any event. This interpretation is consistent with the rationale of
,the case, but it would complicate a procedure that Proposition 115 intended to simplify. Arguably, however, even a complex procedure is
more efficient than doing without the hearsay exception at all.

ADAM L. JOHNSON
V.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A.

Under Penal Code section 1538.5(i), the government may
,recallat a second hearing those prosecution witnesses who
testified previously at a preliminary hearing even when the
defendant has presented no new evidence: People v. Hansel.

In People v. Hansel,' the California Supreme Court considered wheth-

FRANCIscO CHRON., Dec. 10, 1991, at A14 ("the police officer who testifies ... cannot
be simply a "reader" who relates what is in a police report"). But see Philip Hager,
Key Portion of Prop. 115 OKd by High Court, LA. TIMEs, December 10, 1991, at A3
(avoiding such implication by focusing on the requirement that the officer have
sufficient outside knowledge to admit hearsay).
43. Justice Kennard's solution permitting a testifying officer to relate only out-ofcourt statements by civilians avoids such problems. However, it would also disqualify
valuable evidence that the testifying officer could offer regarding out-of-court statements the investigating officer makes as a witness himself.
1. 1 Cal. 4th 1211, 824 P.2d 694, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888 (1992). Justice Paneli wrote
the opinion for a unanimous court consisting of Chief Justice Lucas and Justices
Mosk, Kennard, Arabian, Baxter, and George. The defendants, charged with possession
for sale of methamphetamine, possession of cocaine, and possession for sale of marijuana, moved to suppress evidence obtained by police officers under suspect circumstances. The sole witness testifying at the preliminary hearing was a police officer
called by the people. Upon denial of the motion to suppress, the defendants renewed
the motion at a special hearing before the superior court. The prosecution attempted
to recall the officer as a witness, but was prohibited from doing so because the
defendants had not presented any new evidence. The defendants' motion to suppress
was granted and the court dismissed the case after the people expressed an inability
to proceed without the suppressed evidence. Id. at 1214-16, 824 P.2d at 696, 4 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 890.

er, under Penal Code section 1538.5(i),' the prosecution may recall witnesses at a second hearing when the defendant has presented no new
evidence The court held that the statute imposed no limitation upon
the people's right to recall prosecution witnesses at a renewed suppression hearing.' The court adopted a literal interpretation of section
1538.5(i), reasoning that the statute's clear and unambiguous language
precluded any need for extrinsic evidence of legislative intent.'
In ruling that the trial court had erred in refusing to allow the prosecution to recall witnesses when the defendants had presented no new
evidence, the supreme court clarified the meaning of Penal Code section
1538.5(i).' The court specifically declined to follow the statutory inter-

The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal and ruled that the prosecution could
not recall a witness at the special hearing unless the defendant presented new evidence. People v. Hansel, 234 Cal. App. 3d 572, 577-78, 277 Cal. Rptr. 854, 857 (1991)
(citing People v. Anderson, 210 Cal. App. 3d 24, 28, 258 Cal. Rptr. 125, 127 (1989)
(interpreting Penal Code section 1538.5(i) as merely allowing the prosecution to recall
witnesses who testified at the preliminary hearing in opposition to evidence which
the defendant presented at trial)). The California Supreme Court reversed that holding. 1 Cal. 4th at 1224, 824 P.2d at 702, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 896.
2. See generally Randy E. Barnett, Resolving the Dilemma of the Exclusionary
Rule: An Application of Restitutive Principles of Justice, 32 EMORY L.J. 937, 966
(1983) (describing the exclusionary rule and its effect on the prosecutor's role at
trial).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(i) (West Supp. 1992). The relevant part of this section states that "evidence presented at the special hearing shall be limited to the
transcript of the preliminary hearing and to evidence which could not reasonably
have been presented at the preliminary hearing, except that the people may recall
witnesses who testified at the preliminary hearing." Id. See generally 4 B. WITKIN &
N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Exclusion Of Illegolly Obtained Evidence §
2255 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1992) (discussing the effect of the 1986 amendment on
the statute).
4. Hansel, 1 Cal. 4th at 1217, 824 P.2d at 697, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 891.
5. Id. See also Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 788, 789 P.2d 934, 940,
268 Cal. Rptr. 753, 760 (1990) (finding no need to resort to legislative intent when
the statutory language is clear and unambiguous); Solberg v. Superior Court, 19 Cal.
3d 182, 198, 561 P.2d 1148, 1158, 137 Cal. Rptr. 460, 470 (1977) (same).
6. Hansel, 1 Cal. 4th at 1217, 824 P.2d at 697, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 891 (interpreting
the words "except that the people may recall witnesses who testified at the preliminary hearing" as modifying both the clause "limited to the transcript of the preliminary hearing" and the clause "evidence which could not reasonably have been presented at the preliminary hearing" in Penal Code section 1538.5(i)). The supreme
court found that the statute's language was clear and unambiguous without requiring
inquiry into construction or legislative intent. Id. at 1218, 824 P.2d at 698, 4 Cal.
Rptr. 4th at 892. The court next addressed the defendants' contention that such a
literal interpretation of the statute would lead to "absurd" results. Id. The court recognized that the statute's purpose was to substantially reduce the time expended on
litigating suppression motions and concluded that a literal interpretation of the statute
would be consistent with legislative intent. Id. See generally 21 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3184 (1985 & Supp. 1992) ("[Tlhe purpose of § 1538.5 subd. (i) . . . was
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pretation set forth in People v. Anderson,' as well as other evidence suggestive of legislative intent, upon which the court of appeal relied Instead, the supreme court followed a literal interpretation of the statute
and deternned that recall of prosecution witnesses by the people should
not be predicated upon the defendants' presentation of new evidence
While a literal reading of section 1538.5(i) may appear to convey a
privilege upon the prosecution which is not similarly enjoyed by the
defendants, the court found that under certain limited circumstances
such inequity would not be unjust.' The court reasoned that the
defendants' opportunity to litigate for suppression of the evidence both
at the preliminary hearing and in the superior court offset any potential

advantage realized by the prosecution."

to eliminate duplicate litigation of issues and repeat testimony by restricting a defendant to only one full hearing on a suppression motion.") (citation omitted).
7. 210 Cal. App. 3d 24, 28, 258 Cal. Rptr. 125, 127 (1989). See Hansel, 1 Cal. 4th
at 1216, 824 P.2d at 697, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 891 (rejecting as mere dictum the opinion
expressed in Anderson that the statute limits recall of prosecution witnesses to those
witnesses who testified at the preliminary hearing in opposition to new evidence
which a defendant presents in the superior court).
8. Hansel, 1 Cal. 4th at 1217-18, 824 P.2d at 697-98, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 891-892.
9. Hansel, 1 Cal. 4th at 1218-19, 824 P.2d at 697-98, 4 Cal. 2d Rptr. at 891-92
([Tlhere is no need to construe the section or to look to external evidence of the
intent 'of the Legislature."). The defendants argued that a literal reading of the statute
would grant the people an unqualified right to recall witnesses without bestowing a
reciprocal right upon the defendant. Id. at 1219, 824 P.2d at 698, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
892. See, e.g., Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 472 (1973) (finding that a statute
which does not grant reciprocal discovery rights to the defendant is fundamentally
unfair); Evans v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 617, 623, 522 P.2d 681, 685, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 121, 125 (1974) (recognizing that discovery is a two-way street that should permit the defendant the same right to discover and utilize contrary evidence as the
plaintiff). See generally Note, Prosecutorial Discovery Under Proposed Rule 16, 85
HARV. L REV. 994, 998-1001 (1972) (discussing balance between prosecutorial and
defense discovery at trial).
10. Hansel, 1 Cal. 4th at 1221, 824 P.2d at 700, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 894. See Whitman v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 1063, 1082, 820 P.2d 262, 273, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 160,
171 (1991) (finding that a limited exception to the general hearsay rule favoring the
prosecution was not fundamentally unfair to the defendant).
11. Hansel, 1 Cal. 4th at 1222, 824 P.2d at 700-01, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 894-95 (recognizing that the defendants had ample opportunity to cross-examine witnesses recalled
by the prosecution and rebut any new evidence presented). Moreover, section
1538.5(i) neither requires the defendant to give the prosecution notice of the motion
nor present a formal written motion at the preliminary hearing. See generally, 4 B.
WITIIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Exclusion of Illegally Obtained Evidence § 2254 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1992); see, e.g., People v. Ciraco, 181 Cal. App.
3d 1142, 226 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1986) (holding that the defendant's motion to suppress at

337

The court, in addressing the defendants' due process argument, considered whether limiting the prosecution's right to recall witnesses at the
special hearing absent new evidence violated the defendants' constitutional right to compulsory process.' The court viewed the process in its
entirety to determine whether the defendants had ample opportunity to
establish that the seizure*was illegal. 3 The court concluded that the process as a whole did not deny the defendants a meaningful opportunity to
argue for suppression of the evidence, and affirmed the statute's constitutionality."'
The California Supreme Court's holding in Hansel serves to clarify
Penal Code section 1538.5(i) by specifically allowing the state to recall
prosecution witnesses at a second hearing regardless of whether the
defendant has presented new evidence. The court's holding permits the
prosecution to further clarify any prosecution witnesses' testimony which
may have been unclear or misunderstood initially. Such ambiguities in
witness testimony are likely to occur when the defendant unexpectedly
moves to suppress evidence and the prosecution must call witnesses
without extensive preparation. 6 Therefore, by permitting the people to

a preliminary hearing may be oral and the defendant need not give prior written
notice).
12. The defendants argued that such procedures violated both their federal and
state constitutional rights to compulsory process. Hansel, I Cal. 4th at 1222, 824 P.2d
at 701, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 895. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV;
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15 (1974) ("The defendant in a criminal case has the right ...
to compel attendance of witnesses in the defendant's behalf.").
13. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (recognizing that the
defendant's right to present witnesses is a fundamental element of due process); see
also In re Martin, 44 Cal. 3d 1, 29, 744 P.2d 374, 391, 241 Cal. Rptr. 263, 280-81
(1987) (acknowledging that the prosecution's interference with the defendant's presentation of witnesses would violate the defendant's constitutional right to compulsory
process); People v. Warren, 161 Cal. App. 3d 961, 971, 207 Cal. Rptr. 912, 917 (1984)
(explaining that the defendant's right to present witnesses is fundamental to establishing a defense).
14. Hansel, 1 Cal. 4th at 1223, 824 P.2d at 701, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 895. The court
recognized that the defendants had two opportunities to litigate the seizure's illegality,
as well as the right to call rebuttal witnesses had the prosecution presented new evidence. Id. at 1222-23, 824 P.2d at 701, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 895.
15. Hansel, 1 Cal. 4th at 1218, 824 P.2d at 698, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 892 ("We understand the words of section 1538.5, subdivision (i), to mean . . . the People have an
unqualified right to recall witnesses at the special hearing.").
16. The court's interpretation of the statute did not entail a full de novo hearing,
thereby furthering the legislative goal behind Penal Code section 1538.5(i) to eliminate
duplicate litigation of issues. Id. at 1218, 824 P.2d at 698, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 892; see
21 CAL JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3184 (1985 & Supp. 1992). See generally Diann L.
Smith & Kimberly A. Berger, Nineteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United
States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1988-1989, 78 GEO. L.J. 956 (1990) (discussing the constitutional complexities which the prosecutor faces during discovery in
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recall prosecution witnesses, the court has refined the discovery process
surrounding section 1538.5 and has advanced the legislative goal of reducing the judicial resources expended upon such litigation.

JAMES J. MOLONEY
B.

Under Article I, Section 15 of the CaliforniaConstitution, a
criminal is denied the right to counsel when represented by
an attorney who, unknown to the defendant, has been suspendedfrom the practice of law and has resignedfrom the
state bar while disciplinarycharges are pending: In re
Johnson.

In re Johnson' presents the issue of whether a defendant is denied the
constitutional right to counsel, as a matter of law, when represented by
an attorney who, unknown to the defendant, has resigned from membership in the state bar with disciplinary charges pending.! The California

preliminary proceedings).
1. 1 Cal. 4th 689, 822 P.2d 1317, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 170 (1992). Justice Baxter wrote
the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli, Arabian, and
George joined. Justice Kennard wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, joined by Justice Mosk. The defendant, represented by Mr. Raymond E. Hane,
was convicted of selling cocaine in violation of Health and Safety Code section
11352. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352 (West 1991). Prior to the representation, and unknown to the defendant, the state bar had suspended Mr. Hane from the
practice of law for conviction of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child, a crime
of moral turpitude. See I B. WrrTIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Attorneys § 375 (3d ed.
1985) (describing crimes involving moral turpitude). See generally Linda Capel-Galiber,
DisciplinaryAction Against Attorneys for Crimes of Moral Turpitude, 31 How. LJ.

313, 322 (1988) (analyzing several jurisdictions' definitions of moral turpitude and concluding that. they typically encompass crimes which involve fraud, deceit, dishonesty,
depraved violation of an accepted or customary societal duty, or harm to another for
personal gain). On appeal, the defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus,
arguing that he had been denied both his federal and state rights to competent counsel and due process. The defendant further contended that counsel's failure to inform
him of the conviction and suspension from practice deprived him of the right to
private counsel of choice. The court of appeal affirmed the judgment and denied the
petition. In re Johnson, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1124, 1138, 273 Cal. Rptr. 446, 455 (1990).

The California Supreme Court granted review only on the order denying the petition
for writ of habeas corpus and reversed that denial. In re Johnson, 1 Cal. 4th at 702,
822 P.2d at 1324, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 177.
2. In re Johnson, 1 Cal. 4th at 696, 822 P.2d at 1318, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 169. Suspension at the time of representation, without more, does not warrant reversal of the

Supreme Court held that representation by an attorney who formerly
resigned from the state bar, has disciplinary proceedings pending, and
has been placed on "inactive status," denies the defendant his constitutional right to counsel.3 The court, however, stopped short of concluding
that such conduct denied the defendant the right to counsel as a matter
of law.'
Although the court recognized that holding oneself out as practicing
law while under suspension is both unlawful and contemptuous, 6 it recognized that suspension alone for such conduct does not create a presumption of incompetence under Business and Professions Code section
6102.6 In doing so, the court considered the legislative goal of subjecting

conviction as a matter of law. See People v. Medler, 177 Cal. App. 3d 927, 930, 223
Cal. Rptr. 401, 402 (1986) (reversal not warranted where state bar suspended attorney
from practice for non-payment of state bar dues without an additional showing that
representation was inadequate or ineffective). Courts may impose a per se rule of
reversibility, however, when there is evidence calling into question an attorney's
ability to provide effective assistance of counsel. See People v. Hinkley, 193 Cal. App.
3d 383, 392, 238 Cal. Rptr. 272, 277 (1987) (finding deprivation of Sixth Amendment
right to counsel where suspension related to competency in representing clients or to
personal qualities of attorney).
3. In re Johnson, 1 Cal. 4th at 693-94, 822 P.2d at 1318-19, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
171-72.
4. Id. at 700, 822 P.2d at 1323, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 176.
5. Id. at 697 n.2, 822 P.2d at 1320 n.2, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171 n.2. It is both unlawful and a contempt to hold oneself out as practicing or entitled to practice law
while suspended from membership in the state bar or after resigning from the state
bar with charges pending. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6126-6127 (West 1990 &
Supp. 1992) (punishable by imprisonment in the state prison or county jail). See generaly Robert L. Miller, "Beware of Coyotes": A Commentary on the Unauthorized
Practice of Law, 47 CAL. ST. B.J. 237 (1972); John C. Toews, Unauthorized Practice
Statutes and the Rights of Out-of-State Attorneys, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 569 (1966-67)
(discussing state interest in requiring practicing attorneys to be members of the state
bar and analyzing the underlying policies of state attorney-licensing statutes).
6. In re Johnson, 1 Cal. 4th at 696, 822 P.2d at 1320, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 173. "An
attorney who is professionally competent does not become any less competent upon
the filing of an order made pursuant to section 6102 suspending the attorney from
practice." Id. at 697, 822 P.2d at 1321, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 174. The supreme court
retains the power to prescribe the rules for the practice and procedure governing
suspension and disbarment proceedings pursuant to sections 6101 and 6102. CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 6102(g) (West 1990). See generally Richard Green Wallace, Comment,
Attorney Discipline and the California Supreme Court: Transfer of Direct Review to
the Courts of Appeal, 72 CAL. L REV. 252 (1984) (providing an overview of the current disciplinary system in California and outlining the supreme court's role in upholding the integrity of the bar). The supreme court has typically viewed the act of
moral turpitude in the context of its surrounding facts and circumstances. See In re
Kristovch, 18 Cal. 3d 468, 472, 556 P.2d 771, 773, 134 Cal. Rptr. 409, 411 (1976)
(recognizing that a court is not restricted to the elements of the crime, but may look
to the entire course of an attorney's conduct in evaluating his or her fitness to practice law); In re Wright, 10 Cal. 3d 374, 376, 515 P.2d 292, 293, 110 Cal. Rptr. 348,
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attorneys to disciplinary action for criminal wrongdoing and violations of
the Rules of Professional Conduct." The court evaluated whether
counsel's conduct, which the court found to be an act of moral turpitude,
accurately reflected the attorney's honesty and ability to carry out his
professional duties.8 Further, the court recognized that while most
crimes that call into question an attorney's competence and qualifications
constitute an act of moral turpitude per se,' the contrary proposition is
not always true." Thus, the court reasoned that all acts of moral turpitude do not lead unequivocally to the conclusion that the individual is

349 (1973) (finding that facts and circumstances of conviction are relevant to the
issue of discipline); In .re Bogart, 9 Cal. 3d 743, 748, 511 P.2d 1167, 1171, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 815, 819 (1973) (concluding that facts and circumstances of attorney's crime are
admissible to determine appropriate discipline).
7. In re Johnson, 1 Cal. 4th at 697, 822 P.2d at 1321, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 174. The
court found that protecting the public from dishonest or corrupt attorneys and maintaining public confidence in the bar were the overall objectives in the discipline of
attorney misconduct. Id. See In re Ford, 44 Cal. 3d 810, 816 n.6, 749 P.2d 1331, 1334
n.6, 244 Cal. Rptr. 476, 479 n.6 (1988) (quoting In re Severo, 41 Cal. 3d 493, 500, 714
P.2d 1244, 1247, 224 Cal. Rptr. 106, 109 (1986)) (noting that the primary purpose of
attorney discipline is the protection of the public, the profession, and the courts,
rather than punishment of the attorney); In re Kristovich, 18 Cal. 3d 468, 471-72, 556
P.2d 771, 773, 134 Cal. Rptr. 409, 411 (1976) (recognizing that the purpose of state
bar disciplinary proceedings is to inquire into the moral integrity of an attorney in
order to determine that individual's fitness to participate in the profession).
8. In re Johnson, 1 Cal. 4th at 700, 822 P.2d at 1323, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 176
(finding that serious sexual offenses fall within the category of crimes involving
moral turpitude, yet not necessarily determinative of one's lack of knowledge or
ability). See generally Annotation, Moral Delinquency or Other Conduct Not Affecting
Court or Client as Ground for Disbarment or Suspension of Attorney, 55 A.L.R. 1373
(1928).
9. In re Johnson, 1 Cal. 4th at 700, 822 P.2d at 1323, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 76. Conviction of certain offenses may serve as conclusive proof of moral turpitude and has
been recognized traditionally as calling into question an attorney's professional integrity. See, e.g., In re Kristovich, 18 Cal. 3d 468, 556 P.2d 771, 134 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1976)
(perjury); In re Dedman, 17 Cal. 3d 229, 550 P.2d 1040, 130 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1976)
(falsifying documents); In re Fahey, 8 Cal. 3d 842, 505 P.2d 1369, 106 Cal. Rptr. 313
(1973) (dishonesty for personal gain); In re Bogart, 9 Cal. 3d 743, 511 P.2d 1167, 108
Cal. Rptr. 815 (1973) (forgery); In re Hallinan, 43 Cal. 2d 243, 272 P.2d 768 (1954)
(intent to defraud).
10. In re Johnson, 1 Cal. 4th at 698, 822 P.2d at 322, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 175. Examination of the facts and circumstances of a case may be necessary to determine whether moral turpitude is involved. In re Strick, 34 Cal. 3d 891, 896, 671 P.2d 1251, 1253,
196 Cal. Rptr. 509, 511 (1983) (holding that a conviction for passing a forged prescription for a controlled substance was by itself insufficient to determine whether
the offense involved moral turpitude warranting discipline).

unfit to practice law or lacks knowledge of the law."
Recognizing the inherent limitation of the inferences which may be
drawn from acts of moral turpitude, the court turned to the defendant's
right to counsel as guaranteed under the California Constitution, Article
I, section 15.12 Once an attorney resigns from membership in the state
bar, the attorney is no longer licensed to practice law in that state. 3 The
court refrained from holding that the attorney's suspension alone was
sufficient to establish incompetence as a matter of law." Instead, the
court found that the defendant was denied the right to counsel because
the defendant's attorney had, submitted his resignation from state bar
membership while charges were pending against him. 6
Thus, the Johnson court held that an attorney's suspension from the
bar alone does not establish the attorney's incompetence as a matter of
6
law."
Mere, suspension from practice in conjunction with the representa-

11. In re Johnson, 1 Cal. 4th at 698, 822 P.2d at 1322, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 175.
"[T]he commission of some crimes, standing alone, [do] not implicate an attorney's
fitness to practice law." In re Strick, 43 Cal. 3d 644, 653, 738 P.2d 743, 749, 238 Cal.
Rptr. 397, 403 (1987). See In re Higbie, 6 Cal. 3d 562, 569-70, 493 P.2d 97, 101, 99
Cal. Rptr. 865, 869 (1972); In re Rothrock, 16 Cal. 2d 449, 453-54, 106 P.2d 907, 910
(1940). "Erring morally or by breach of professional ethics does not necessarily indicate a lack of knowledge of the law." Friday v. State Bar, 23 Cal. 2d 501, 508, 144

P.2d 564, 568 (1943).
12. In re Johnson, 1 Cal. 4th at 698, 822 P.2d at 1323, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 176. See
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15 (1983).
13. In re Johnson, 1 Cal. 4th at 702, 822 P.2d at 1324, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 177. See
CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6117 (West 1990); 7 CAL. JUR. 3D Attorneys at Law § 66
(1989 & Supp. 1992). See generally Elizabeth Michelman, Guiding the Invisible Hand:
The Consumer Protection Function of Unauthorized Practice Regulation, 12 PEPP. L.
REV. 1 (1984) (discussing the regulation of the practice of law and the effort to ensure a high level of competence in the legal profession); Philbrick McCoy, The Dilemma of Suspended and DisbarredAttorneys, 15 L.A. B. BULL. 285 (1940) (outlining
the traditionally permitted and prohibited activities of attorneys).
14. In re Johnson, 1 Cal. 4th at 702, 822 P.2d at 1324, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 177.
15. Id. The court reversed the order denying the defendant's petition for writ of
habeas corpus, vacated the judgment against the defendant, and remanded the case
to the superior court for further proceedings. Id. Justice Kennard concurred with the
result here, but disagreed with the majority's refusal to hold that the attorney's suspension for a crime of moral turpitude denied the defendant the right to qualified
counsel. Id. at 705, 822 P.2d at 1326, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 179 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting). Justice Kennard reasoned that conviction for a serious sexual offense
was conclusive proof of moral turpitude and that suspension for such a crime was a
substantive defect, thereby rendering the attorney unfit to practice law. Id. (Kennard,
J., concurring and dissenting) (citing In re Duggan, 17 Cal. 3d 416, 422, 551 P.2d 19,
22, 130 Cal. Rptr. 715, 718 (1976)) (finding that conviction of certain crimes, such as
those which necessarily involve an intent to defraud, intentional dishonesty for personal gain, murder, and serious sexual offenses, establishes moral turpitude as a
matter of law).
16. In re Johnson, 1 Cal. 4th at 700, 822 P.2d at 1323, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 176.
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tion of a defendant will not constitute a per se denial of the defendant's
constitutional right to counsel. In such circumstances, it is necessary
for the defendant to show that the attorney's misconduct or act of moral

turpitude reflects negatively upon the attorney's competence to practice
law or otherwise calls into question the attorney's professional integrity.Is

JAMES J. MOLONEY
C.

When the court erroneously imposes a restitutionfine by
failing to advise of plea consequences or imposing punishment in excess of plea bargain terms, appropriateremedies
are reducing the fine to the statutory minimum, or allowing
the defendant to withdraw his plea, depending on the situation: People v. Walker.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The supreme court granted review in People v. Walker ' to resolve a

17. Id. at 701, 822 P.2d at 1323, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 176. Where, however, the attorney is no longer licensed to practice law in the state, the court need not weigh the
attorney's competence, but instead may find that the right to counsel was violated.
Id.
18. See supra note 6 (indicating that such an analysis should occur on a case-bycase basis, taking into consideration the surrounding facts and circumstances).
1. 54 Cal. 3d 1013, 819 P.2d 861, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 902 (1991).
Walker was charged with two felony counts in connection with a bomb he allegedly placed in his ex-wife's car. Pursuant to a plea bargain, count one was dismissed,
and Walker pleaded guilty to count two (attempted use of a destructive device with
the intent to injure or intimidate, under California Penal Code § 12303.3). The probation report supplied to the defense recommended a $7000 restitution fine in accordance with California Government Code § 13967(a), which requires a mandatory fine
of $100410,000. See infra note 8. However, no other mention of a restitution fine
was made prior to sentencing. Walker, 54 Cal. 3d at 1018-19, 819 P.2d at 683-84, 1
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 905. Upon entering his plea, the court advised Walker that the maximum penalty for the offense was a prison term and a fine of up to $10,000. Id.
Apparently the court was referring to a possible punitive fine. The court made no
California Penal Code § 1192.5 advisements. Id. See infra note 17.
Walker was sentenced immediately after entering the guilty plea, in accordance
with the terms of the plea bargain. Walker, 54 Cal. 3d at 1018-19, 819 P.2d at 683-84,
1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 905. In addition, the court imposed a restitution fine of $5000 that
had not been part of the plea bargain. Id. Walker did not object to the fine at sentencing. Id.

conflict in the courts of appeal over the proper means of remedying the
erroneous imposition of restitution fines. The confusion stemmed mainly
from the difficulty of reconciling statutory requirements with certain
principles regarding plea bargains.2 The unanimous opinion stated the
rules regarding such error and the remedies appropriate in each situation." In sum, when error in failing to advise of a mandatory restitution
fine is not raised at or before sentencing, the error is waived." If the
objection is timely and the defendant is prejudiced, the court must reduce the fine to the statutory minimum or allow the defendant to withdraw his plea.' When a mandatory restitution fine significantly exceeds
the terms of a plea agreement, and a California Penal Code Section
1192.5 admonition is not given, the error is not waived by acquiescence
and may not be deemed harmless. In addition, the court must reduce the
fine to the statutory minimum or allow the defendant to withdraw his
plea!6 When such error is raised after sentencing, the proper remedy is
to reduce the fine to the statutory minimum.7
When a person is convicted of a felony, the court can impose a punitive fine, a restitution fire, or both.8 Unlike the punitive fine, however,
the restitution fine in felony cases is mandatory, ranging from one hundred to ten thousand dollars. The fine may only be waived if the court
finds there are "compelling and extraordinary reasons" for doing so.'
Before a defendant pleads guilty, he must knowingly and intelligently
0
The court must also question the defenwaive his constitutional rights."

Walker appealed on the ground that the fine was not part of the plea bargain
and should be stricken. The court of appeal found error, but held that the only remedy was to allow Walker to withdraw his guilty plea and reinstate the dismissed
count. Id. The supreme court granted review to determine which remedy was proper.
Id
2. Id. at 1019-20, 819 P.2d at 864, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 906.
3. Id. Justice Arabian wrote the opinion of the court in which Chief Justice
Lucas, and Justices Mosk, Panelli, Kennard, Baxter, and George concurred.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1030, 819 P.2d at 871, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 913.
8. Id. at 1019, 819 P.2d at 864, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 905. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§
672, 1202.4(a), 12303.3 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992) (penal fine of up to $10,000 may be
imposed); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13967(a) (West Supp. 1992) (mandatory restitution fine
of at least $100 and no more than $10,000); see generally 3 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN,
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Punishmentfor Crimes 99 1320, 1325 (2d ed. 1988) (fines,
in general and restitution).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.4(a) (West Supp. 1992) (stating that the court must
record the reasons supporting the waiver).
10. Walker, 54 Cal. 3d at 1020, 819 P.2d at 864, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 905 (citing
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); In re Tahl, I Cal. 3d 122, 460 P.2d 449, 81
Cal. Rptr. 577 (1969)). See generally 4 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL
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dant to be sure the accused understands the plea and its consequenc-

es." Admonition of one's constitutional rights is constitutionally mandated,' but advisement as to the consequences of a plea is a judicially
declared rule of criminal procedure, with two consequences relevant
here. A court's failure to explain the consequences of a plea is waived
absent a timely objection. Furthermore, an uninformed waiver can only
be set aside if the error is prejudicial to the defendant. 3
The second maxim, distinct from advisement, is that the parties must
be strictly held to the terms of a plea bargain. 4 Adherence is mandated
by due process."5 Thus, a constitutional right to a remedy exists when a
state agent violates the terms of a plea bargain."6 This right may be
waived, however, if no objection is made, and the trial court has complied with the requirements of section 1192.5 of the Penal Code. 7 If the

LAW, Proceedings Before Trial §§ 2149-52, 2200 (2d ed. 1989) (specifying knowing and
intelligent waiver of rights as requirement for valid plea; knowledge of rights in general); 21 CAL JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2816 (1985 & Supp. 1991) (waiver of constitutional rights); 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law § 403 (1989 & Supp. 1991) (court's duty to
advise).
11. Walker, 54 Cal. 3d at 1022, 819 P.2d at 864, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 905, 907. See
generally 4 B. WrrIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL' LAW, Proceedings Before
Trial §§ 2159-60 (2d ed. 1989); 21 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2817 (1985 & Supp.
1991); 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law § 404 (1989 & Supp. 1991) (advisement as to consequences of plea).
12. A constitutionally mandated admonition differs from a judicially declared rule
in that failure to admonish of constitutional rights requires the plea to be set aside.
Walker, 54 Cal. 3d at 1020, 1022, 819 P.2d at 864, 866, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 905, 907.
13. Id.
14. Walker, 54 Cal. 3d at 1020, 1024, 818 P.2d at 864, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 906 (citing People v. Mancheno, 32 Cal. 3d 855, 654 P.2d 211, 187 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1982)). See
also People v. Glennon, 225 Cal. App. 3d 101, 104, 276 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (1990). See
generally 4 B. WITION & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Proceedings Before
Trial §§ 2179-80, 2212-16 (2d ed. 1989) (plea bargains in general, nonperformance of
plea bargain, and remedies); 21 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2824 (1985 & Supp.
1991) (breach of agreement and remedies); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 365, 368, 37374 (1989 & Supp. 1991) (plea bargain in general, contractual nature, performance,
breach, and remedies).
15. Mancheno, 32 Cal. 3d at 860, 654 P.2d at 214, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 444.
16. Id. See also Glennon, 225 Cal, App. 3d at 104, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 2. See generally Peter Westen & David Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedies for Broken
Plea Bargains, 66 CAL L REV. 41, 474-75 n.10, 476 n.16 (1978).
17. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992). This section provides
that when a plea bargain is accepted by the court, the defendant "cannot be sentenced on such a plea to a punishment more severe than that specified in the plea."
In addition, when the court approves the plea, it must inform the defendant of the

trial court has not followed the requirements of section 1192.5, failure to
object is not deemed to be a waiver of these rights. 8 In addition, violation of a plea bargain is not subject to harnness error analysis because
of the importance of the right breached.
Appellate court cases leading up to Walker involved violations of advisement requirements, the plea bargain, or both. Typically, defendants
were not advised of the mandatory fine until sentencing, claimed that it
exceeded the terms of a plea bargain, and that they should therefore be
entitled to a remedy. Confronted with this error, the courts have (1)
granted no relief; (2) ordered the fine stricken;2' and (3) allowed the
defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.' As discussed below, the California Supreme Court explained that "the proper remedy depends on the
nature of the error, and the time and manner in which it is brought to
the attention of the court. " '
II.

TREATMENT

The court discussed the background of the case, the advisement issue,
the violation of the plea bargain issue, the appropriate remedy, and then

following:
(1) its approval is not binding, (2) it may at the time set for the hearing on
the application for probation or pronouncement of the judgment, withdraw its
approval in the light of further consideration of the matter, and (3) in such
case, the defendant shall be permitted to withdraw his plea if he desires to
do so.
Id. Regarding uninformed waiver of the right to object, see Walker, 54 Cal. 3d at 102526, 819 P.2d at 868-69, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 909-10.
18. WaLker, 54 Cal. 3d at 1024-26, 819 P.2d at 867-69, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 909-10.
19. Id. See also Mancheno, 32 Cal. 3d at 865, 654 P.2d at 218, 187 Cal. Rptr. at
448.
20. People v. Melton, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1406, 267 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1990) (holding
defendant waived his right to challenge restitution fine on appeal since fine was mentioned in probation report); People v. Davis, 205 Cal. App. 3d 1305, 252 Cal. Rptr.
924 (1988) (recognizing violation of advisement requirement and plea bargain, but
denying relief on grounds of public policy and no prejudice to defendant from the
small $100 fine).
21. People v. Ross, 217 Cal. App. 3d 879, 265 Cal. Rptr. 921 (1990) (reasoning that
failure of advisement was a "compelling and extraordinary reason" for waiving the
fine); People v. Oberreuter, 204 Cal. App. 3d 884, 251 Cal. Rptr. 522 (1988) (giving
precedence to plea violation over mandatory restitution fine, and striking fine altogether); see supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also People v. Williams, 224
Cal. App. 3d 179, 273 Cal. Rptr. 526 (1990) (agreeing with both Ross and Oberreuter).
22. People v. Glennon, 225 Cal. App. 3d 101, 276 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1990) (noting that
relief is only appropriate if the failure to advise is prejudicial to the defendant, but
allowing the defendant to withdraw his plea, since the trial court advised the defendant he could withdraw if the indicated disposition was not the sentence imposed).
23. Walker, 54 Cal. 3d at 1022, 819 P.2d at 866, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 907.
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analyzed the situation. Regarding advisement of the consequences of the
plea, the court stated that where failure to advise is the only error, the
error is waived if not raised at or before sentencing.' If timely raised,
"the sentencing court must determine whether the error prejudiced the
defendant, i.e., whether it is reasonably probable the defendant would
not have pleaded guilty if properly advised."' When there is no prejudice, the defendant is not entitled to relief. If the objection is timely and
there is prejudice, the defendant is entitled to a remedy. The court
analogized this result to the violation of a plea bargain which is brought
to the attention of a court.'
As discussed above, a defendant waives the right to object to punishment exceeding the terms of a plea bargain if section 1192.5 is complied
with, and if no objection is made at or before sentencing. In such a case,
the defendant is not entitled to relief. If the requirements of section
1192.5 are not complied with, or if the defendant objects to the violation
of the plea bargain, the defendant is entitled to a remedy."

The court stated that in both cases the trial court must impose either
the statutory minimum, or give the defendant the option to withdraw the
plea.' The appellate court decisions granted no relief, struck the fine, or
allowed the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. The court cautioned
that striking out the fine here, however, was not appropriate because the
fine was mandatory.' Additionally, in many cases, allowing the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea is "undesirable."' The middle ground
between these two extremes is to simply reduce the mandatory fine to
the statutory minimum.

24. Id. at 1022-24, 819 P.2d at 866-67, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 907-08.
25. Id. at 1022, 819 P.2d at 866, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 907 (citing Glennon, 225 Cal.
App. 3d at; 105, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 3). "The court should consider the defendant's financial condition, the seriousness of the consequences of which the defendant was advised, the nature of the crimes charged, the punishment actually imposed, and the
size of the restitution fine." Id. (citing People v. Wright, 43 Cal. 3d 487, 499, 729 P.2d
260, 267, 233 Cal. Rptr. 69, 76 (1987); People v. Melton, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1406, 1408
.n.1, 267 Cal. Rptr. 640, 641 n.1 (1990)). The court emphasized that the size of the
fine is particularly important. Id.
26. Walker, 54 Cal. 3d at 1022, 819 P.2d at 866, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 907.
27. Id. at 1024-26, 819 P.2d at 867-69, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 908-10.
28. Id. at 1026-29, 819 P.2d at 869-71, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 910-12.
29. Id at 1027, 819 P.2d at 869, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 910.
30. Id. The court emphasized the important role plea bargains play in facilitating
efficient disposition of cases, and in sparing victims the trauma and inconvenience of
trial. It reasoned that the legislature could not have intended the fine to invalidate a
plea where the victims could be harmed by such invalidation. Id.

Reduction of the fine to this negligible level would not violate a plea
bargain since only a punishment significantly greater than that bargained for violates the plea bargain.3 Because of the serious nature of
the felony crimes under which the mandatory fine obtains, the court
ruled that a one-hundred-dollar fine is not, as a matter of law, significant.' The result is substantial compliance with the terms of the plea
bargain without violating the mandatory requirement of a fine. The court
reasoned that the reduction would generally not prejudice the defendant
or prosecution since a fine crucial to the plea bargain would not have
been overlooked in negotiations.'
The court went on to say that both reduction of the fine, and the option to withdraw the plea, were acceptable remedies within the court's
discretion if violation of the plea bargain is raised at or before sentencing.' The appropriate remedy depends on the circumstances of each
case.' 5 However, if the breach of the plea bargain is first brought to the
court's attention after sentencing, the proper remedy is generally to reduce the fine to the statutory minimum and leave the plea intact.36 This
is because after sentencing, the factors tilt heavily in favor of not disturbing the plea.37
In the instant case, the trial court advised the defendant of the possibility of a punitive fine up to ten thousand dollars, but did not advise of
the mandatory restitution fine between one hundred and ten thousand
dollars. Since the defendant did not object at or before sentencing, however, he waived any objection to the error. In addition, because at sentencing the restitution fine was five thousand dollars and no punitive fine
was imposed, making the total fine less than the possible punitive fine of

31. Id. at 1024, 819 P.2d at 867, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 909. See also Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) ("(W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a
promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fufilled."). See generally 22 C.J.S.
Criminal Law § 373 (1989 & Supp. 1991).
32. Walker, 54 Cal. 3d at 1027, 819 P.2d at 869, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911.
33. Id. at 1028, 819 P.2d at 870, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911.
34. Id.
35. Id. "Factors to be considered by the trial court [in determining the appropriate
remedy] are the importance of imposing a greater restitution fine, the interests of the
parties and victims, whether circumstances have changed between entry of the plea
and the time of sentencing, and whether reducing the fine will constrain the court to
a disposition that it determines to be inappropriate." Id. (citing People v. Mancheno,
32 Cal. 3d 855, 860, 654 P.2d 211, 214, 187 Cal. Rptr. 441, 444 (1982)).
36. Id,
37. The defendant may have completed a portion of his prison term or relied on
the sentence in some other way. Victims' memories may have dimmed with the passage of time, or victims may be traumatized at the thought of a trial regarding a
crime they thought had been resolved. In addition, a restitution fine may not even
cover the costs of a new trial. Id, at 1028-29, 819 P.2d at 870, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 912.
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which the defendant was advised, the defendant was not prejudiced by
the error.'
However, the five-thousand-dollar fine was a significant
deviation from
the terms of the plea bargain. Since the court gave no section 1192.5
warning, the defendant did not waive his right to object to punishment
greater than the plea bargain. It was acceptable to raise this objection on
appeal, and since harmless error analysis did not apply, the defendant
was entitled to the sole remedy for such error on appeal: the reduction
of the fine to the statutory minimum of one hundred dollars.9
The court stressed that the rules advanced only applied to judicial
error.' The court admonished trial courts to always advise felony defendants of the mandatory fine, as well as comply with section 1192.5. It
also approved appellate court dicta suggesting trial court judges should
follow an informal "script" in taidng pleas, or require defendants to sign
forms specifying all the consequences of their pleas, so as to avoid the
need for the rules."
III.

CONCLUSION

The court would rather have lower courts avoid error altogether than
apply the remedies announced in this case. Trial courts should require
the defendant to sign a form enumerating all the consequences of a plea,
or develop a plea bargain acceptance "script." Failing that, the court has
announced clear rules regarding the proper remedies to be applied.
When the error to advise of a mandatory fine is not raised at or before
sentencing, the error is waived. If timely raised, and it has prejudiced the
defendant, the court must reduce the fine to the statutory minimum, or
allow the defendant to withdraw his plea.
When a mandatory fine significantly exceeds the terms of a plea
agreement, and a section 1192.5 admonition is not given, the error is not
waived by acquiescence and may not be deemed harmless. The trial
court must reduce the fine or allow the defendant to withdraw his plea.
When such error is raised after sentencing, the proper remedy is to re-

38. Id. at 1029-30, 819 P.2d at 871, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 912.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1030, 819 P.2d at 871, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 913.
41. Id. (approving dicta in People v. Melton, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1406, 1409 n.2, 267
Cal. Rptr. 640, 642 n.2 (1990)). See In re Ibarra, 34 Cal. 3d 277, 285, 666 P.2d 980,
984, 193 Cal. Rptr. 538, 542 (1983) (suggesting written plea form or judicial script
specifying all serious consequences of the plea).

duce the fine to the statutory minimum.
The court's decision should clear up the confusion in determining the
appropriate remedy for the erroneous imposition of a restitution fine.
The only "soft" areas of the rules are in determining prejudice when
there is failure to advise the defendant, and in determining whether a
fine significantly exceeds the terms of a plea bargain. The court has provided guidelines for determining prejudice and significance, but the standards will most likely be fleshed out on a case-by-case basis. The court
has provided some guidance by concluding that five thousand dollars significantly exceeds a plea bargain's terms where no fine is mentioned, as
well as holding that one hundred dollars is not, as a matter of law, significantly excessive. Furthermore, the court's dicta proposes that the
excessiveness test is stricter than the prejudice test,42 indicating punishment that is not prejudicial may be significantly excessive in terms of a
plea bargain. Beyond these problems, the rules are bright lines and
should present little difficulty in application.
ADAM L. JOHNSON

VI. DAMAGES
Under CaliforniaCivil Code section 1431.2, defendants' liabilityfor non-economic damages is limited to their proportionate share of comparativefault regardless of whether other
tortfeasorsat fault are subject to suit: DaFonte v. Up-Right,
Inc.
Section 1431.2 of the California Civil Code states that defendants are
severally, but not jointly, liable for non-economic damages in personal
injury, property damage, or wrongful death actions.' In addition, section

42. Wa/ker, 54 Cal. 3d at 1027-28 n.3, 819 P.2d at 870 n.3, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911
n.3.

1. CAL CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West Supp. 1992). Section 1431.2 provides:
(a) In any action for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death,
based upon principles of comparative fault, the liability of each defendant for
non-economic damages shall be several only and shall not be joint. Each
defendant shall be liable only for the amount of non-economic damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant's percentage of
fault, and a separate judgment shall be rendered against that defendant for
that amount.
(b)(1) For purposes of this section, the term "economic damages" means
objectively verifiable monetary losses including medical expenses, loss of
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1431.2 limits the liability of each defendant to his or her own percentage
of fault for non-economic damages.2 In DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc.3 the
California Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether section 1431.2
makes a defendant only severally liable for non-economic damages in
cases in which other parties at fault were immune from liability or otherwise not subject to suit.4 Finding no exceptions to the application of
section 1431.2, the court held that a third party defendant was not liable
to an injured employee for non-economic damages attributable to the
employer, even though the employer was statutorily immune.'
The court began by analyzing the plain meaning of section 1431.2.6 The
court rejected the plaintiffs argument that section 1431.2 applied only to

earnings, burial costs, loss of use of property, costs of repair or replacement,
costs of obtaining substitute domestic services, loss of employment and loss
of business or employment opportunities.
(2) For the purposes of this section, the term "non-economic damages"
means subjective, non-monetary losses including, but not limited to, pain,
suffering, inconvenience, mental suffering, emotional distress, loss of society
and companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation and humiliation.
Id.
2. 1d
3. 2 Cal. 4th 593, 828 P.2d 140, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 238 (1992). Justice Baxter
authored the unanimous opinion of the court.
4. Id. at 605 n. 7, 828 P.2d at 147 n. 7, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 245 n. 7. The plaintiff,
Mark DaFonte, an employee of Van Erickson Ranches, was injured when his arm was
drawn into the conveyor belt of a mechanical grape harvester. DaFonte received
workers' compensation benefits from American Insurance Company for his injuries.
DaFonte then sued the manufacturer of the grape harvester, Up-Right, Inc., for negligence and product defectiveness. This suit was joined with American's subrogation
'claim against Up-Right, Inc. for workers' compensation benefits. By special verdict,
the jury found that DaFonte was 15% at fault, Van Erickson was 456 at fault, and
Up-Right, Inc. was 40% at fault. The trial court reduced the award by 15%, which
was attributable to the fault of DaFonte. The trial court followed section 1431.2 and
reduced the judgment against Up-Right, Inc. by 45% of the non-economic damages,
which were attributable to the fault of Van Erickson. The court of appeal ruled that
the trial court had improperly applied section 1431.2, and reinstated the non-economic
damages attributable to Van Erickson in the judgment against Up-Right, Inc. The
supreme court reversed, holding that defendants' liability for non-economic damages
is limited to their proportionate share of comparative fault regardless of whether
other torifeasors at fault are subject to suit. Id. at 596-97, 828 P.2d at 141-42, 7 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 239.40.
5. Id. at 596, 828 P.2d at 141, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 239.
6. Id. at 601, 828 P.2d at 144, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 242; see Kimmel v. Goland, 51
Cal. 3d 202, 208-09, 793 P.2d 524, 527, 271 Cal. Rptr. 191, 194 (1990) (stating that the
court must first look at the language of a statute giving effect to its plain meaning to
determine legislative intent).

defendants whose liability was mutually joint and several before the
enactment of the statute The court interpreted section 1431.2 as eliminating joint liability of all defendants for non-economic damages, finding
that the statute neither stated nor implied any exceptions.! The court
then examined Proposition 51,' which was the initiative measure responsible for the enactment of section 1431.2.1" The court noted that the express purpose of Proposition 51 was to prevent defendants who possessed only a fraction of the fault from being obligated for all of the
damages." It reasoned that the only interpretation of section 1431.2 supporting this purpose was the interpretation that limited liability for noneconomic damages to defendant's proportionate share of fault.12 The
court relied lastly on its prior ruling concerning Proposition 51.'" It held
that Proposition 51 limited the potential liability of all defendants for
non-economic damages to a portion equal to their share of fault.'4 The
court emphasized that this holding does not imply that section 1431.2 is
limited to insolvent tortfeasors, but rather, that there are no exceptions

7. DaFonte, 2 Cal. 4th at 600-01, 828 P.2d at 144, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 242.
8. Id. at 604, 828 P.2d at 147, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 245.
9. For an in-depth discussion and analysis of Proposition 51, see James A. Gash,

Rethinking Principles of Comparative Fault in Light of California's Proposition 51,
19 Pepp. L Rev. 1495 (1992).
10. DaFonte at 599, 828 P.2d at 143, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 241. For further discussion
of Proposition 51, also known as the Fair Responsibility Act of 1986, see generally
CALIFORNIA TORTs §§ 9.04, 74.01(3)(c) (Neil M. Levy et al. eds., 1992); 19 ALLEN P.
WILKINSON & EDWARD BARKER, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE, TORT LAW § 13.2 (1991); 8 B.
WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 51-55 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1992);
Robert N. Pafundi, Proposition 51 Takes Hold, CAL. LAW., July 1990, at 48.
11. DaFonte, 2 Cal. 4th at 603, 828 P.2d at 146, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 244. The purpose of Proposition 51 is codified in section 1431.1 of the California Civil Code,
which provides:
(b) Some governmental and private defendants are perceived to have substantial financial resources or insurance coverage and have thus been included in
lawsuits even though there was little or no basis for finding them at fault.
Under joint and several liability, if they are found to share even a fraction of
the fault, they often are held financially liable for all the damage. The People--taxpayers and consumers alike-ultimately pay for these lawsuits in the
form of higher taxes, higher prices and higher insurance premiums.
CAL. ClV. CODE § 1431.1(b) (West Supp. 1992).
12. DaFonte, 2 Cal. 4th at 603, 828 P.2d at 146, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 244.
13. Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 753 P.2d 585, 246 Cal. Rptr.
629 (1988). In Evangelatos, the plaintiff was injured by chemicals he was using to
create fireworks and brought an action for personal injuries against the retailer and
wholesale distributor. Before trial, however, Proposition 51 was enacted. The plaintiff
alleged that Proposition 51 was unconstitutional in that it discriminated against persons injured by insolvent tortfeasors. The supreme court held that Proposition 51 did
not violate equal protection guarantees. Id. at 1204, 753 P.2d at 594, 246 Cal. Rptr. at
638.
14. Id.
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to its application.'
By holding that there are no exceptions to section 1431.2, the court
shifted the risk of receiving non-economic damages from insolvent or
unreachable tortfeasors from the defendants to the plaintiff. 6 Employees as plaintiffs in personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death
actions will now be unable to recover non-economic damages attributable to their employers from co-tortfeasors. This decision marks the
latest effort in the attempt to cure the inequities suffered by deep-pocket
defendants under the common law rule of joint and several liability. 7
DAVID C. WRIGHT

VII.

ELECTION LAW
The Proposition140 political reform initiative to article IV
of the CaliforniaConstitution is constitutionalin principal
part, specifically section 2(a), which limits the number of
terms that legislators may serve, and section 7.5, which limits state-financed incumbent staff and support services; but
section 4.5, which restricts incumbent pensions, is unconstitutional and severable: Legislature of California v. Eu.
I.

INTRODUCTION

I dislike, and greatly dislike [in the new Constitution] the abandonment in every
instance of the,principle of rotation in office.
-Thomas Jefferson, in a letter to James Madison, 1787

Ninety-two percent of all incumbents were reelected in California's
November 6, 1990 general election.' On the same ballot, the people of

15. DaFonte, 2 Cal. 4th at 603, 828 P.2d at 146, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 244.
16. Id. at 600, 828 P.2d at 144, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 242.
17. For an overview of the development of California tort liability principles, see
Evangelatos, 44 Cal. 3d at 1204, 753 P.2d at 595, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 1639 (1988) (any
damages attributable to an insolvent tortfeasor can be apportioned among solvent cotortfeasors); American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d
899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978) (defendants sued for personal injury can join cotortfeasors in the original action or seek equitable indemnity from co-tortfeasors); Li
v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) (replaced
doctrine of contributory negligence with comparative negligence principles).
1. Bruce Fein, Term Limits Offer False Security to Lazy Electorate, N.J.L.J., Oct.

California passed Proposition 140, "The Political Reform Act," which
restricted retirement benefits of legislators, limited state-funded incumbent staff and support services, and limited the maximum number of
terms that legislators may serve.2 In Legislature v. Eu,3 the California
Supreme Court assumed original jurisdiction to consider whether Proposition 140 could withstand constitutional challenges.4 Although the supreme court held the pension restrictions to incumbent legislators unconstitutional, the court gave great deference to the voter's interests in
finding the restrictions on support service funds and term limitations for

31, 1991, at 18.
2. Proposition 140 imposed limitations on legislators' pension rights such that the
state would contribute the employer's share to the Federal Social Security system on
behalf of participating legislators "elected to or serving in the Legislature on or after
November 1, 1990," but "[n]o other pension or retirement benefit shall accrue as a result of service in the Legislature." CAL. CONST. ART. IV, § 4.5.
The measure also stated that "the total aggregate expenditures of the Legislature
for the compensation of members and employees of, and the operating expenses and
equipment for, the Legislature may not exceed" $950,000 per member for that fiscal
year, or 8096 of the amount of money expended for such purposes in the preceding

year, whichever is less.

CAL.

CONST.

ART. IV,

§ 7.5.

Proposition 140 limited the following persons, elected or appointed on or after November 6, 1990, to two four-year terms: Governor (CAL. CONST. ART. V, § 2), Lieutenant Governor (CAL. CONST. ART. V, § 11), Attorney General (CAL. CONST. ART. V, §
11), Controller (CAL. CONST. ART. V, § 11), Secretary of State (CAL. CONST. ART. V, §
11), Treasurer (CAL. CONST. ART. V, § 11), Superintendent of Public Instruction (CAL.
CONST. ART. IX, § 2), state senators (CAL. CONST. ART IV, § 2(a)), and members of the
State Board of Equalization (CAL. CONST. ART. XIII, § 17). The limit for members of
the assembly is three terms. CAL. CONST. ART IV, § 2(a).
3. 54 Cal. 3d 492, 816 P.2d 1309, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1991). Chief Justice Lucas
wrote the majority opinion in which Justices Panelli, Kennard, Arabian, Baxter and
George concurred. Justice Mask wrote a separate opinion, concurring and dissenting
in part.
At the time of this opinion, voters in three states had passed term limit measures: California, Colorado, and Oklahoma. Katherine Bishop, California High Court
Backs Law Limiting Term of State Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1991, at 1. Ballot
campaigns to the same effect were present in at least twelve states, and one such
ballot measure was voted down in Washington State. So far, this California decision
is the only term limitation initiative subject to judicial review. Id.
4. The supreme court determined that the issues were "of sufficient public importance to justify departing from the usual course" and using an extraordinary writ. Eu,
54 Cal. 3d at 497, 500, 816 P.2d at 1312, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 286; see Raven v.
Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 340, 801 P.2d 1077, 1079, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326, 328 (1990)
(reviewing the constitutionality of Proposition 115, adopted at the June 1990 Primary
Election).
5. "[T]he people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum."
CAL. CONST. ART. IV, § 1. "[A}II
presumptions favor the validity of initiative measures ... ; such measures must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality clearly,
positively, and unmistakably appears." Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 501, 816 P.2d at 1313, 286
Cal. Rptr. at 287.
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legislators constitutionally sound."
The stated purpose of Proposition 140 was to "restore a free and democratic system of fair elections, and to encourage qualified condidates to
7
seek public office" by limiting "the powers of incumbency." The court
cited the incumbent's generally superior fund raising ability, media coverage, experienced staffs, greater name recognition, and favorably drawn
voting districts to evidence potential advantages over other candidates.'

II.

TREATMENT OF THE CASE

Majority Opinion

A.
1.

Lifetime Ban or Limit on Consecutive Terms

Proposition 140 states, in part, that "[n]o [state] Senator may serve
more than [two] terms" and "no member of the Assembly may serve
more than [three] terms."' The court found this language ambiguous on
its face as to whether the term limits impose a lifetime ban on legislators
who have served the specified maximum number of terms or merely restrict the number of consecutive terms the legislators may serve. 0 Because no express language addresses the consecutive terms issue, the
supreme court considered the indicia of the voters and found strong
support in the voters' pamphlet that a lifetime ban was intended by the

framers of, and voters for, Proposition 140."
2.

Constitutional Revision or Amendment

A constitutional revision addresses "comprehensive changes" to the
constitution and requires more formality, discussion and deliberation
2
than is available through the initiative process. A revision differs from

6. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 501, 816 P.2d at 1313, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
7. CAL CONST. ART. IV, §1.5.
8. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 601, 816 P.2d at 1313, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
9. CAL CONST. ART. IV, § 2(a).
10. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 503-04, 861 P.2d at 1314-15, 286 Cal. Rptr. 288-89.
11. Id. at 504-05, 816 P.2d at 1314, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 289. In the voter pamphlet,
the legislative analyst described the term limitations as limiting "the number of terms
that an elected state official can serve in the same office." CAL GEN. ELECTION BALLoT PAMPiHET (Nov. 6, 1990), quoted in Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 505, 816 P.2d at 1315, 286

Cal. Rptr. at 289. The opponents' ballot arguments against Proposition 140 made repeated reference to the measure's "lifetime ban." Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 505, 816 P.2d at
1315, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 289.

12. Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 349-50, 801 P.2d 1077, 1085, 276 Cal.

an amendment in that an amendment requires an initiative by the people,
whereas a revision requires the consent of two-thirds of the legislature to
convene a constitutional convention and obtain popular ratification."
The petitioners argued that Proposition 140 results in a revision of the
California Constitution because the subsequent effects of the measure
are "comprehensive changes" to the state constitution.' Proposition 140
virtually guarantees a new legislature every six years, where persons
with minimal legislative experience will be chairing committees, forced
to deal with the budget and with. each other. Moreover, the measure's
thirty-eight percent reduction in funding for legislative staff and support
services, at the time this opinion was handed down, had resulted in a
loss of 640 jobs since the measure's enactment.'" Finally, the petitioners
warned that the legislators would possibly become "susceptible to the
subtle pressures of gubernatorial powers of appointment" and lobbyist
influence."
The supreme court acknowledged these arguments but found no revision of the California Constitution because Proposition 140 did not substantially change the fundamental structure of the legislature as a representative body.'8 The court conceded that term and budgetary liintations would affect the legislature and the staff members, but would not
affect the essential process of legislators enacting laws they find appropriate."' Further, because such a revision requires two-third legislature
approval, and due to the sensitive issues of the legislature involved, the
court determined the legislators should not be relied upon to convene a
constitutional convention aimed at its own reform.' Hence, the court
refused to find a constitutional revision where the measure effected no
comprehensive changes to the constitution.2'
3.

Single-Subject Requirement

"An initiative measure embracing more than one subject may not be
submitted to the electors or have any effect." ' However, an initiative
does not violate the single-subject requirement if its relative parts are

Rptr. 326, 334 (1990).
13. CAL CONST. ART. XVIII. This Article is entitled 'Amending and Revising the
Constitution."
14. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 506, 816 P.2d at 1316, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
15. Id. at 507, 816 P.2d at 1317, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
16. Id. at 508, 816 P.2d at 1317, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
17. Id at 507, 816 P.2d at 1317, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
18. Id at 508, 816 P.2d at 1318, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
19. Id. at 508-09, 816 P.2d. at 1318, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
20. Id. at 511, 816 P.2d at 1320, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 293-94.
21. Id. at 512, 816 P.2d at 1320, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
22. CAL CONST. ART. II, §8(d).
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reasonably germane.' The court compared Proposition 140 with prior
measures upheld by the court' and found that Proposition 140's "incumbency reform" theme was not excessively general.'
4.

Voting and Candidacy Rights

Proposition 140 affects the incumbent's right to run for reelection and
the voter's right to reelect the incumbent.' The California Supreme
Court looked to the United States Supreme Court for guidance concerning the constitutionality of voting regulations." The United States Supreme Court has generally placed these regulations under the equal protection laws,' but has not settled the standard of review for voting regulations cases.'

The petitioners argued for the court to strictly scrutinize the measure,' thereby requiring a compelling state interest in retaining the legislation and no less restrictive means of accomplishing the measure's objectives.' The California Supreme Court found that strictly scrutinized
voting regulation cases have typically involved an impairment of First
Amendment rights.' The court distinguished those cases on the grounds
that Proposition 140 did not affect First Amendment rights and applied
evenhandedly to all political groups.'
Consequently, the court rejected a strict scrutiny test and applied a
mid-tier balancing test.' This test requires three distinct elements to

23. See Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982)
(rejecting the argument that Proposition 8 involved improper constitutional revision).
24. See supra note 23.
25. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 512, 816 P.2d at 1321, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 295.
26. Id at 514, 816 P.2d at 1322, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
27. Id at 515, 816 P.2d at 1322, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
28. See Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222 (1989) (invalidating California's prohibition on primary endorsements by political parties).
29. See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 200-01 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (noting the majority's failure to articulate the appropriate standard of review when appraising the validity of restrictions on ballot access).
30. Eu,,, 54 Cal. 3d at 515, 816 P.2d at 1322, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
31. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that racial classifications are
subject to strict scrutiny).
32. Munro, 479 U.S. at 225 (reasoning that "because a ban on endorsements burdened the appellees' right to free speech and free association, it can only survive
constitutional scrutiny if it serves a compelling governmental interest").
33. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 515, 816 P.2d at 1322, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
34. Id at 517, 816 P.2d at 1324, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 298. The court extrapolated this

determine the constitutionality of ballot restrictions: a) the nature of the
injury to protected rights, i.e., voters and incumbents, b) the interests of
the state in permitting the injury, and c) the necessity of imposing the
particular burden.'
a. Nature of injury
Although Proposition 140 imposes a lifetime ban from the state senate
or assembly, the incumbent is not barred from seeking public office
elsewhere.' Moreover, the limitations are placed on the legislator after a
significant period of time in office, and past terms are not calculated in
the limitation.' Hence, these factors mitigate the injury to candidates.
The court noted that voters will be denied the right to vote for the
incumbent who has reached the maximum term limit, but also asserted
that voters have no clearly established constitutional right to vote for
specific persons.TM The voters still retain their right to vote for the candidate of their choice.' Also, since the people enacted Proposition 140,
any subsequent injury to the voters as a result is self-inflicted and without constitutional protection.'
b.

Interests of the state

Proposition 140 strives to "restore free, fair, and competitive elections"
to the political arena and thereby protect the people "against an entrenched, dynastic legislative bureaucracy."4 States have a strong interest in preventing a "political machine" from emerging which could "effectively foreclose access to the political process." 2 Thus, the absence of
such a "machine" would enhance the competitiveness in a meaningful
election.'

test from Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460
35. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 796.
36. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 518, 816 P.2d
37. 1d.
38. Id, at 519, 816 P.2d at 1325,
Takushi, 927 F.2d 469, 473-74 (1991)

U.S. 780 (1983).
at 1324, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
286 Cal. Rptr. at 299. See, e.g., Burdick v.
(upholding Hawaii's complete ban on write-in

voting).
39. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 519, 816 P.2d at 1325, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 299.

40. Id.
41. Id. at 520, 816 P.2d at 1325-26, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 299-300.
42. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 521, 816 P.2d at 1326, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 300 (quoting State ex
reL Maloney v. McCartney, 223 S.E.2d 607, 611 (W. Va. 1976)).
43. Id.
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c.

Necessity of restrictions

The petitioners argued that a lifetime ban on candidacy is drastic and
that less restrictive alternatives are available-campaign contribution
restrictions, decreased fringe and pension benefits, and incentives for
early retirement, for instance.' The court found incumbency advantages
at present were hegemonic and such narrow changes as the petitioners
proffered would not serve to remedy the condition." The court ultimately concluded that "[tihe legitimate and compelling interests" of Proposition 140 outweigh[ed] the candidates and voters' wish "to perpetuate...
incumbency," and, hence, the restrictions were constitutionally valid.'
5.

Bill of Attainder

Bills of Attainder are constitutionally proscribed because they function
as a legislative punishment of a specific person or group. 7 The petitioners argued that Proposition 140 was designed to punish the present incumbent legislators, particularly Assemblyman Willie Brown and Senator
David Roberti.'
The California Supreme Court applied three different tests under the
federal constitution and concluded that the petitioners' argument was
without rnerit.' First, the "historical" test was unsuccessful because the
court found no cases where term limits were imposed on legislators as a
form of )unishment.' Second, the "functional" test for the existence of
actual punishment failed because the law was construed to be "non-punitive legislative policy-making. " 'B Finally, the "motivational" test, looking at the intent of the legislation, failed because the court found no
intent to punish legislators on the face of the initiative measure.'

44. Id. at 522-23, 816 P.2d at 1327, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 301.
45. Id. at 524, 816 P.2d at 1328-29, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 302-03.
46. Id. at 525, 816 P.2d at 1329, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 303.
47. U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 10; see United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 447 (1965)
(holding unconstitutional, as a bill of attainder, a federal law precluding Communist
Party members from serving as union officers).
48. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 525, 816 P.2d at. 1329, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 303.
49. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (describing the
three tests to determine bills of attainder).
50. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 526, 816 P.2d at 1330, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 527, 816 P.2d at 1330, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 304.

6.

Impairment of Contract

The federal constitution provides: "No State shall... pass any... law
impairing the obligation of contracts."' Proposition 140 purported to
terminate a legislator's right to accrue additional benefits through continued state services on or after November 1, 1990.'
Although a pension modification is permitted as long as the employees
recover "comparable new advantages in place of any lost,"' the court
read this measure's restriction as an impairment of a legislator's pension
rights.' The court found that incumbent legislators elected prior to
Proposition 140's enactment were impliedly promised pension benefits
when they first assumed office.' Because incumbent legislators retained
a "vested" contractual (or statutory) right to participate in the
Legislator's Retirement System,' this provision terminating pension
rights for incumbent legislators was held invalid' and, consequently,
severed.' Non-incumbent legislators, elected after the enactment of
Proposition 140, acquired no vested pension rights."
B.

DissentingOpinion

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Mosk took issue with the majority
opinion on whether the measure violated the single-subject rule and
constituted a revision of the state constitution.' Mosk claimed that

53. U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 10.
54. CAL. CONST. ART. IV, § 4.5.
55. Olson v. Cory, 27 Cal. 3d 532, 541, 636 P.2d 532, 537, 178 Cal. Rptr. 568, 573
(1980).
56. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 534, 816 P.2d at 1335, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
57. Id. at 530, 816 P.2d at 1332, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
58. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 9350 (West 1980).

59. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 534, 816 P.2d at 1335, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
60. Proposition 140 contained a severance clause pertaining only to the pension
obligations of the Legislative Retirement System rather than the entire initiative measure. CAL. CONST. AiT. IV, § 11. The supreme court, however, found the pension
rights provision severable under a three-prong test for severability. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at
535, 816 P.2d at 1335-36, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 309-10. The invalid provision must be
grammatically, functionally, and volitionally separable. Id. The provision here is grammatically severable by construing the pension restriction to apply only to non-incumbent legislators elected "on or after November 1, 1990." Id. (citing CAL. CONST. ART.
IV, § 4.5). Functionally, the restriction can be severed because its removal would not
affect the remaining valid provisions. Id. Finally, the invalid pension restriction is volitionally severable because the framers and voters would have wanted the remaining
valid portions even in the absence of the invalid pension restriction. Id.
61. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 534, 816 P.2d at 1335, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
62. Id. at 536, 816 P.2d at 1336, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 310 (Mosk, J., concurring and

dissenting).
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Proposition 140's purported "incumbency reform" was nothing more than
"a seductive label of indefinite scope," which truncated the single-subject

requirement.' Mosk pointed to the legislative analyst who described the
initiative as making "three major changes to the California Constitution,"

and thereby failing the single-subject requirement."'
Moreover, Mosk argued that Proposition 140 resulted in a revision of
the California Constitution because it substantially changed the nature

and character of the legislature.'

Specifically, "politicians" would be

replaced by "citizens."' In an extended analogy to Raven v.
Deukmejian,' Mosk attempted to demonstrate that "citizens" in place of
"politicians" in the legislature was similar to "laypersons" in place of "jurists" in the judiciary.' Such effects amount to significant changes in the
nature of the legislature, and, thus, require the protections involved in a

constitutional revision.'
II.

CONCLUSION

In Legislaturev. Eu, the supreme court addressed the constitutionality
of The Political Reform Act of 1990.' The court found constitutionally
valid the restrictions on state-funded incumbent staffs and support services and the limitations on the maximum number of terms legislators
may serve.' But the court also found that incumbent legislators, upon

election prior to Proposition 140's enactment, had acquired "vested"

63. 1d. at 538, 816 P.2d at 1337-38, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 311-12 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting). See Marilyn E. Minger, Comment, Putting the "Single" Back in the
Single-Siubject Rule: A Proposalfor Initiative Reform in California,24 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 879, 929 (1991) (stating that voters are often called upon to vote on a number
of issues by casting a single ballot).
64. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 537, 816 P.2d at 1337, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 311 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting); see CAL. GEN. ELECTION BALLOT PAMPHLET (Nov. 6, 1990).

65. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 543, 816 P.2d at 1341, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
66. Id. The model for this notion is Cincinnatus, the Roman who laid down his

plow to save the state but returned home after the battles were won. He was not
interested in being a dictator.
67. 52 Cal. 3d 336, 801 P.2d 1077, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1990).
68. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 543-44, 816 P.2d at 1341, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 315. In Raven v.
Deulmejian, 52 Cal. 3d at 353, 801 P.2d at 1088, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 337, the provision
in question would have restricted the power of state courts to interpret certain state

constitutional rights of criminal defendants.
69. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 544, 816 P.2d at 1341, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
70. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
71. Eu 54 Cal. 3d at 536, 816 P.2d at 1336, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 310.

rights in the Legislators' Retirement System; thus, the measure's termination of those rights was invalid." However, legislators elected after the
enactment of Proposition 140 were held subject to the measure's pension
limitation."
Mosk dissented on state law grounds, specifically the single-subject
violation and the constitutional revision. 4 The pivotal issue, however,
whether the initiative infringes on candidates' federal constitutional
rights to run for office and voters' federal constitutional rights to vote for
the representative of their choice, has risen to the United States Supreme
Court, where this decision was upheld.'
Proposition 140 is no panacea. Running for state office will still be
costly, with money dominating the process. There is no guarantee that
the pool of willing candidates will be more qualified, or more representative, or less susceptible to the sometimes corruptible influence of special
interest lobbyists. However, the measure may restore to the legislature
the notions of free and fair self-government to which the framers held
steadfast.
In free governments, the rulers are the servants, and the people their superiors .... For the former, to return among the latter [does] not degrade, but promote them.
-Benjamin Franklin

DEAN THOMAS TRIGGS

VIII.

FAMILY LAW
An unwed father's parental interest is entitled to constitutional protection, regardlessof the statutory scheme, if he
promptly comes forward and demonstrates a full commitment to his parental responsibilities:Adoption of Kelsey S.

I. INTRODUCTION
In Adoption of Kelsey S.,' the California Supreme Court addressed two

72. Id. at 535, 816 P.2d at 1335-36, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 309-10.
73. 1d. at 534, 816 P.2d at 1335, 286 Cal. 3d at 309.
74. Id. at 536, 816 P.2d at 1336, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
75. Katherine Bishop, California High Court Backs Law Limiting Terms of State
Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1991, at 1.
1. 1 Cal. 4th 816, 823 P.2d 1216, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615 (1992). Justice Baxter
authored the majority opinion, in which Justices Lucas, Panelli, Kennard, Arabian and

[Vol. 20: 257, 1992]

CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

issues. First, the court decided whether the requirement under California
Civil Code section 7004(a)2 that a natural father must receive the child
into his home to achieve "presumed father" status was satisfied by constructive receipt.- The court determined that, based on the statutory
language and legislative intent of section 7004(a)(4),4 actual receipt was
required.' Second, the court decided whether the natural father's federal
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection were violated
by the Code's distinction between natural and presumed fathers.' The
court held that this distinction violated the natural father's rights.7 The
court concluded that the natural father should be treated as a presumed
father if he exhibits his commitment toward rearing the child in a responsible manner, and he is not found to be unfit to parent the child. 8
A.

Background

Until 1975, a child born out of wedlock was considered to be illegitimate. Illegitimacy had strong negative implications for children, including placing a stigma on the child and resulting in unfavorable legal
treatment. ' For example, illegitimate children were considered to be

George concurred. Justice Mosk filed a concurring and dissenting opinion.
2. Section 7004(a)(4) provides that "a man is presumed to be the natural father
of a child if ...
[hie receives the child into his home and openly holds out the
child as his natural child." CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a)(4) (West 1983 & Supp. 1992).
3. Kelsey S., I Cal. 4th at 825, 823 P.2d at 1220, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 619.
4. See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
5. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 829-30, 823 P.2d at 1223, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 622.
6. Id. at 830, 823 P.2d at 1223, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 622.
7. Id. at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635. "[S]ection 7004[(a)] ...
violates ...
constitutional guarantees ...
to the extent that [it] allow[s] a mother
unilaterally to preclude her child's biological father from becoming a presumed father
and thereby allowing the state to terminate his parental rights on . . . a showing of
the child's best interest." Id. See generally William G. Phelps, Protecting the Opportunity Interest of the Unwed Fathers of Newborn Infants Placed for Adoption: Does
California's Statute Go Far Enough?, 25 CAL. W. L. REV. 123, 124-25 (1988) (discussing the constitutionality of California Civil Code § 7017(d)(2) which allows an illegitimate child to be adopted over the objections of his or her father if the adoption is
in the best interest of the child).
8. Ke/sey S., I Cal. 4th at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.
9. Former California Civil Code section 230 provided the situation in which a
child could be legitimated. Id. at 828, 823 P.2d at 1222, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 621. See
10 B. WInuN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Parent and Child § 422 (9th ed., 1989)
(discussing former section 230 in depth).
10. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 828, 823 P.2d at 1222, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 621. The
stigma attached to illegitimacy created an interest in construing former Civil Code

without parents, and thus had no inheritance rights from their natural
parents."
In order to mitigate some of the negative effects of being labeled illegitimate, the California Legislature enacted the Uniform Parentage Act in
1975,12 which substituted the concept of illegitimacy with the concept of
parentage. Section 7004(a)(4) of the Uniform Parentage Act provides
that a natural father may achieve "presumed father" status 4 by
"receiv[ing] the child into his home and openly hold[ing] out the child as
his natural child."' 6 The classification of a natural father as a "presumed
father" is significant because, under section 221.20," either a presumed
father or the natural mother can withhold consent to the child's adoption
unless there is a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the pre-

section 230 broadly and in favor of legitimation. Id. However, with the enactment of
the Uniform Parentage Act, this stigma has largely been mitigated. Id. Thus, the interest in a broad construction of the Code is less pervasive. Id. at 828-29, 823 P.2d at
1222, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 621. See 10 B. WrnuN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Parent
and Child §§ 422, 423 (9th ed., 1989) (discussing constructive receipt, and the effect
of the Uniform Parentage Act); see also 4 JOHN LESLIE GODDARD, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE,

Parentage of Children § 403 (3d ed., 1981) (stating that the Uniform Parentage Act
provides a procedure to establish the parent-child relationship without regard to
distinctions based on legitimacy). For a discussion of illegitimacy, see 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 3(a) (1937); 10 Am. JUR. 2D Bastards § 8 (1963 & Supp. 1992).

11. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 828, 823 P.2d at 1222, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 621.
12. See generally CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 7000-7021 (West 1983 and Supp. 1992); 10 B.
WITIaN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Parent and Child §§ 409-448 (9th ed., 1989).
13. Kelsey S., I Cal. 4th at 828, 823 P.2d at 1222, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 621.
14. The parental rights of a natural father who is a presumed father are greater
than those of a natural father who is not a presumed father. Id. at 824-25, 823 P.2d
at 1219, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 618. A presumed father's parental rights are only revoked
upon a showing of unfitness, whereas a mere natural father's rights may be revoked
upon a showing that such revocation is in the best interest of the child. Id. at 824,
823 P.2d at 1219, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 618.
E.

15. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a)(4) (West 1983 and Supp. 1992). For a discussion of
section 7004(a)(4), see 10 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Parent and Child
§ 423 (9th ed., 1989 & Supp. 1992); 32 CAL. JUR. 3D Family Law § 110 (1977 &
Supp. 1992); 4 JOHN LESLIE GODDARD, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE, Parentage of Children §§
402, 416 (3d ed., 1981).
16. CAL. CIV. CODE § 221.20 (West 1983).
Under section 221.20, either a mother or presumed father can withhold consent to the adoption except in certain specified and narrow circumstances:
(1) if a noncustodial parent willfully fails for a year or more to communicate
with and support the child; (2) a court has declared the child to be free of
or the parent has voluntarily relinthe parent's custody and control ...
quished his or her rights in a judicial proceeding; (3) the parent has deserted

the child without provision for its identification; or (4) the parent has relinquished the child for adoption.
Kelsey S., I Cal. 4th at 824-25, 823 P.2d at 1219, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 618.
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sumed father is unfit, to parent the child. 7 In contrast, Section
7017(d)(2) 8 provides that a natural father who is not a presumed father
under section 7004(a) may only retain his parental rights to the child if
the court determines that it would be in the child's best interest. Effectively, the presumed father's rights rise to the level of the mother's
rights, while the natural father's rights are protected at a lower level.
B.

Statement of the Case

Kelsey S. was born on May 18, 1988 to Kari S., the natural mother and
a respondent, and Rickie M., the natural father and the petitioner.' The
petitioner and Kari S. have never been married to each other.' In response to Kari's plan to place the child up for adoption, the petitioner
filed an action on May 20, 1988 to establish his parental rights and obtain
custody.' The superior court issued a temporary restraining order grant-

ing the petitioner custody.'
On May 24, Steven and Suzanne A., the prospective adoptive parents
and respondents in this action, filed an adoption petition alleging that
because there was no presumed father, only the mother's consent to the
adoption was required.' On May 26, the superior court amended its May
20th order and gave Kari S. temporary custody of the child, provided that

17. Id. at 825, 823 P.2d at 1219, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 618.
18. Section 7017(d)(2) provides in relevant part: "[T]he court shall determine if he

is the father .

.

. [and] then determine if it is in the best interest of the child that

the father retain his parental rights .. . if the court finds that it is in the best interest of the child ...
[i]t shall order that his consent is necessary for an adoption."
CAL CIV. CODE § 7017(d)(2) (West 1983 & Supp. 1992). Subdivision (d)(2) was added
to section 7017 in 1986. The amendment removed application of section 4600 to the
proceedings, effectively removing parental preference by no longer requiring that the
trial court find that awarding the natural parent custody would be detrimental to the
child. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 843, 823 P.2d at 1232, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 631. See
generally 10 B. WmuIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Parent and Child §§ 441-445
(9th ed. 1989 & Supp. 1992) (discussing the 1986 amendment to section 7017).
19. Kelsey S., I Cal. 4th at 824-25, 823 P.2d at 1219, 4 'Cal. Rptr. 2d at 618.
20. Id. at 822, 823 P.2d at 1217, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 616-17.
21. Id. at 822, 823 P.2d at 1217, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 616.
22. Id. at 822, 823 P.2d at 1218-19, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 616-17. The action was
brought pursuant to section 7006. Id. Section 7006 provides in pertinent part "[a]ny
interested party may bring an action . . . for ...
determining the existence . . . of
the father and child relationship presumed under . . . section 7004[(a)(4)]." CAL. Civ.
CODE § 7006(b) (West 1983 & Supp. 1992).
23. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 822, 823 P.2d at 1218, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617.

24. Id.

she live with the child in a shelter for unwed mothers, with no visitation
by the petitioner or the prospective adoptive parents.' On May 31, the
prospective adoptive parents initiated proceedings to terminate the
petitioner's parental rights.' The court consolidated this proceeding
with the adoption proceeding, granting supervised visitation rights to the
petitioner, and unsupervised visitation rights to the prospective adoptive
parents.2
The superior court held that the petitioner was not a presumed father
under section 7004(a)(4), because he did not receive the child into his
home.' Furthermore, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence, under section 7017(d)(2), that it would be in the child's best interest to terminate the petitioner's parental rights.' The petitioner appealed, arguing that because he was prevented by the mother, the adoptive parents, and a court order from receiving the child into his home, he
should be deemed a presumed father based on his efforts to receive the
child into his home.' The court of appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial court did not err in finding by a preponderance of the,
evidence that the petitioner was not a presumed father.3 The petitioner
appealed again, and the California Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the statutory scheme is unconstitutional to the extent that it permits the
termination of an unwed father's parental rights without due process, at
least where the father has demonstrated his commitment to his parental
responsibilities.'

II.

TREATMENT

The Majority Opinion

A.
1.

Statutory Language and Legislative Intent

The first issue the court addressed was whether the petitioner satisfied
the "receipt" requirement of section 7004(a)(4)' by constructive receipt,

25. Id.
26. Id
27. Id. at 822-23, 823 P.2d at 1218, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617. Visitation was to take
place at the shelter only. Id.
28. 1d at 823, 823 P.2d at 1218, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
29. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 823, 823 P.2d at 1218, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617.
30. Id, The petitioner's three contentions on appeal were that the court "erred by:
(1) concluding that he was not the child's presumed father, (2) not granting him a
parental placement preference; and (3) applying a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof." Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.
33. For the relevant portion of section 7004(a)(4), see supra note 2.
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even though he did not actually receive the child into his home.' After
explaining why the classification of "presumed father" is crucial to the
parental rights of the petitioner,3' the court analyzed section 7004(a)(4)
to determine whether it supported the use of constructive receipt to
satisfy the requirements.' In examining the statutory language, the court
determined that section 7004(a)(4) neither implicitly nor explicitly referred to constructive receipt.' In analyzing legislative intent, the court
examined the 1986 amendment to section 7017, which made section 4600
inapplicable to proceedings under section 7017.' The court observed
that by providing "the efforts made by the father to obtain custody" as
one of the factors used to determine the natural father's rights, the legislature showed it was aware of the restrictions being placed on unwed
fathers.' "The express statutory distinction between presumed fathers
and fathers who attempt unsuccessfully to gain custody demonstrates
that the members of the latter group are not presumed fathers within the
Legislature's intent."' The court believed that the statutory language
was a clear expression of the legislature's intent to require actual receipt.' The court noted that to construe the statute as allowing constructive receipt would require insertion of words into the statute, which
would go beyond the authority of the court.'
The court surveyed prior decisions to determine whether section
7004(a)(4) has been construed as allowing constructive receipt.' The
court observed that California Court of Appeal decisions clearly did not
support the use of constructive receipt to satisfy section 7004(a)(4)."

34. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 825, 823 P.2d at 1220, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 619.

35. Id. at 824-25, 823 P.2d at 1218-19, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617-18. See supra notes
16-19 and accompanying text for an explanation of the statutory scheme giving a presumed father greater parental rights than a natural father who is not a presumed
father.
36. Ketse~l S., 1 Cal. 4th at 825-30, 823 P.2d at 1220-23, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 619-22.
37. Id. at 826, 823 P.2d at 1220, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 619.
38. Id. at 827, 823 P.2d at 1221, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 620. See supra note 18.
39. Keisel S., 1 Cal. 4th at 827, 823 P.2d at 1221, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 620.
40. Id.
41. Id at 826, 823 P.2d at 1220, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 619. The court did not find the
statute to be ambiguous. The petitioner conceded this and made no argument that he
was a presumed father based solely on the language of section 7004(a)(4). Id.
42. Id. at 827, 823 P.2d at 1220-21, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 619-20.
43. Id. at 827-30, 823 P.2d at 1221, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 620.
44. Id. at 827, 823 P.2d at 1221, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 620. See In re Adoption of
Marie R., 79 Cal. App. 3d 624, 630, 145 Cal. Rptr. 122, 126 (Ct. App. 1978) (finding
that despite a mother's rejections of a father's efforts to establish his relationship

The court further noted that its prior decisions provided little guidance
on the issue at hand.' Not finding any support for allowing constructive
receipt to satisfy the "receipt" requirement of section 7004(a)(4), the
court held that the petitioner was not a presumed father under the statute.46
2.

Due Process and Equal Protection

a.

Survey of the law

The court next addressed whether a natural father's federal constitutional rights of due process and equal protection are violated if the mother is allowed to unilaterally deny him the legal right a presumed father
has to withhold consent for adoption. 7 The court first looked at the development of relevant United States Supreme Court cases for guidance.*
The Kelsey S. court observed that the Supreme Court has held that conceiving and raising one's children is a protected and essential right, that
an unwed father is entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before
any termination of his rights, 9 and that the relationship between a par-

with the child, he was not considered a presumed father, overruled by Kelsey S., I
Cal. 4th at 816, 823 P.2d at 1216, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 615 (1992); see also In re
Sabrina H., 217 Cal. App. 3d 702, 710, 266 Cal. Rptr. 274, 278 (1990) (observing that
since the passage of the Uniform Parentage Act, no cases have affirmed the doctrine
of constructive receipt).
45. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 827, 823 P.2d at 1221, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 620. In the
case of In re Richard M., 14 Cal. 3d 783, 537 P.2d 363, 122 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1975), the
court upheld the doctrine of constructive receipt, but that decision came prior to the
enactment of the Uniform Parentage Act. The court explained that it had a strong
interest in a statutory scheme that favored legitimation due to the strong stigma associated with illegitimacy. Id. at 793, 537 P.2d at 369, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 537. According
to the court in Kelsey S., this policy interest is not as strong since the advent of the
concept of parentage, and thus, the statute should not be construed as broadly in the
present case. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 828-29, 823 P.2d at 1222, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 621.
See also Michael U. v. Jamie B., 39 Cal. 3d 787, 791, 705 P.2d 362, 364, 218 Cal.
Rptr. 39, 41 (1985) (holding that a natural father is not a presumed father if he has
not received the child into his home); see also Beth W. Kanik, Not Necessarily in the
Best Interest of the Child: In Re Baby Girl M., 20 U.S.F. L. REv. 701, 715-17 (1985).
The court in Kelsey S. explained that Michael U. did not resolve the matter at hand
because constructive receipt was not at issue. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 829, 823 P.2d
at 1222, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 621.
46. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 829-30, 823 P.2d at 1222-23, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 621-22.
47. 1& at 830, 823 P.2d at 1223, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 622.
48. Id. at 830-37, 823 P.2d at 1223-28, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 622-27.
49. Id. at 830-31, 823 P.2d at 1223-24, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 622-23. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). In Stanley, the father had lived intermittently with the
mother and children for 18 years and had developed a parental relationship with the
children. Id. at 651. The court in Kelsey S. indicated that although Stantey is factually distinguishable from the present case, the rules and holding from Stanley were
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ent and child is constitutionally protected.' The Supreme Court has also
held that factors to be considered in the equal protection analysis include the natural father's attempt to rear and establish a relationship
with the child, and the nature of the relationship between the child and
the natural father."'
The court concluded that the general principle espoused by the United
States Supreme Court is that "the biological connection between father
and child is unique and worthy of constitutional protection if the father
grasps the opportunity to develop that biological connection into a full
and enduring relationship. " ' The court based this conclusion both on
relevant United States Supreme Court cases, and its analysis of recent
decisions by both the New York Court of Appeals' and the Georgia Supreme Court.' Furthermore, the Kelsey S. court, noting the Supreme

instructive. The court noted that to the extent that Stanley requires a showing of
unfitness to deny a father his parental rights, the California statutory scheme was in
conflict with Stanley. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 831, 823 P.2d at 1223-24, 4 Cal. Rptr.

2d at 622-2,3.
50. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 831-32, 823 P.2d at 1224, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 623. See
Quilloin v. Walcott,-434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978). Although the facts of QuiUoin are analogous to the case at hand, in Quijoin the natural father never sought custody of the
child, and waited 11 years to assert his visitation rights. The Court's holding that the
father was not denied due process and equal protection rights was based on these
key factual differences. Id. at 256. This suggests that if this factual difference had not
existed, and the father had demonstrated an interest in the child, the Quilloin Court

would have held that the father's constitutional rights were improperly denied. Kelsey
S., 1 Cal. 4th at 833, 823 P.2d at 1225, 4 Cal.Rptr. 2d at 624.
51. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1978). "In those cases where the
father never has come forward to participate in the rearing ... nothing in the Equal
Protection Clause precludes the state from withholding from him the privilege of vetoing the adoption of that child." I&. See also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110
(1989) (holding that a significant factor in an action for a declaration of paternity
and visitation rights was whether the natural father had attempted to establish a relationship with the child); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267-68 (1983) (holding that
because the father had not established a relationship with the child, he was not denied equal protection).
52. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 838, 823 P.2d at 1228, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 627.
53. Id. at. 838-39, 823 P.2d at 1228-29, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 627-28. See In re Raquel
Marie X., 559 N.E.2d 418, 424, (N.Y. 1990), rev'd, 173 A.D.2d 709 (1992) (observing
that the protection of a natural father's constitutional parental rights is dependent on
his opportunity to develop a meaningful relationship with the child).
54. Kelsey 5., 1 Cal. 4th at 839, 823 P.2d at 1229, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 628. See In re
Baby Girl Eason, 296, 358 S.E.2d 459, 463 (Ga.. 1987) (holding that a natural father
who tries to develop a relationship with his children should be given the same rights
as the mother).

Court's assertion that "[g]ender-based... distinctions must serve important governmental objectives and 'must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives' in order to withstand judicial scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause, " ' determined that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate in this case.'
Although the United States Supreme Court cases generally supported
the argument of the petitioner, the court also considered relevant California decisions regarding the rights of unwed fathers. 7 The court observed that its prior cases provided little aid to the present case, except
for one finding that "'the state may not deny biological parents the opportunity to establish a protected custodial relationship.'" ' Similarly,
relevant court of appeal cases were not instructive because they applied
the statutory scheme with little constitutional analysis.' However, a recent court of appeal decision held that to the extent they violated a natural father's constitutional rights, state legislative enactments disallowing
the use of the detriment standard Were prohibited.' The court reiterated
its belief that the legislature intended to create a distinction between the
rights of a natural father and the rights of a mother and presumed father;
the issue at hand was whether this statutory scheme was constitution8
al. 1

55. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 834, 823 P.2d at 1226, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 625 (quoting
Mohammed, 441 U.S. at 388 (holding that the distinction between unwed mothers and
unwed fathers is violative of equal protection because the distinction is not substantially related to the State's interest)). See generally Karen A. Koeppe, Comment, The
Rights of Unwed Fathers Are Being Violated Under California's Statutory Scheme in

Light of the United States Supreme Court Decision in Caban v. Mohammed, 23

SAN-

TA CLARA L REV. 899 (1983).

5. Ketsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 845, 823 P.2d at 1233, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 632.
57. Id. at 839-44, 823 P.2d at 1229-34, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 628-32.
58. Id. at 839-40, 823 P.2d at 1229-30, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 628-29 (quoting Elizabeth
Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v.
Robertson, 45 OHIo ST. L.J. 313, 351 (1984)).
59. See In re Adoption of Marie R., 79 Cal. App. 3d 624, 145 Cal. Rptr. 122 (Ct.
App. 1978), overrued by 1 Cal. 4th 849 (1992); W.E.J. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal.
App. 3d 303, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1979).
60. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 843, 823 P.2d at 1232, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 631. See
Jermstad v. McNells, 210 Cal. App. 3d 528, 549-50, 258 Cal. Rptr. 519, 531-32 (Ct.
App. 1989). The Jermstad court held that the legislature intended to preserve the
detriment standard in cases where not doing so would deprive a parent the opportunity to establish a parental relationship-a requirement of the United States Supreme
Court's construction of the Federal Constitution. Id. See supra note 18 and accompanying text for an explanation of the use of parental preference in section 7017 proceedings.
61. Kelsey S.,1 Cal. 4th at 849-50, 823 P.2d at 1236-37, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635-36.
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b.

Application of the law to the present case

In deciding that the application of the statutory distinction between
natural fathers and presumed fathers in this case was unconstitutional,
the court applied the intermediate scrutiny test set forth by the United
States Supreme Court that gender-based distinctions between a biological
mother and father must serve important governmental objectives and be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.' The court rejected the respondents' argument that an unwed mother's control over a
natural father's rights furthers the state interest in adoption, and thus
serves the child's best interest.' The court, however, asserted that the
proper governmental objective was the well-being of the child, an objective not necessarily served by adoption. ' The court posited that although at one time adoption might have been thought to be in the child's
best interest due to a strong likelihood that an adoptive home would
have two parents, the changing concept of family and the increasing
number of single adoptive parents indicates that the overriding advantage
and interest of adoption might no longer exist.'
Next, the court rejected the respondents' argument that the statutes
giving the mother control over the father's rights are substantially related
to the child's best interest because they facilitate adoption.' The court
asserted that this argument is flawed because it "assumes an unwed
mother's decision to permit an immediate adoption of her newborn is
always preferable to custody by the natural father, even when he is a
demonstrably fit parent."'
The court next observed that the two statutory alternatives by which a
father could obtain presumed father status under section 7004-marrying
the mother, or holding the child out as his own and receiving the child
into his home-are both within the mother's control. ' The court reasoned that because the mother can deny the father entrance to her
home, and deny the father the right to take the child into his home, the
father is forced to seek a court determination that he is a presumed

62. Id. at 845, 823 P.2d at 1232, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 631. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
63. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 845, 823 P.2d at 1234, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 633.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 846, 823 P.2d at 1234, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 633.

67. Id.
68. Id. at 847, 823 P.2d at 1235, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 634.

father in order to obtain custody.' However, the statute prevents him
from becoming a presumed father until he receives the child into his
home, the very thing he was prevented from doing without the court
order. Furthermore, a mere showing that adoption by third parties would
be in the child's best interest was enough to terminate the father's
rights.' Thus, a father who is "ready, willing, and able to exercise the
full measure of his parental responsibilities" is left with no recourse. 7 In
contrast, the court observed that mothers, or natural fathers allowed by
the mother to become a presumed father, even if "unready, unwilling,
and unable," were entitled to protection of their parental rights short of a
showing of unfitness, a much more difficult standard to prove than the
best interest standard."
The court concluded that section 7004(a)(4) and the surrounding statutory framework were constitutionally unfair to both the child and the
father." The court reasoned that if a child whose mother wants to sever
legal ties with him or her is fortunate enough to have a fit natural father
who wants to rear him or her, the child should not be denied the advantage of being reared by a natural parent.' Furthermore, if a natural father is willing and fit to be a parent, and the mother is unwilling to rear
the child, the father should not be denied the right to do so on a mere
showing that it is not in the child's best interest.75 The court then created a presumption that the child's well-being is "best served by continuation of the father's parental relationship."76 If, after a consideration of
all the relevant factors, the father is determined to be committed to his
parental responsibilities, he should be afforded protection of his parental
rights equal to that of the mother's rights regardless of whether he is a
presumed father under the statutory scheme.7
The court limited it's holding by stating that the statutory distinction
between natural and presumed fathers is unconstitutional "only to the
extent that it is applied to an unwed father... demonstrat[ing] a full

69. Id,
70. Id. at 848, 823 P.2d at 1236-37, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 634-35.
71. Id. at 847, 823 P.2d at 1235, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 634.

72. Id.
73. Id. at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.
74. Id. at 848, 823 P.2d at 1235, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 634.
75. Id at 848, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.
76. Id. at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.
77. Id. Some factors to be considered are the father's conduct before and since
the child's birth, his efforts to assume his parental responsibilities, his "willingness ... to assume full custody of the child-not merely to block adoption by others," the father's public acknowledgement that he is the natural father, and his fimancial aid to the mother with pregnancy and birth expenses. Id. at 849, 823 P.2d at
1236-37, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635-36.

[Vol. 20: 257, 1992]

CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

commitment to his parental responsibilities."' The court remanded the
case to the trial court to decide whether the petitioner demonstrated a
full commitment to his parental responsibilities, instructing the trial court
to consider the reasonableness of the petitioner's conduct since he
learned that he was the child's father.' If the trial court answers this
question in the affirmative, then a fitness standard must be applied, with
a clear and convincing evidentiary standard, to determine whether the
petitioner has the right under section 221.20 to withhold his consent to
the adoption.m Finally, the court asserted that this decision shall be retroactive as to all cases not yet final."
B.

Justice Mosk's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

Justice Mosk agreed with the majority that the natural father's parental
rights should not have been terminated in this case.' However, he dissented to the majority's use of constitutional analysis in reaching its
decision expressing that such analysis was unnecessary and "create[d]
needless imcertainty in the application of statutory categories that have
been consistently employed for almost 20 years."
Justice Mosk asserted that the proper law upon which to base this
decision was the doctrine of equitable estoppel.' According to Justice
Mosk, the rule of estoppel provides the preclusion of a party's benefit
from his own conduct when such conduct is "designed to prevent determination of the truth and a resolution based thereon."' Justice Mosk
reasoned that the use of an estoppel theory rather than a constitutional
theory would yield a just result in this case without creating a dangerously far-reaching precedent.' Justice Mosk would have remanded this

78. Id. at
79. Id, at
80. Id, at
81. Id.
82. Id. at
dissenting).

849, 823 P.2d at 1237, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636.
850, 823 P.2d at 1237, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636.
851, 823 P.2d at 1238, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 637.
852, 823 P.2d at 1239, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 638 (Mosk, J.,concurring and

83. Id. (Mosk, J.,concurring and dissenting).
84. Id. at 853, 823 P.2d at 1239, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 638 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
85. Id. (Mosk, J.,concurring and dissenting). Justice Mosk pointed out that the
doctrine of equitable estoppel has been used in prior family law cases. For example,
see Guardianship of Ethan S., 221 Cal. App. 3d 1403, 1415, 271 Cal. Rptr. 121, 129
(Ct. App. 1990) (estopping the mother's husband, who had once admitted he was not
the natural father, from relying on a presumption of paternity).
86. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 853-54, 823 P.2d at 1239-40, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 638-39

case to the trial court to determine, based on the rule of equitable estoppel, whether the mother should be estopped from denying that the father
had become a'presumed father."
III.

CONCLUSION

In Adoption of Kelsey S., the court held that a biological father may be
accorded parental rights when his attempt to achieve presumed father
status is thwarted by the child's mother and he "promptly comes forward
and demonstrates a full commitment to his parental responsibilities."'
One probable effect of this decision will be a drop in the number of
adoptions, at least where a natural parent wants custody of the child.
Furthermore, this decision shows that California is willing to disaffirm
statutes which are adverse to the rights of "thwarted fathers."' California trial courts will now be required in custody hearings to give consideration to a fit, committed, natural father equal to the consideration given
to a presumed father.'
The Kelsey S. holding might also give natural fathers a greater right to
custody of their children than the mother's husband who rears the child
on a daily basis. Unfortunately, this protection of the father's rights may
often be at the expense of the child's best interest." The emphasis on
whether a natural father is granted custody of his child has been shifted
from his relationship with the mother to his relationship with the
child.' This may cause the mother to think more seriously about her
decision of whether to relinquish her own custody of the child.'
NANCY G. DRAGUTSKY

(Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
87. Id. at 854, 823 P.2d at 1240, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 639 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
88. Id. at 849, 823 P.2d at 1237, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636.
89. Stephanie B. Goldberg, Having My Baby, Unwed Fathers Score Victory in California, 78 A.B.A. J. 84 (1992).
90. The following recent California Court of Appeal decisions have followed Kelsey
S.: In re Reylene A., 7 Cal. App. 4th 1822, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 121 (Ct. App. 1992); In
re Sarah C., 8 Cal. App. 4th 964, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 414 (Ct. App. 1992); Adoption of Michael H., 8 Cal. App. 4th 1633, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 261 (Ct. App. 1992); In re Heather
B., NO. C010299, 1992 WL 219227 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1992); In re Cassandra V.,
NO. F016248, 1992 WL 274741 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 1992).
91. Goldberg, supra note 89.
92. Goldberg, supra note 89 (citing In re Marie Raquel X, 559 N.E.2d 418 (N.Y.
1990)).
93. Goldberg, supra note 89.
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IX. LABOR LAW
A.

The termination of an employee in retaliationfor truthful
testimony concerning a co-worker's sexual harassment claim
is contrary to public policy, actionable, and neither preempted by the CaliforniaFairEmployment and Housing Act nor
barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers'
CompensationAct: Gantt v. Sentry Insurance.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Gantt v. Sentry Insurance,' the California Supreme Court ruled
that an employee can bring an action against an employer for wrongful
termination in contravention of public policy.2 Further, the court held

1. 1 Cal. 4th 1083, 824 P.2d 680, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 874 (1992). Justice Arabian
wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli, Baxter,
and George joined. Justice Kennard wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, in which Justice Mosk joined. Id.
2. Id. The plaintiff, Vincent A. Gantt, was a sales manager for the defendant, Sentry Insurance. Joyce Bruno, a co-worker who reported to Gantt, complained to him
that she was being sexually harassed by another manager, Gary Desser. The plaintiff
reported this to his supervisor and to an employee who was responsible for receiving
sexual harassment complaints. The harassment continued and the plaintiff spoke with
them a second time. Shortly thereafter, Bruno was transferred and then fired.B r u n o
filed a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH),
alleging harassment against Desser and failure of management to correct the problem.
At this point, Caroline Fribance, Sentry's in-house counsel, began investigating the
matter. Gantt spoke with Fribance, ultimately reporting that Fribance was pressuring
him to retract his prior statement. Subsequently, Gantt's superiors cautioned him that
he was disliked in the company, and lowered Gantt's performance rating.
When the DFEH investigation began, Gantt initially met with the investigator
secretly, who promised him protection from retaliation for his unfavorable testimony.
Prior to his official interview with DFEH, Gantt again spoke with Fribance, who repeatedly reminded him that he was Bruno's only support for Bruno's harassment
claim. Fribance also informed Gantt of his ratings demotion. Following Gantt's DFEH
interview, in which he continued to support Bruno's claim, Fribance suggested to the
investigator that it was Gantt himself who had harassed Bruno and his testimony was
merely a diversionary tactic.
Two months later, the company demoted Gantt and deprived him of the work
materials necessary to function in his new job. During the next month, Gantt experienced a series of illnesses and took a vacation and sick leave. Gantt finally took a
job with another company and then filed lawsuit. The jury returned a special verdict
for Gantt, awarding him $1.34 million. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment as
to Sentry Insurance. The California Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appel-

that the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Acte
does not grant an employer immunity for acts contrary to public policy
and that the California Fair Employment and Housing Acte did not preempt such a claim. In its holding, the court indicated that it must determine public policy by examining constitutional and statutory provisions.'
The court, relying primarily on its decision in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,' held that the employer's attempts to persuade the plaintiff to
withhold information from state investigators constituted an act contrary
to public policy, and, therefore, that plaintiff could maintain an action
against the employer.8
II.

TREATMENT OF THE CASE

The court began its analysis by examining the public policy exception
to at-will employment.' The public policy exception, first recognized in
Tameny, provides that an at-will employee may bring a tort action when
discharged for performing an act that public policy would encourage or
failing to perform an act that public policy would discourage.'0 For public policy to be the basis for such a claim, the policy must affect society
and be "'fundamental,' 'substantial' and 'well established'."" This vague
definition gave the courts broad discretion to determine public policy.'2
However, in practice, only a small number of courts have found an act to
be in violation of public policy absent statutory or constitutional provisions evidencing that policy. 3 Based on that fact, in conjunction with
the general presumption that courts should defer to the legislature in
matters of public policy, the court ruled that a public policy exception

late court. Id. at 1087-89, 824 P.2d at 682-83, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 876-77.
3. CAL. LAD. CODE § 3602 (West 1989).
4. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940 (West 1992).
5. Gantt, I Cal. 4th at 1086, 824 P.2d at 681, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 875.
6. Id. at 1095, 824 P.2d at 688, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 882.
7. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980). The plaintiff-employee
was wrongfully terminated for refusing to participate in an illegal price-fixing scheme.
The supreme court held that the employee could maintain a tort action against the
employer. Id. at 169-70.
8. Gantt, I Cal. 4th at 1097, 824 P.2d at 689, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 883.
9. Id. at 1089, 824 P.2d at 683, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 874. For information on public
policy exceptions to at-will contracts, see 82 Am. JUR. 2D Workers' Compensation §§
11-82 (1992); 20 ALLEN P. WILKINSON & EDWARD BARKER, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE, TORT
LAW § 42.2 (1991); 2 B. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW §§ 167-170 (9th ed.
1987).
10. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1090, 824 P.2d at 683, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 877.
11. Id. (quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 670, 765 P.2d 373,
379, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 217 (1988)).
12. Id,
13. Id.
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should be "carefully tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated
in constitutional or statutory provisions. " "
The court next examined whether the defendant's actions were contrary to constitutional or legislative declarations." The legislature had
specifically prohibited the obstruction of Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) investigations through the Fair Employment and Housing Act. 8 As a result, the court held that any attempt by
an employer to convince an employee to lie to a DFEH investigator was
clearly against state public policy. Therefore, the court ruled that the
plaintiff had8 established a valid claim under the public policy exception
in Tameny.
Having established the existence of a public policy exception and the
validity of the plaintiff's claim under that exception, the court addressed
whether the Workers' Compensation Act preempted the plaintiff's
Tameny claim. 9 The Workers' Compensation Act contains an exclusive
remedy provision" for employee injuries in cases in which the
employer's acts both caused the injury and were. within the normal scope
of the employment relationship.' However, the court noted that the

14. Id. at 1095, 824 P.2d at 687-88, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 881-82.
15. Id.
16. CAL GOVT CODE § 12975 (West 1992). This section provides:
Any person who shall willfully resist, prevent, impede or interfere with any
member of the department or the commission or any of its agents or employees in the performance of duties pursuant to the provisions of this part
relating to employment discrimination, or who shall in any manner willfully
violate an order of the commission relating to such matter, is guilty of a
misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail, not exceeding six
months, or by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1000), or both.
Id.
17. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1097, 824 P.2d at 689, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 883.
18. Id.
19. For a general overview of the Workers' Compensation Act, see 65 CAL. JUR.
3D, Work Injury Compensation §§ 1-16 (1981); 2 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW §§ 5-11 (9th ed. 1987).
20. CAL LAB. CODE § 3602 (West 1989). Section 3602(a) provides in pertinent part:
"Where the conditions of compensation set forth in Section 3600 concur, the right to
recover such compensation is .. . the sole and exclusive remedy of the employee or
his or her dependents against the employer." Id.
21. Gantt, I Cal. 4th at 1099, 824 P.2d at 691, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 885. For information on the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker's Compensation Act, see 82
AM. JUR. 2D Workers' Compensation §§ 62-115 (1992); 1 CAL LAW OF EMP. INJ. §
11.01-11.02 (Warren L Hanna ed., 2d ed. 1992); 65 CAL JUR. 3D Work Injury Compensation §§ 22-28 (1981); 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation §§ 918-935 (1960); 20

scope of the exclusive remedy of the Workers' Compensation Act is not
universal, and that numerous situations are outside the exclusive remedy
provision.'
The defendant argued that it is improper to distinguish between employees who suffer injury from standard industrial causes and those who
suffer injury from sexual or racial discrimination.' The court rejected
this argument, however, stating that the distinction is made to preserve
"public policy and sound morality."' The court reasoned that since the
Tameny cause of action "reflects a duty imposed by law upon all employers in order to implement... fundamental public policies," it clearly
falls outside of the exclusive remedy provision." Therefore, the court
concluded that the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act does not preempt a Tameny action for tortious discharge in
contravention of public policy.'
Justice Kennard wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part.Y She agreed with the court's findings that the plaintiff
was entitled to bring a Tameny cause of action, which did not conflict
with the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation
Act.' However, Justice Kennard dissented from the court's analysis of
what constitutes public policy.' She noted that the court went beyond
the facts of the case to create a definition of public policy because the
plaintiff had not presented public policy that was not founded in statutory or constitutional provision; therefore, the holding as to this issue was
mere dictum.' Further, she disagreed with the majority's view that only
statutory or constitutionally based policies are firmly established and
important." She suggested that there are other valid sources of public

ALLEN P. WILKINSON & EDWARD BARKER, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE, TORT LAW § 42.8 (1991);

2 B. WITIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW §§ 25-35 (9th ed. 1987).
22. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1100, 824 P.2d at 691, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 885.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1100-01, 824 P.2d at 691-92, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 885-86.
25. Id. at 1098, 824 P.2d at 690, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 884 (quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 668, 765 P.2d 373, 378, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 216

(1988)).
26. Id. at 1101, 824 P.2d at 692, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 886 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
27. Id. at 1101-04, 824 P.2d at 692-694, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 886-88 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
28. Id. at 1101, 824 P.2d at 692, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 886 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
29. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
30. Id. at 1102, 824 P.2d at 692-93, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 886-87 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
31. Id. at 1103, 824 P.2d at 693-94, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 887-88 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
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policy, such as judicial decisions and codes of professional ethics, which
provide safeguards similar to statutory and constitutional provisions.'
Justice Kennard summarized by stating, "Courts should not be foreclosed
from acjudicating wrongful discharge cases based on violations of public
policy springing from nonstatutory and nonconstitutional sources. " '
III.

CONCLUSION

By holding the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act inapplicable to employers whose acts. are contrary to public
policy, the court acted in strict accordance with the line of cases starting
with Tameny and continuing through Foley.' These cases have made it
clear that the focus is on "the public interest in not permitting employers
to impose as a condition of employment a requirement that an employee
act in a manner contrary to fundamental public policy."'
However, it is not the outcome of this case that is of particular interest. Rather, it is the route the majority chose to take in order to reach
the outcome that is of particular interest. The majority went out of its
way to -create a rule limiting the available sources of public policy to
statutory and constitutional provisions.' As Justice Kennard emphasized, the facts of this case did not demand that the court address the
issue of defining public policy.37 Apparently, the court was concerned
with creating a consistent framework by which lower courts could analyze questions of public policy.'
Even though the court may have overstepped its bounds in creating
the rule, it is doubtful that the rule will have any substantial impact.
Although California courts have differed on whether they should restrict
public policy to statutory and constitutional authority, no cases have

32. Id. at 1103, 824 P.2d at 693, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 887 (Kennard, J., concurring

and dissenting).
33. Id. at 1104, 824 P.2d at 694, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 888 (Kennard, J., concurring

and dissenting).
34. Id. at 1101, 824 P.2d at 692, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 886.
35. Id. (quoting Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 667 n.7, 765 P.2d 377 n.7, 254 Cal. Rptr. 215
n.7).
36. Id. at 1103, 824 P.2d at 693, 4 Cal, Rptr. at 874 (Kennard, J., concurring and

dissenting).
37. Id. at 1102, 824 P.2d at 692-93, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 886-87 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
38. Id. at 1092-93, 824 P.2d at 868, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 880 (observing that the lower courts are divided as to how to determine public policy).

challenged this restriction on public policy. As a result, opinions advocating an expansion of public policy have all been limited to dicta.' Therefore, it is difficult to imagine a factual scenario upon which this holding
will have any substantial impact.
DAVID C. WRIGHT

B.

Section 3601 of the CaliforniaLabor Code prohibits injured
employees from bringing actions against co-employees where
the co-employees acted within the scope of their employment'

Hendy v. Losse.
In Hendy v. Losse,' the California Supreme Court interpreted the effect of section 3601 of the California Labor Code' on the right of an em-

ployee to bring an action against a co-employee.3 The court concluded
that when an employee is harmed by a co-employee acting within the
scope of their employment, section 3601 bars the injured employee from
bringing an action against the co-employee.4
39. Id. at 1093, 824 P.2d at 686, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 880 (citing Dabbs v. Cardiopulmonary Management Servs., 188 Cal. App. 3d 1437, 1443-44, 234 Cal. Rptr. 129, 133
(1987); Garcia v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1556, 1561, 232 Cal. Rptr.
490, 492 (1986); Koehrer v. Superior Court,, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 1165-67, 226 Cal.
Rptr. 820, 825-26 (1986)).
1. 54 Cal. 3d 723, 819 P.2d 1, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 543 (1991). In Hendy, John Hendy,
a professional football player for the San Diego Chargers, brought a medical malpractice suit against the team's physician, Gary Losse. On August 11, 1986 and May 28,
1987, Hendy incurred injuries to his right knee. The injuries were the result of
Hendy's employment by the Chargers. After both' injuries, the defendant examined
Hendy and advised him to continue playing football. As a result of the defendant's
diagnoses, Hendy suffered irreparable injury to his right knee. Hendy brought actions
against both the Chargers and Losse; the actions against the Chargers, however, were
later dismissed. Id. at 728 n.3, 819 P.2d at 4 n.3, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 546 n.3. The
defendant demurred to the action for medical malpractice. The trial court sustained
the demurrer without leave to amend, stating that section 3602 barred the action. Id.
at 728, 819 P.2d at 4, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 546. The court of appeal reversed. Id. The
California Supreme Court reversed, sustaining the defendant's demurrer without leave
to amend. Id. at 743, 819 P.2d at 14, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 556.
2. Section 3601(a) states in pertinent part:
Where the conditions of compensation set forth in Section 3600 concur, the
right to recover such compensation, pursuant to the provisions of this division is, except as specifically provided in this section, the exclusive remedy
for injury or death of an employee against any other employee of the employer acting within the scope of his or her employment ....
CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601(a) (West 1989).
3. Hendy, 54 Cal. 3d at 727, 819 P.2d at 2, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 545.
4. Id. at 739, 819 P.2d at 11, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 553. Justice Baxter authored the
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The California Supreme Court noted that prior to the 1959 amendment
of section 3601," co-employees possessed the common law right to sue
one another.' However, the court stated that following the amendments
of section 3601 in 1959 and 1982,' .an employee could not sue a co-employee unless the co-employee was acting beyond the scope of his employment.9 Therefore, because the defendant was acting within the scope
of his employment,'0 the court opined that section 3601 barred the
plaintiff's action."
In light of the clear limitation established by section 3601, the ruling of
the court appears to be reasonable. Moreover, through strict application
of section 3601, the California Supreme Court has established a test for
co-employee liability courts can easily apply.
RICHARD JOHN BERGSTROM III

unanimous opinion, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk, Panelli, Kennard,
Arabian and Geoige concurred.
5. For the original text of section 3601, see Act of Aug. 27, 1937, ch. 90, § 3601,
1937 Cal. Stat. 185, 269 (to be codified at CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601).
6. Baugh v. Rodgers, 24 Cal. 2d 200, 214, 148 P.2d 633, 641 (1944) (stating that
workers' compensation laws did not prohibit an employee from suing another employee).
7. Act of Sept. 18, 1959, ch. 1189, § 1, 1959 Cal. Stat. 3275, 3275-76 (to be codified at CAL LAB. CODE § 3601).
8. Act of Sept. 13, 1982, ch. 922, § 5, 1982 Cal. Stat. 3363, 3366 (to be codified at
CAL LAB. CODE § 3601)..For the relevant portion of section 3601(a), see supra note
2.
9. Hendy, 54 Cal. 3d at 738-39, 819 P.2d at 10-11, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 552-53. See
generally 65 CAL JUR. 3D Work Injury Compensation § 28 (1981); Annotation, Right
to Maintain Direct Action Against Fellow Employee For Injury or Death Covered by
WorkmeWn Compensation, 21 A.LR. 3D 845 (1968); STANFORD D. HERLICK, CALIFORNIA
WORKERS' COMPENSATION HANDBOOK 11TH § 12.10 (1991) (discussing the right of an
employee to sue a fellow employee).
10. Hendy, 54 Cal. 3d at 740-41, 819 P.2d at 12, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 554. Co-employees are widthin the scope of employment when -"engaged in any active service for the
employer." Saala v. McFarland, 63 Cal. 2d 124, 130, 403 P.2d 400, 404, 45 Cal. Rptr.
144, 148 (1965). See generally 2 B. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Workers'
Compensation §§ 63-64 (9th ed. 1987); Kent Frewing, Note, Workmen's Compensation:
Negligent Co-employee's Personal Liability Defined: Saala v. McFarland (Cal. 1965),
6 SANTA CLARA L REV. 100 (1965) (discussing the meaning of the phrase "within the
scope of employment).
11. Hetdy, 54 Cal. 3d at 727, 819 P.2d at 3; 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 545.

X.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Patrons harmed by a substance in served food, natural to
that food, may state cause of action in negligence, but not
under theory of strict liability, breach of implied warranty of
merchantability,orfitness: Mexicali Rose v. Superior
Court.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Mexicali Rose v. Superior Court,' the California Supreme Court
held that a cause of action in negligence lay for throat injuries resulting
from a chicken bone concealed in a chicken enchilada that was served to
a patron.2 The holding of Mexicali Rose partially overrules the fifty-yearold precedent of Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co.,' where the court held that
a substance causing injury which is natural to the food served, such as a
chicken bone in a chicken dish, can never lead to tort or implied warranty liability.' The Mexicali Rose court, however, did reaffirm the ruling in
Mix that an object foreign to the food, such as a piece of glass, wire, or
a nail, gives rise to actions in strict liability, implied warranty, and negligence.'
The plaintiff in the instant case was served a chicken enchilada at the
defendant restaurant. The plaintiff choked on a one-inch chicken bone
concealed within the enchilada and sustained serious throat injuries.6 He

1. 1 Cal. 4th 617, 822 P.2d 1292, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 145 (1992); see also New Court
Decisions: Torts, 60 U.S.C.W. 2508 (Feb. 18, 1992) (summary of opinion); Reasonable
Expectations of Restaurant Customer May Be Basis for Negligence Action for Injuries Caused by Object in Food, Cal. Sup. Ct. Serv. (Barclay's Law Publishers) 28
(Jan. 28, 1992) (summary of opinion).
2. Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 634, 822 P.2d at 1304, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157.
Chief Justice Lucas wrote the majority opinion in which Justices Panelli, Baxter, and
George concurred. Justice Mosk wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice
Kennard. Justice Arabian wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
3. 6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P.2d 144 (1936).
4. Id. at 682, 59 P.2d at 148.
6. Id. For discussion regarding products liability for served food, see 50 CAL. JUR.
3D Products Liability § 42 (1979 & Supp. 1992) (liability for food in general); 3 B.
WrraUN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Sales §§ 101, 105 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1992)
(Implied warranty with service of food and breach of warranty); 6 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Torts § 956 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1992) (negligence liability for food); 35 AM. JUR. 2D Food §§ 84-106 (1967 & Supp. 1992) (civil liability); 63
AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability §§489, 497-99, 672-73 (1984 & Supp. 1992) (food); 36A
C.J.S. Food §§ 57-71 (1961 & Supp. 1992) (liability in general); 77 C.J.S. Sales § 331
(1961 & Supp. 1992) (implied warranty).
6. The plaintiff underwent three throat operations and amassed medical bills in
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sued under theories of strict liability, implied warranty, and negligence.7
The defendant demurred to the action, arguing that Mix precluded any of
the stated causes of action since chicken bones were natural to the
chicken dish.' The trial court denied the demurrer on the grounds that
Mix was more than fifty years old, and thus, did not express the present
state of the law." The court of appeal disagreed with this reasoning, declaring that under stare decisis, Mix controlled., Thus, the court ordered that the demurrer be granted." The supreme court granted review
to consider the continuing validity of Mix. 2
II.

TREATMENT

Mix distinguished bones and other substances that are "natural" to
certain kinds of foods from "foreign" substances, which cannot be anticipated by the reasonable consumer. In Mix, a consumer could not
state a cause of action for iujuries from a chicken bone in a chicken pot
pie since the substance was natural to the dish. 4 The court stated,
"Bones which are natural to the type of meat served cannot legitimately
be called a foreign substance, and a consumer who eats meat dishes
ought to anticipate and be on his guard against such bones." 5 Under the
foreign-natural test, a substance natural to the type of food served could
never lead to tort or implied warranty liability, whereas a foreign substance could.'

excess of $25,000. Philip Hager, Case Challenges Doctrine Protecting Restaurants, LA.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 1991, at A3.
7. Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 620, 822 P.2d at 1294, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 147.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. ld.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 619, 822 P.2d at 1293, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146.
13. Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal. 2d 674, 681-82, 59 P.2d 144, 148 (1936).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. For discussion regarding foreign-natural and reasonable expectation tests, see
generally 63 AM. JuR. 2D Products Liability § 227 (1984 & Supp. 1992); 3 RONALD A.
ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314:184 to 2-314:185 (3d
ed. 1983 & Supp. 1991); 3 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON SALES § 18-10, at 102-04
(Alphonse M. Squillante & John R. Fonseca, eds., 4th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1990); Charles
R. Janes, Note, Products Liability-The Test of Consumer Expectation for "Natural"
Defects in Food Products, 37 OHIO ST. LJ. 634 (1976); Mary Ann Luetto, Comment,
Attack of the Killer Enchilada, The Chicken Bone Law Revisited, 17 W. ST. U. L.
REV. 429 (1990); Stacy L Mojica, Note, Breach of Implied Warranty: Has the For-

The Mexicali Rose court noted that the Mix ruling had been followed
for thirty years in California" and some other jurisdictions, 8 but that
courts had recently deviated from strict application of the ruling.
These courts reasoned that ultimate liability should not rest on the foreign-natural distinction, but on "whether the consumer reasonably should
have anticipated the natural injury-producing substance in the food." '°
Other courts abandoned the foreign-natural distinction entirely, basing
liability solely on the reasonable expectation of the consumer." In this

eign/Natural Test Lost Its Bite?, 20 MEM. ST. U. L REV. 377 (1990); Jane M. Draper,
Annotation, Liability for Injury or Death Allegedly Caused by Food Product Containing Object Related to, but Not Intended to Be in, Product, 2 A.L.R.5TH 189 (1992).
17. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Hotel, 132-F. Supp. 891 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (fish bone in Hot
Barquette of Seafood Mornay natural); Evart v. Suli, 211 Cal. App. 3d 605, 259 Cal.
Rptr. 535 (1989) (requiring "natural" substance to be natural to dish and reasonably
anticipated by consumer, and declaring bone in hamburger not reasonably expected);
Mais v. Hatch, 8 Cal. Rptr. 351 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1960) (beef bone in hanburger natural); Lamb v. Hill, 112 Cal. App. 2d 41, 245 P.2d 316 (1952) (chicken bone
splinter in chicken pie natural); Silva v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 28 Cal. App. 2d 649, 83
P.2d 76 (1938) (precluding recovery ;under Mix since bone in roast turkey dish natural).
18. See, e.g., Adams v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 112 S.E.2d 92 (N.C. 1960)
(grain of corn in corn flakes); Norris v. Pig'n Whistle Sandwich Shop, 53 S.E.2d 718
(Ga. Ct. App. 1949) (bone in barbecued pork sandwich); Goodwin v. Country Club of
App. Ct. 1944) (chicken bone in creamed chicken); Brown
Peoria, 54 N.E.2d 612 (Ill.
v. Nebiker, 296 N.W. 366 (Iowa 1941) (sliver of bone in pork chop natural). But see
Jackson v. Nestle-Beigh, Inc., 569 N.E.2d 1119 (IMI.App. Ct. 1991), affd, 589 N.E.2d
1992) (specifically rejecting the foreign-natural doctrine adopted 47 years
587 (Ill.
earlier); Goodman v. Wenco Management, 394 S.E.2d 832 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (allowing suit for sizable bone in hamburger patty).. See generally supra note 15.
19. Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 625-31, 822 P.2d at 1297-1301, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
150-54. The court cited a string of Lousiana cases and a lower California court decision to support this proposition. See infra note 25 for case citations. Justice Arabian
in his dissent mocked the majority's representation of Lousiana's.law as a "trend." Id.
at 647, 822 P.2d at 1312, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 165 (Arabian, J., dissenting). In addition,
Justice Mosk noted that a California Court of Appeals decision held that a, patron
could sue for a bone fragment in a hamburger but never suggested the claim should
be limited to proving negligence. Id. at 640, 822 P.2d at 1308, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 161
(Mosk, J., dissenting). Thus, Evart implied that the test used was a reasonable expectation test. Id. See Evart v. Suli, 211 Cal. App. 3d 665, 259 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1989)
(holding that substance must be natural as well as one not reasonably expected to
preclude a cause of action).
20. Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 625, 822 P.2d at 1298, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 151 (citing Brown v. Nebiker, 296 N.W. 366 (Iowa 1941) and Allen v. Grafton, 164 N.E.2d
167 (Ohio 1960)). But see Thompson v. Lawson Milk Co., 356 N.E.2d 309 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1976) (applying pure reasonable expectation test).
21. Mexicali Rose, I Cal. 4th at 641, 822 P.2d at 1308-09, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 161-62
(Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing numerous cases following the reasonable expectation
test); Id. at 651, 822 P.2d at 1315, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 168 (Arabian J., dissenting)
(adding to Justice Mosk's list). E.g., Zabner v. Howard Johnson's, Inc., 201 So. 2d 824
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Phillips v. West Springfield, 540 N.E.2d 1331 (Mass. 1989);
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context, the naturalness of the substance is only important in determining whether the consumer might have reasonably expected to find such
an object in the food served.'
Critics of the foreign-natural test complain that it assumes that average
consumers would anticipate finding any or all sorts of natural objects in
their food.? Thus, some courts follow the "reasonable expectation" approach, arguing that some natural substances are just as unanticipated as

foreign substances.'
Many cases adopting a reasonable expectation test, however, did not reject completely the foreign-natural test when the injury was caused by a substance natural
to the food served ....In these cases, the "naturalness" of the substance is used
to determine which theory of recovery should be allowed-strict liability, implied
warranty and/or negligence. When it is found that the irjury-producing substance
is natural to the food product, such as a chicken bone in a chicken pie, these
courts have applied the Mix rule to hold an injured plaintiff cannot state a cause
of action based on the breach of the implied warranty of merchantability or strict
products liability, because it is a matter of common knowledge that the natural
substance is occasionally found in the food served. These courts have departed
from Mix, however, in holding that under the same facts, an action can be stated
in negligence for the failure to exercise reasonable care in the food preparation.'

Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 103 N.W.2d 64 (Wis. 1960). See generally supra note 16.
22. Mexicali Rose, I Cal. 4th at 649, 822 P.2d at 1316, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 167 (Arabian, J., dissenting) (relying on language in Zabner, 201 So. 2d at 826).
23. Id. at 649, 822 P.2d at 1314, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 167 (Arabian, J., dissenting)
(quoting Zabner, 201 So. 2d at 826). For example, one does not expect to find bones
in a hamburger, or pearls in processed oysters. O'Dell v. DeJeans Packing Co., 585
P.2d 399, 402 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978)...
The dissenters' frustrations stem from the difficulty in determining what is "natural" to the preparation of the dish. See Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 634-35, 822 P.2d
at 1304, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157 (Mosk, J., dissenting); id. at 645 n.1, 822 P.2d at 1311
n.1, 4.Cal. Rptr. 2d at 164 n.1 (Arabian, J, dissenting). Justice Arabian pointed out
that this approach could allow as "natural" a chicken beak in a chicken dish or a
cow's eyeball in a hamburger. Id. However, the majority maintained that only substances natural to the preparation of the product will be considered natural to the
product. Id. at 630 n.5, 822 P.2d at 1301 n.5, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 154 n.5. Courts may
apply the test so that unanticipated natural substances will not be considered natural
to the preparation of the dish, thereby reaching a result similar to the reasonable
expectation test under negligence. However, because a bone in a hamburger is considered "foreign" since it Is not part of the dish's preparation, the majority would
also allow causes of action under implied warranty and strict liability. See id. at 633,
822 P.2d at 1303, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156. See generally Janes, supra note 9, at 652
(criticizing the foreign-natural test for insulating food processors from liability even if
the technology exists to remove injurious natural substances from food).
24. Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 638, 822 P.2d at 1306, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 159
(Mosk, J., dissenting); Draper, supra note 16, at 202.
25. Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 626, 822 P.2d at 1298, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 151. See

The court agreed with the defense that a patron could not reasonably
expect a chicken pie to be free of all bones.' However, the court embraced the trend allowing an action in negligence for substances natural
to the food.' The court reasoned that the duty of care to make a dish
free of injury causing substances is not affected by whether the object is
natural or foreign-the same danger of injury exists.' This new rule
corresponds with modem developments in tort law that require persons
to exercise ordinary care to prevent injuries when in a position to exercise control over another.' Yet even under this stricter approach, restaurant owners still retain traditional negligence defenses, including comparative negligence.'
The court concluded that the Mix foreign-natural test "should be rejected as the exclusive test for determining liability when a substance
natural to food injures a restaurant patron."3' Instead, the court announced the following as the proper test for the trier of fact:
If the injury-producing substance is natural to the preparation of the food
served, it can be said that it was reasonably expected by its very nature and the
food cannot be determined unfit or defective. A plaintiff in such a case has no
cause of action in strict liability or implied warranty. If, however, the presence of
the natural substance is due to a restauranteur's failure to exercise due care in
food preparation, the injured patron may sue under a negligence theory.
If the injury-causing substance is foreign to the food served, then the injured
patron may also state a cause of action in implied warranty and strict liability,
and the trier of fact will determine whether the substance (i) could be reasonably
expected by the average consumer and (ii) rendered the food unfit or defective.'

Justice Mosk, in a strong dissent, pointed out the difficulty of deter-

Musso v. Picadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 178 So. 2d 421, 425 (La. Ct. App. 1965) (allowing
negligence claim when natural substance caused injury); Loyacano v. Continental Ins.
Co., 283 So. 2d 302, 306 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (looking to patron's reasonable expectations in determining negligence liability); Title v. Pontchartrain Hotel, 449 So. 2d 677,
679 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (explaining two-tiered approach of natural/foreign test, followed by reasonable expectation to determine negligence); Evart v. Suli, 211 Cal.
App. 3d 605, 259 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1989) (see supra note 17).
26. Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 631, 822 P.2d at 1302, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 155.
27. Id. at 632, 822 P.2d at 1302-03, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 155-56.
28. See id. at 632, 822 P.2d at 1303, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156. Justice Mosk cited this
as another reason for eliminating the foreign-natural distinction. Id. at 635, 822 P.2d
at 1304, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 632, 822 P.2d at 1303, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156. See Brown v. Superior
Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 251 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988) (reviewing strict product liability law in California).
30. Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 633, 822 P.2d at 1303, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156. See
generally 6 B. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Torts § 1082 (9th ed. 1988 &
Supp. 1992) (discussing comparative negligence).
31. Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 633, 822 P.2d at 1303, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156.
32. Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 633, 822 P.2d at 1303, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156.
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mining whether a substance is natural,' especially in reference to processed foods,' and the unfairness of burdening a consumer with costs
against which she has no protection. He argued that the overriding concern in such cases is public health, and that the Mix rule did not serve
this concern.' Furthermore, he stated, "A natural object may cause as
much harm and be just as unanticipatedas a foreign object in food, so
that it is simply illogical to distinguish between the two solely on the
basis of their provenance. " '
Justice Mosk claimed that a clear majority of courts have abandoned
the foreign-natural distinction in favor of the reasonable expectation
test.' He also argued that the foreign-natural test violates the intent behind the warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.'
Justice Arabian also dissented, claiming that the majority's ruling was
at odds with "fundamental fairness, public policy, and common
sense."'Advocating adoption of the reasonable expectation test, Justice
Arabian emphasized the principles underlying warranty and argued that
because the seller was in the position to prevent the harm, "public health
and consumer confidence mandate[d] ... [an unaware] consumer be
made whole."' Protecting the restaurateur from strict liability for natu33. Id. at 634-35, 822 P.2d at 1304, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 638, 822 P.2d at 1307, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 160 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 636-38, 822 P.2d at 1305-06, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 158-59 (Mosk, J., dissenting) ("[T]here is no difference to public health whether the consumer is injured by
an unanticipated bit of bone or an unexpected bit of wire.").
36. Id. at 638, 822 P.2d at 1306, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 159 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 640-41, 822 P.2d at 1308-09, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 161-62 (Mosk, J., dissenting). His claim is supported by a recent A.LR. annotation. See Draper, supra note 16.
38. Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 642, 822 P.2d at 1309-10, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 162-63
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
Application of the foreign/natural test rather than the reasonable expectations
test evidences a misunderstanding of the nature of the implied warranty of
merclutabity with respect to food. The foreign/natural test presumes that
the implied warranty refers to the absence of any foreign substances in the
food. The true nature of the warranty, however, is that it guarantees that the
food will be merchantable, implying that the food can be consumed without
resulting injury or illness.
Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Mojica, supra note 16, at 407-08). See 3 ANDERSON, supra note 16, § 2-314:185 at 272 (preferring reasonable expectation test); Luetto, supra
note 16, at 436, 439 (stating that pre-UCC courts apply foreign-natural test and postUCC courts apply reasonable expectation test).
39. Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 645, 822 P.2d at 1311, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 164 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 645, 822 P.2d at 1311-12, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 164-65 (Arabian, J., dissent-

ral objects does not serve this policy.
In accord with Justice Mosk, Justice Arabian argued that the majority
of courts have adopted the reasonable expectation test and rejected the
foreign-natural distinction."' He cited a variety of sources criticizing the
Mix test as artificial, unworkable, and unsound.42 He also attacked the
"ongoing vitality" of the Mix doctrine, concluding that only Georgia and
Louisiana support it.' Justice Arabian criticized the majority for suggesting that California's legislative history supported incorporating the foreign-natural distinction into the California Uniform Commercial Code."
As he interpreted the legislative history, Mix was used only to establish
the sale of food and drink as a "sale" under the UCC, and not for the
purpose of supporting the natural-foreign distinction. 5
III.

CONCLUSION

In Mexicali Rose, the majority of the California Supreme Court struck
a precarious balance in substantially modifying, but not completely overruling Mix. This sharply divided decision, with its virulent dissents, as
well as a nationwide split on the issue, indicates that the holding of
Mexicali Rose rests upon unstable ground. Nonetheless, the ruling gives
consumers some of the protection available in reasonable expectation jurisdictions by allowing negligence claims where the injury-causing substance is natural. This decision also protects restaurant owners by immunizing them against strict liability and warranty actions where a natural
object causes injury.' With plaintiffs foreclosed from these causes of
action, courts will likely see an increase in the number of negligence
lawsuits for injuries caused by natural objects in food."
The negligence requirement should provide significant protection to
restaurants against suits by patrons, since a plaintiff must prove all the
elements of negligence.' Particularly distressing for restaurant owners,
however, is the possible application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine,
since the injury-producing food is normally in the exclusive control of
the restaurant." While lower courts have applied the doctrine, the Caliing).
41. Id. at 647, 822 P.2d at 1313, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 165 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 650, 822 P.2d at 1315, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 168 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 651, 822 P.2d at 1316, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 169 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 652, 822 P.2d at 1316, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 169 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
45. Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting).
46. The court emphasized that the foreign-natural test does not apply in express
warranty situations. Id. at 631 n.6, 822 P.2d at 1301 n.6, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 154 n.6.
47. Hager, supra note 6, at AS.
48. Meaicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 633, 822 P.2d at 1303, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156;
Hager, supra note 6, at A3.
49. See generaUy I B. WrIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Burden of Proof and Pre-
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fornia Supreme Court refrained from doing so in Mexicali Rose. Instead,
it left the decision to the lower courts to treat on a case-by-case basis.'
It is unlikely this ruling will appease critics of the foreign-natural test
since the court did not overrule its fundamental distinction. The court
has, however, taken some of the harshness out of the "natural" label by
allowing negligence claims. Theoretically, this should mean that restaurants will take more care in the preparation of food. Airline food preparation companies have already begun to worry about increased liability."' However, a diner must still be on guard against objects-especially
ones "natural" to the preparation of foods. The best advice, as it has
always been, is to chew one's food carefully and thoroughly before swallowing.

ADAM L. JOHNSON

XI.

PROPERTY LAW
A sale of property with a simultaneous leaseback to a seller
constitutes a change in ownership subjecting the property to
reassessment: Pacific Southwest Realty Co. v. County of

Los Angeles.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Proposition 13,' enacted in 1978, provides that until a change in own-

sumptions §§ 272-273 (3d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1992) (res ipsa loquitur); 36A C.J.S. Food
§ 69(2) (1961 & Supp. 1992); 35 AM. JUR. 2D Food § 105 (1967 & Supp. 1992).
50. Mt.icali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 633 n.9, 822 P.2d at 1303 n.9, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
156 n.9.
51. See Overturned Case in California Said to Have Airline Liability Implications, 307 AVIATION DAILY 250 (Feb. 11, 1992).
1. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA (1978). Proposition 13 was a "tax revolt" initiative intended to lower property taxes which had quadrupled in the 16 years preceding the
proposal. Id. It was adopted in the June 1978 primary election and added Article
XIIIA to the California Constitution. Id. Proposition 8 amended portions in the November 1978 general election. Id. See geneally I KENNETH A. EHRmAN & SEAN FLAVIN, TAXING CAUFORNIA PROPERTY, §§ 2:0140 (3d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1991) (Proposition
13); 9 B. WrUN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Taxation §§ 107-123 (9th ed. 1989 &
Supp. 1991) (Proposition 13 and its implementation); 51 CAL. JUR. 3D Property Taxes
§§ 43-58 (1979 & Supp. 1992) (assessment generally); Taxation; Implementation of

ership occurs, real property is to be taxed at no more than one percent
of its 1975-76 value, adjusted for inflation.2 When ownership changes,
however, the property is reassessed at its current market value.' In Pacific Southwest Realty Co. v. County of Los Angeles,' a unanimous 5 supreme court determined that when a seller transfers a fee simple interest
to a buyer and simultaneously acquires a leasehold interest in the property from the buyer, the property is subject to a real estate tax reassessment.'
The parties to the action agreed on the facts. The plaintiff conveyed
title to an office building complex in fee simple absolute, while "excepting and reserving" a leasehold interest.7 One tower on the property was
to be leased for at least sixty years and the other for at least twenty-one
months. Both the seller and buyer treated the transaction as a sale and
purchase, respectively, for federal and state income tax purposes. However, the seller claimed that since it retained exclusive use of the
buildings under the lease, there was no change in ownership, and thus
asserted that the property should not be subject to a real estate tax reassessment under Proposition 13. The trial court, relying on an exception
in section 62(e) of the Revenue and Taxation Code8 held there was no

Proposition 13, 10 PAc. L.J. 573 (1979) (review of legislation); Taxation; Property
Tax Assessment and Collection Procedures, 11 PAc. L.J. 625 (1979) (review of legislation and definition of change of ownership); Daniel G. Nauman, Local Government
Taxing Authority Under Proposition 13, Sw. U. L. REV. 795 (1978).
2. CAL CONST, art. XIIIA, §§ 1-2 (1978).
3. Id. See generally 9 B. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAw, Taxation §§ 112114 (9th ed. & Supp. 1992) (change in ownership in general, inclusions, and exclusions).
4. 1 Cal. 4th 155, 820 P.2d 1046, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 536 (1991). See also State Taxes-Sale and Leaseback Ffects Change in Ownership Within Meaning of Prop. 13,
DAILY REP. FOR ExEcUlvEs, Jan. 9, 1992, at KI1 (summary and full text of decision).
5. Pacific, 1 Cal. 4th at 155, 820 P.2d at 1046, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 536. Justice
Mosk wrote the unanimous opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas, Justices Panelli,
Kennard, Arabian, Baxter, and pro tern Justice Lillie concurred. Id. Justice Lillie of
the Second District court of appeal sat in for Justice George who participated in the
case at the appellate level. Id.
6. Id. at 159, 820 P.2d at 1048, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 538.
7. Id. The court of appeal held that this express reservation of an estate of years
was sufficient to exempt the transaction from a change of ownership under Revenue
and Taxation Code section 62(e). Id. See infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text
for the reasons why the supreme court disagreed. The court of appeal distinguished
Industrial Indemnity Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 218 Cal. App. 3d 999,
267 Cal. Rptr 445 (1990), which held that a sale-leaseback constituted a change in
ownership, by pointing out that no express reservation of an estate of years was
made in that case. Pacific Southwest Realty Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 235 Cal.
App. 3d 1817, 1823, 280 Cal. Rptr. 155, 158 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
8. See notes 28-32 and accompanying text for the supreme court's analysis to the
contrary.

(Vol. 20: 257, 1992]

CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

change of ownership and entered judgment for the seller." The court of
appeal affirmed.'
II.

TREATMENT

The supreme court reversed the court of appeal, and held that the
transaction was a change of ownership since it fulfilled the three-prong
test in Revenue and Tax Code section 60." Section 60 was intended to
be the overarching definition of a change in ownership.2 Under the test,
a change of ownership occurs on "a transfer of a present interest in real
property, including the beneficial use thereof, the value of which is substantially equal to the value of the fee interest." 3
The first prong was satisfied because the seller transferred the present
interest of a fee title to the buyer." Moreover, the leasehold did not defeat the transfer of a present interest because a leasehold is an interest
different in kind from a freehold. 6
Next, the court determined the buyer had beneficial use of the property, since he was entitled to exact rent at the market rate from the seller.'" In addition, the presumption that the owner of legal title also has

9. Pacific, 1 Cal. 4th at .160, 820 P.2d at 1045, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 535.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 162-66, 820 P.2d at 1050-53, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 540-43.
12. Id. at 161-62, 820 P.2d at 1050, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 540. The task force created
to establish uniform guidelines for implementing Proposition 13's change in ownership
provision specified the characteristics of a change in ownership in a single test. Id.
(quoting the Task Force Report on Property Tax Administration submitted to the
Assembly Committee on Revenue and Taxation on January 22, 1979). The task force
recommended that the test "control all transfers, both foreseen and unforeseen." Id.
Thus, the court declared it important that all statutory examples, including the exemptions, be interpreted consistent with the general test. Id. As applied in the instant
case, the test even controls exemptions whose plain meanings encompass the instant
transaction. Id. See infra notes 24-34 and accompanying text.
13. Pacific, 1 Cal. 4th at 161-66, 820 P.2d at 1050, 2 Cal. Rptr: at 540. CAL REV. &
TAx. CODE § 60 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992).
14. Pacific, 1 Cal. 4th at 162-63, 820 P.2d at 1050-51, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 540-41.
15. Id. An estate in fee simple is a freehold estate; a leasehold is not. See CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 762, 765 (1982 & Supp. 1992) (estate in fee and chattels real). A freehold is an ownership interest, whereas a leaseholder has a mere possessory interest
in the land. Pacific, I Cal. 4th at 162-63, 820 P.2d at 1050-51, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54041. The seller in the instant case was left with an interest different in kind than
before the transaction. Id. The court held this sufficient to prove the transfer of a
present interest.
16. Id. at 163-64, 820 P.2d at 1051-52, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54142. See Industrial In-

beneficial title'! was not rebutted because the seller offered no evidence
of a custodial or trust relationship.'8 Furthermore, the fact that the buyer could not occupy the building as a result of the lease did not deprive
the buyer of the right to collect the value of the beneficial title as rent
from the seller.'
The third prong of the test was met because the value of the transferred interest was equivalent to the value of a fee interest.' The property was merely subject to the encumbrance of a leasehold interest."
Moreover, if the property were, resold, it would probably sell at the market price.' Further, the third prong was intended to insulate from reassessment transfers of, low value, such as a one-year lease.' Thus, the
transfer of the full value of the fee interest satisfied the requirement that
the substantial value of the fee interest pass.
After determining that the transfer resulted in a change of ownership
under the three-part test, the court found that no part of section 62 exempted the conveyance from the change of ownership test.' Subdivision
(g) of section 62 exempts "[amny transfer of a lessor's interest in taxable
real property subject to a lease with a remaining term (including renewal
options) of 35 years or more."' However, the exemption was not intended to apply to a sale and leaseback transaction.' Although the lease was

demnuty Co. V. City and County of San Francisco, 218 Cal. App. 3d 999, 267 Cal.
Rptr. 445 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (equating beneficial use with the right to receive rent).
17. Pacific, I Cal. 4th at 163-64, 820 P.2d at 1051-52, 2 Cal. Rptr. at 541-42. "The
owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title. This presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof." Id.
(citing CAL EVID. CODE § 662 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992)).
18. Pacific, 1 Cal. 4th at 164, 820 P.2d at 1051-52, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 541-52.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id,
22. 1d at 166, 820 P.2d at 1053, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 543.
23. Id. A one-year lease would not be considered a change in ownership since the
value of the interest is not substantially equal to the fee interest. Id. By contrast, the
creation of a 35-year lease would achieve a change in ownership because the value
of the lease transferred is substantially equal to the fee value. Id. See CAL. REV. &
TAx CODE § 61(c)(1) (West 1987 & Supp. 1992) (specifically including lease of 35
years or more as change in ownership).
24. Pacific, 1 Cal. 4th at 166-71, 820 P.2d at 1053-55, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 543-55.
25. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 62(g) (West 1987 & Supp. 1992).
26. Pacific, 1 Cal. 4th at 167, 820 P.2d at 1054, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 544. The exception was intended to apply when property is sold subject to a long-term lease. Id, It
protects long-term lessees who are obligated to pay property taxes under lease agreements, because a sale by the lessor will not be considered a change in ownership.
Id. It is consistent with the task force report that the party with the primary economic interest in the property control changes in ownership. Id. The sale-leaseback is
too far removed from the intent behind the exception. Id. at 167-68, 820 P.2d at
1054-55, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54445.
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executed prior to the sale, it could not be considered a "remaining term"
because it was not in existence at the time of the transaction.'
The supreme court also found inapposite the exemption applied by the
court of appeals.' Subdivision (e) of section 62 exempts "[a]ny transfer... whose terms reserve.., an estate of years. " ' Although superficially the transaction fit under the language of the exemption, such an
inclusion would be contrary to the finding that a sale-leaseback is not a
change of ownership under section 60.' The 62(e) exception was intended to protect parents who commonly want to convey family property
to their children, yet retain the right to live in the family home the rest of
their lives.' The legislature did not intend for a sale and leaseback transaction to fall within section 62(e).'
Finally, the court stated that to the extent section 462(k)(4) of title 18
of the California Code of Regulations conflicted with the Revenue and
Tax Code, its enforcement was proscribed.' The finding of a change in
ownership under section 60 controlled over the rule as well as the exceptions above.'

27. Id. at 167, 820 P.2d at 1054, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 544.
28. Id.
29. CAj. REV. & TAX. CODE § 62(e) (West 1987 & Supp 1992).
30. 1d.
31. Pacific, 1 Cal. 4th at 170, 820 P.2d at 1056, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 546.
32. Id.
33. Id. Section 462, subdivision (k)(4) of title 18 of the California Code' of Regulations provides: "Sale and leaseback. A sale of real property, coupled with a leaseback
which is not reserved to the transferor by terms of the sale instrument, constitutes a
change in ownership of such property." CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 18, § 462(k)(4) (1990).
The trial court read the negative pregnant of the rule to say "a sale of real property,
coupled with a lease-back, that is reserved to the transferor by the terms of the sale
instrument does not constitute a change in ownership," thereby exempting the instant
transaction. Pacific, 1 Cal. 4th at 170, 820 P.2d at 1056, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 546. The
court of appeal had reached the same conclusion. Pacific Southwest Realty Co. v.
County of Los Angeles, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1817, 1823, 280 Cal. Rptr. 155, 159 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991).
Although this interpretation is consistent with the plain meaning of the rule, the
supreme court once again determined it was superseded by the change of ownership
finding under Revenue and Taxation Code 60. Pacific, 1 Cal. 4th at 171, 820 P.2d at
1056, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 546.
34. Pacific, 1 Cal. 4th at 170, 820 P.2d at 1056, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 546.

Ill.

CONCLUSION

The supreme court's finding in the present case was a tax victory for
cities and counties because real property involved in sale-leaseback
transactions will now be reassessed at current market value. Moreover,
the ruling in the instant case means an additional $10 million in revenue
for the county of Los Angeles. A similar case pending in San Francisco
will generate an additional $18 million in taxes for the city.'
This decision, however, is a blow to banks and businesses that raise
capital by using the confusion over whether a sale-leaseback constitutes
a change of ownership.' The sale-leaseback transaction allows a seller
to use his or her property to'generate capital without relinquishing control. It also provides companies in need of depreciation deductions or
investment opportunities a property in fee with a guarantee of a longterm lease. However, as a result of the court's holding, these transactions
are not attractive because assessments will no longer be calculated at
their 1975-76 ratesY
It is unclear just how many banks and thrifts have raised capital
through sale-leasebacks, but the practice is thought to be widespread.'
Many sale-leasebacks have been challenged as changes in ownership by
assessors.' The individual impact on institutions will depend on whether they paid the full tax and filed for a refund, or simply paid the lower
rate.' Those that paid taxes assessed at the 1975-76 rate are in for the
unpleasant surprise of an unexpected tax liability.
ADAM L. JOHNSON

XII.

TORT LAW
When an on-duty police officer misuses his authority by
raping a woman whom he has detained, (1) the officer's
actions are within the course of his employment and (2) the
public entity that employs the officer may be liable under the
doctrine of respondeat superior: Mary M. v. City of
Los Angeles.

35. California Changes Tax Treatment of Leasebacks, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, Jan.
6, 1992, at 5.

36. ld.
37. Justices See Through Sale-teaseback Gambit, LA. DAILY J., Jan. 13, 1992, at 6.
38. California Changes Tax Treatment of Leasebacks, supra note 35.

39. I&
40. I&
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The California Supreme Court's decision in Mary M. v. City of Los
Angeles' addressed the issue of whether a governmeht employer may be
held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior when an on-duty
police officer rapes a woman after having detained her for erratic driving.2 For the doctrine to apply, the court had to determine whether the
officer's actions came within the scope of his employment The fivejustice majority' held in the affirmative on substantive tort law principles,5 emphasizing the unique position of authority and trust that police
officers occupy in our society.'

1. 54 Cal. 3d 202, 814 P.2d 1341, 285 Cal. Rptr. 99 (1991).
2. Id, at 207, 814 P.2d at 1342, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 100. See infra notes 21-32 and
accompanying text.
3. Mary M., 54 Cal. 3d at 209, 814 P.2d at 1344, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 102. See infra
notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
4. Mary M., 54 Cal. 3d at 202, 814 P.2d at 1341, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 99. Justice
Kennard wrote the majority opinion in which Justices Mosk, Panelli, and Broussard
concurred. Justice Arabian filed a concurring opinion. Justice Baxter, joined by Chief
Justice Lucas, filed an opinion concurring only in the judgment.
5. Id. at 221, 814 P.2d at 1352, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 110. Justices Baxter and Lucas
agreed with the majority that the city was liable in this case, but reached that conclusion using only the narrow procedural ground of the invited error doctrine. Id. at
225-28, 814 P.2d at 1354-57, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 112-15 (Baxter, J., concurring). Their
intense disagreement with the majority's "vicarious liability" and "scope of employment" analysis makes Justice Baxter's opinion appear more like a dissent. Lisa
Stansky, Cities Can Face Liability In Cases of Police Rape, TIE RECORDER, Sept. 6,
1991, at 1. Basically, Justice Baxter disagreed with the majority's scope of employment and public employer liability analysis because such issues are governed by statute (namely, the California Tort Claims Act of 1963) which precludes judicial justification based solely on policy and case law. Mary M., 54 Cal. 3d at 228-30, 814 P.2d

at 1357-58, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 115-16 (Baxter, J., concurring). See infra note 51.
6. Mary M., 54 Cal. 3d at 206, 814 P.2d at 1342, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 100. The court

stated:
[S]ociety has granted police officers extraordinary power and authority over
its citizenry. An officer who detains an individual is acting as the official
representative of the state, with all of its coercive power. As visible symbols
of that power, an officer is given a distinctively marked car, a uniform, a
badge, and a gun ....
Inherent in this formidable power is the potential for
abuse.
Id. at 216-17, 814 P.2d at 1349, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 107.

II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The plaintiff, Mary M., was driving home by herself early in the morning of October 3, 1991.' At about 2:30 a.m., Sergeant Schroyer of the Los
Angeles Police Department stopped the plaintiff for erratic driving and
administered a field sobriety test.8 Schroyer was wearing his badge and
uniform, carrying a gun, and driving the traditional black-and-white patrol car.'
Not having performed the field sobriety test well, Mary M. began to
cry, pleading with Schroyer not to take her to jail.V 0 Schroyer told her to
get into his police car." He then drove to the plaintiff's home where he
told her he "expected payment" for not taking her to jail. 2 When Mary
M. tried to escape from within her own house, Schroyer threatened to
take her to jail. Once she stopped struggling, he raped her. 3 This sequence of events led to the filing of criminal charges against Schroyer
and a subsequent conviction of rape 4 with a state prison sentence."
The plaintiff then filed a civil action for damages against both Schroyer
and the City of Los Angeles as his employer. 6 The jury awarded the
plaintiff $150,000 in damages, for which the trial court held the officer
and the City of Los Angeles jointly and severally liable. 7 The appellate
court reversed, holding that, as a matter of law, a police officer's act of
rape was not within the scope of his employment. 8 Granting review, the

7. Id. at 206-07, 814 P.2d at 1342, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
8. Id. at 207, 814 P.2d at 1342, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
9. Id.
10. Id,
11. Id. Schroyer never handcuffed the plaintiff. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id, at 207, 814 P.2d at 1342-43, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 100-01. When Schroyer had
originally pulled the plaintiffs car over to the side of the road, he notified headquarters that he was "conducting an investigation." Id. at 207, 814 P.2d at 1343, 285
Cal. Rptr. at 101.' Upon leaving the plaintiffs house, he called in again on his car
radio, this time stating he was back from his "lunch break." Id. When the radio operator questioned the inconsistency between Schroyer's present and previous statements,
Schroyer did not respond. Id.
14. See CAL PENAL CODE § 261(a)(2) (West Supp. 1992).
15. Mary M., 54 Cal. 3d at 207, 814 P.2d at 1343, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
16. Id at 208, 814 P.2d at 1343, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
17. Id. at 208 n.1, 814 P.2d at 1343 n.1, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 101 n.l. See generally 57
CJ.S. Master and Servant § 579 (1948) (joint and several liability); 35 CAL. JUR. 3D
Government Tort Liability § 134 (1988 & Supp. 1992) (payment of judgments against
local public entities); 35 CAL JUR. 3D Government Tort Liability § 135 (1988 & Supp.
1991) (providing funds to pay judgments). The trial court also assessed $150,000 in
punitive damages against Schroyer. Mary M., 54 Cal' 3d at 208 n.1, 814 P.2d at 1343
n.1, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 101 n.1.
18. Id. at 208, 814 P.2d at 1343, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
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Supreme Court of California held that the officer's actions satisfied the
scope of employment requirement of respondeat superior and that the
city, as the officer's employer, was vicariously liable.'9 The court also
reinstated the $150,000 jury award.'
.III.
A.

THE COURT'S OPINION

Policy Goals Underlying the Doctrine of Respondeat Superior
Are Furtheredby Holding the Public Employer Vicariously Liable
for a Police Officer's Sexual Assaults

According to the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be
held vicariously liable for an employee's tortious conduct that occurs
within the course and scope of employment.' The theory creates an
exception to the general tort concept that liability follows fault and represents a conscious allocation of risk.' The doctrine pertains not only
to private employers, but public employers as well.'
Respondeat superior is based on three policy objectives, all of which,
according: to the majority, would be realized in the present situation
where an on-duty peace officer exploits his police power to commit a
rape. First, vicarious liability encourages the employer to take preventive
measures:, thereby reducing the likelihood of repeated tortious behavior.' In this regard, the court stated that the Los Angeles Police Department could adopt a rule requiring a male officer, whenever transporting a

19. Id. at 221, 814 P.2d at 1352, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
20. Lisa Stansky, Cities Can Face Liability In Cases of Police Rape, THE
ER, Sept. 6, 1991, at 1.

RECORD-

21. Mary M., 54 Cal. 3d at 208, 814 P.2d at 1343, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 101. See generally 2 B. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 115 (9th ed. 1987); 5 B.
WITHIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Agency and Employment § 115 (9th ed. 1987 &
Supp. 1992); 29 CAL. JUR. 3D Employer and Employee §§ 91, 95 (1986 & Supp. 1992);
3 CAL. JUR. 3D Agency § 131 (1973 & Supp. 1992); 57 C.J.S. Master and Servant §§
561, 572-73 (1948).
22. Mary M., 54 Cal. 3d at 208, 814 P.2d at 1343, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
23. Id at 209, 814 P.2d at 1344, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 102. Section 815.2(a) of the Californda Government Code provides:
A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission
of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if
the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a
cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.
CAL. GOV'T 'CODE § 815.2(a) (West 1980) (emphasis added).
24. Mary M., 54 Cal. 3d at 214, 814 P.2d at 1347, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 105.

female suspect, to report the time, location, and mileage before departing
and again upon reaching his destination.' Such a preventive procedure
would not impede the ability of police departments in carrying out their
law enforcement responsibilities.' The second justification is to increase the certainty of compensation for the plaintiff,' an objective already recognized as legitimate through the Legislature's enactment of the
California Tort Claims Act of 1963. Acknowledging that courts have already interpreted the Act to hold governmental employers vicariously

25. dL at 215 n.7, 814 P.2d at 1348 n.7, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 106 n.7. The San Francisco Police Department has already implemented such a rule. Id. The Los Angeles
Police Department has a similar policy "which requires officers on duty who transport persons of the opposite sex to report the time and the mileage on the vehicle's
odometer before and after the trip." Id at 218 n.10, 814 P.2d at 1350 n.10, 285 Cal.
Rptr. at 108 n.10.
Justice Baxter argued that the majority's premise that the City of Los Angeles
could and should adopt further regulations defies statutory authority which provides
that "'[a] public entity is not liable for an irjury caused by adopting or failing to
adopt an enactment or by failing to enforce any law.'" Id. at 237, 814 P.2d at 1363,
285 Cal. Rptr. at 121 (Baxter J., concurring) (quoting CAL. Gov'T CODE § 818.2 (West
1980 & Supp. 1992)). According to section 810.6 of the California Government Code,
the term 'enactment" includes regulations. Id. at 237, 814 P.2d at 1363, 285 Cal. Rptr.
at 121 (Baxter, J., concurring) (citing CAL GOV'T CODE § 818.2 (West 1980 & Supp.

1992)).
26. Id. at 215, 814 P.2d at 1348, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 106. Cf. John R. v. Oakland Uni-

fied Sch. Dist., 48 Cal. 3d 438, 769 P.2d 948, 266 Cal. Rptr. 766 (1989) (holding
school district not liable for a teacher's sexual molestation of a junior high school
student at the teacher's apartment during an authorized extracurricular program because any preventive measures implemented would probably inhibit extracurricular
activities and one-on-one teacher-student contacts).
Justice Baxter disagreed, arguing that the principle underlying the Tort Claims
Act of 1963 is to limit the liability of a public entity so that it need not implement
preventive measures that are so "onerous, impossible, or impractical" as to impair its
public functions. Mary M., 64 Cal. 3d at 236-37, 814 P.2d at 1362-63, 285 Cal. Rptr. at
120-21 (Baxter, J., concurring). Justice Baxter argued that imposing vicarious liability
in this case leaves the City of Los Angeles with two alternatives: (1) decide all reasonable precautionary steps have already been taken "and accept the fact that errant
officers might on occasion rape citizens, thereby subjecting the City to vicarious
liability," in which case no deterrent effect is achieved, or (2) implement additional
measures, which might unduly interfere with the effectiveness of the City's police
force. Id at 238, 814 P.2d at 1364, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 122 (Baxter, J., concurring).
Justice Baxter did not enumerate the ways in which the added policies would frustrate the city's responsibilities. See id.
27. Id. at 209, 814 P.2d at 1343, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
28. CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 810-997.6 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992). The California Tort
Claims Act of 1963 makes all public entities liable in tort to the extent provided by
statute, with certain statutory immunities and defenses. See generally 5 B. WITKIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 129, 132-33 (1988 & Supp 1992) (statutory liability); 5 B. WrmN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNA LAw, Torts § 136-40 (1988 & Supp. 1992)
(immunities and defenses); 35 CAL. JUR. 3D Government Tort Liability §§ 1-9 (1988 &
Supp 1992).

[Vol. 20: 257, 1992]

CdliorniaSupreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

liable for a police officer's assaultive conduct or use of excessive
force,' and seeing little difference between police beatings and police
rapes, the court reasoned that both types of assault victims deserve to be
compensated.' The third and final justification for respondeat superior
is that it effectively spreads the risk of loss.' In this rinstance, the community should bear the cost of police power abuse because it is the community that derives substantial benefits from the lawful exercise of that

authority.'

29. Manvj M., 54 Cal. 3d at 215, 814 P.2d at 1348, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 106. The majority noted that the legislature "declin[ed] to grant immunity to public entities when
their police officers engage in violent conduct." Id. (emphasis added). See, e.g.,
Larson v. City of Oakland, 17 Cal. App. 3d 91, 94 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1971) (holding city
liable for policeman's assault and battery because plaintiff was not a prisoner within.
the meaning of the statute providing immunity); Scruggs v. Haynes, 252 Cal. App. 2d
256, 60 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1967) (holding city liable for policeman's use of excessive
force while acting in the course and scope of employment); Griffith v. City of
Monrovia, 134 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 6, 184 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1982) (holding that city was
not immune from liability when a policeman sprayed the plaintiff with mace). See
generally 35 CAL. JUR. 3D Government Tort Liability § 66 (assault and battery by
policeman) (1988 & Supp. 1992); 3 C.J.S. Agency § 428 (use of excessive force) (1973
& Supp. 1992).
30. Mary M., 54 Cal. 3d at 216, 814 P.2d at 1348-49, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 106-07. Disagreeing with the majority's goal of more adequately compensating the victim, Justice
Baxter argued that holding cities liable for employee-committed rapes will simultaneously "increase the cost of insurance and .. . decrease its availability." Id. at 239,
814 P.2d at 1365, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 123 (Baxter, J., concurring). Furthermore, "[tihe
public has equally compelling interests in adequate law enforcement and preservation
of public finds." Id. at 240, 814 P.2d at 1365, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 123 (Baxter, J., concurring). Tius the decision is better left to the legislature. Id. (Baxter, J., concurring). See iqtfra note 32.

31. Mary M., Cal. 3d at 209, 814 P.2d at 1343, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 101. The rationale
is that it is only fair to place the responsibility for the victim's losses on those who
benefit front the activity that gave rise to the harm. Id.
32. Id. at 217, 814 P.2d at 1349, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 107. Justice Baxter disagreed,
arguing that the evaluation of risk distribution for public entity torts is part of the
legislature's budgetary function. Id. at 236, 814 P.2d at 1362, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 120
(Baxter, J., concurring). Moreover, the court lacks "sufficient empirical data on which
to make the difficult choice between coaipeting fiscal priorities." Id. (Baxter, J., concurring). The California Law Revision Commission's explanation, after extensive research and before enactment of the Tort Claims Act, is instructive:
The problems involved in drawing standards for governmental liability and
governmental immunity are of immense difficulty. Government cannot merely
be made liable as private persons are, for public entities are fundamentally
different: from private persons ....
incarcerate violators of the law ..

.

Private persons do not prosecute and
. Unlike many private persons, a public

B.

The Scope of Employment Issue Was Properly Left to the Jury
Because the Rape, When Considered in Context, Was Not
Necessarily Dissociatedfrom the Police Officer's Occupation

The standard for determining whether an employee's conduct falls
outside the scope of employment is whether the employee's behavior, in
the context of his particular line of work is so unusual or startling that
requiring the employer to bear the loss would seem unfair.' A risk that
arises out of the employment is one that is "typical of or broadly incidental to" the employer's operations.' Intentional acts, malicious acts, conduct contrary to an employee's authorized tasks or employer's explicit

entity often cannot reduce its risk of potential liability by refusing to engage
in a particular activity, for government must continue to govern and is required to furnish services that cannot be adequately provided by any other
agency.
Id, at 235, 814 P.2d at 1362, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 120 (Baxter, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).
33. Id. at 209, 214, 814 P.2d at 1344, 1347, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 102, 105. See generally, 2 B. WrrITN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNiA LAW, Agency and Employment § 126 (9th
ed. 1987 & Supp. 1992); 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 150-51
(1987 & Supp. 1992); 29 CAL. JUR. 3D Employer and Employee § 107 (1986 & Supp.
1992) (scope of employment in general); 29 CAL JUR. 3D Employer and Employee §
108 (1986 & Supp. 1992) (foreseeability); 29 CAL. JUR. 3D Employer and Employee §
110 (1986 & Supp. 1992) (departure from course of duty); 3 C.J.S. Agency § 424
(1973 & Supp. 1992) (tort within course of employment); 3 C.J.S. Agency § 426 (1973
& Supp. 1992) (tort outside course of employment); 57 C.J.S. Master and Servant §
570 (1948) (acts or omissions imposing liability in general); 30 C.J.S. Employer-Employee Relationship § 220 (1992) (criminal acts); 30 C.J.S. Employer-Employee Relationship § 223 (1992) (sexual misconduct); 30 C.J.S. Employer-Employee Relationship
§ 224 (1992) (assault by employee).
Compare White v. County of Orange, 166 Cal. App. 3d 566, 212 Cal. Rptr. 493
(1985) (holding that plaintiff stated a cause of action because the sheriff's wrongful
conduct flowed directly from the use of his official authority when he detained a
female motorist, driving her around for hours in the back of his patrol car while
threatening to rape and kill her) and Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., 41 Cal.
3d 962, 719 P.2d 676, 227 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1986) (holding employer liable when an
employee negligently allowed his nephew to ride on a tractor while employee drove
it through an orchard pulling a disking attachment and a branch knocked the nephew
off the tractor and into the disking attachment) with Rita M. v. Roman Catholic
Archbishop, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1453, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1986) (holding that sexual
activity between priest and parishioner is outside the scope of employment because it
is not characteristic of the church and, thus, not foreseeable) and Alma W. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 123 Cal. App. 3d 133, 176 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1981) (holding
school custodian's sexual molestation of an 11-year-old child on school grounds outside scope of employment because "there is no aspect of a janitor's duties that
would make sexual assault anything other than highly unusual and very startling").
34. Mary M., 54 Cal. 3d at 209, 814 P.2d at 1344, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
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direction,, and even behavior that does not benefit the employer may
still fall within the scope of employment.' A limited exception exists,
however, when an employee deviates substantially from his employment
obligations to pursue personal motivations.'
The city argued that a police officer is outside the scope of his employment as a matter of law when he rapes a citizen, even if he asserts
his government-conferred authority beforehand,' because of the tenuous connection between the criminal conduct and an officer's sanctioned
police function.' However, the court disagreed, reasoning that "[iun view
of the considerable power and authority that police officers possess[']
it is neither startling nor unexpected that on occasion an officer will
misuse that authority by engaging in assaultive conduct ....The precise
circumstances of the assault need not be anticipated, so long as the risk
is one that is reasonablyforeseeable." '

35. Id. For background concerning liability for willful, malicious or criminal acts
see supra note 33.

36. Mary M., 54 Cal. 3d at 218, 814 P.2d at 1350, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 108. See generally 2 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Agency and Employment § 128 (9th
ed. 1987 & Supp. 1992); 57 C.J.S. Master and Servant § 574 (1948).
37. Mary M., 54 Cal. 3d at 211, 814 P.2d at 1345, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 103. Generally,

the determination of whether an employee acted within the scope of employment embodies a question of fact, but becomes a question of law when no disputed facts or
contradicting inferences exist This occurs only when "the relationship between an
employee's work and wrongful conduct is so attenuated that a jury could not reason-

ably conclude that the act was within the scope of employment." Id. at 213, 814 P.2d
at 1347, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 105. •
38. Id. at 217, 814 P.2d at 1349, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
39. For example, police officers may detain criminal suspects "at gunpoint, place
them in handcuffs, remove them from their residences, order them into police cars
use deadly force." Id. at 217, 814 P.2d at 1349-50,
and, in some circumstances, ....
285 Cal. Rptr. at 107-08.
[TJhe very nature of law enforcement employment requires exertion of physical control over persons whom an officer has detained or arrested ....
That authority carries with it the risk of abuse. The danger that an officer
will commit a sexual assault while on duty arises from the considerable
authority and control inherent in the responsibilities of an officer in enforcing
the law.
Id. at 218, 814 P.2d at 1350, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 108 (emphasis added).
40. Id, at 217-18, 814 P.2d at 1350, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 108 (emphasis added). The
fact that the Los Angeles Police Department already has such a mileage recordation
policy when officers transport members of the opposite sex tends so show that
Shroyer's conduct was reasonably foreseeable. See id. at 218 n.10, 814 P.2d at 1350
n.10, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 108 n.10.

With regard to the limited exception for an employee who departs
significantly from his employment obligations for personal purposes, the
city argued that Schroyer was predominately pursuing his own interests
when he committed the rape.4 However, the court stated that it is crucial to examine the employees' tortious conduct in context, not in isolation.' Several factors led the court to conclude that Schroyer's acts
were still within the scope of his employment. In the first place,
Schroyer accomplished the detention through the direct exercise of his
police authority when he "activat[ed] the red lights on his patrol car."'
Thereafter, he ordered her to get out of her car, to perform a field sobriety test, and then to get into his police car." Moreover, when the
plaintiff tried to avoid the sexual assault, Schroyer "continued to assert
his authority by threatening to take her to jail." 5
IV.

IMPACT

The California Supreme Court's decision in Mary M. significantly expands governmental liability for police officer misconduct4" and will certainly affect policies within police departments.47 There are two concerns with the ruling, however. First is the possible transformation of
"blameless public agencies into liability insurers for much, if not all, of
the intentional misconduct committed by peace officers in their employ"' because the effect of imposing the doctrine of respondeat superior is to impose strict liability.49 Second, there seems to be no limit on

41. Id. at 218, 814 P.2d at 1350, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 108. Justice Baxter agreed with
the city's argument that for an on-duty police officer to commit a sexual assault for
his own personal gratification constitutes a complete deviation from his work assignment that is both startling and unusual, finding that apart from the original detention,
there is no connection whatsoever between a rape and a police officer's duties. Id.
at 230, 814 P.2d at 1358, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 116. (Baxter, J.,concurring). Indeed, "[n]o
act can be more unrelated to the duties of a police officer than his rape of a member of the public he is sworn and paid to protect." Id. at 228, 814 P.2d at 1357, 285
Cal. Rptr. at 115 (Baxter, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 218-19, 814 P.2d at 1350, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
43. Id. at 221, 814 P.2d at 1352, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 110. This is similar to the reasoning of the court in White v. County of Orange, 166 Cal. App. 3d 566, 212 Cal.
Rptr. 493 (1985). See supra note 33.
44. Mary M., 54 Cal. 3d at 219, 814 P.2d at 1351, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. Philip Hager, L.A. is Liable in Rape by Officer, Court Rules, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 6, 1991, at Al.
47. City of Los Angeles Liable for Cop's Rape of "Mary M. ", PROPRIETARY TO THE
UNITED PRESS INT'VL, Sept. 5, 1991.
48. See Hager, supra note 46, at Al.
49. Mary M., 54 Cal. 3d at 235, 814 P.2d at 1362, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 120 (Baxter, J.,
concurring). This is because it is an exception to the general tort principle that liability is based on fault. Justice Baxter "warn(s] that the court's unprecedented ex-
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the amount of damages the public will have to pay.' The case also
raised, but the court declined to resolve, the issue of whether sovereign
immunity protects the city from liability for the trauma caused by the
investigation and criminal prosecution of the rape."1 The court directed
the court of appeals to examine this issue on remandr.'

In addition to imposing liability on cities, Mary M. marks a continuing
trend toward reducing the obstacles that block women from pursuing
actions related to sex crimes. Justice Arabian concurred with the majority but wrote separately to discuss the progress achieved through the
Mary M. holding in rectifying "the historical imbalance between victim
and accused in sexual assault prosecutions. "'
V.

CONCLUSION

The outcome in this case turns on the abuse of coercive power of
employees in a position of authority.' Employees without this power or
authority may very well be acting outside the scope of their employment
as a matter of law when they commit sexual assaults.' If the legislature
pansion of governmental liability would leave taxpayers responsible for 'almost any
abuse of position' by an officer." Id. (Baxter, J., concurring).
50. See Hager, supra note 46, at Al. Considering the co-existing scarcity and high
cost of municipal liability insurance, damage awards could seriously deplete public
funds. Mary M., 54 Cal. 3d at 236, 814 P.2d at 1362, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 120 (Baxter, J.,

concurring).
51. California Government Code section 815.2(b) states that "Ielxcept as otherwise
provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act
or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from
liability." CAL GOV'T CODE § 815.2(b) (West 1980) (emphasis added). The comment to
this section states that it "abolishes all common law or judicially declared forms of
liability." IL In other words, sovereign immunity is the rule in California and governmental liability is limited to exceptions specifically set forth by statute or required by
the federal or state constitutions. See generally 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW, Torts § 129 (1988 & Supp. 1992). For background on governmental liability for
police activities and correctional facilities, see generally 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 198-216 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
52. Mary M., 54 Cal. 3d at 221 n.12, 814 P.2d at 1352 n.12, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 110
n.12.
53. Id. at 222, 814 P.2d at 1353, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 111 (Arabian, J., concurring).
54. For the Record, THE NAT'L L.J., Sept. 16, 1991, at 6. In a case involving a job
counselor at the State Employment Security office who raped two Laotian refugees
when they contacted him about obtaining employment, the Ninth Circuit reached the
same conclusion (that vicarious liability can be imposed on local governments when
employees on duty perpetrate rapes) for the same reason (the coercive power that
authority figures possess). Id. (citing Vang v. Toyed, 944 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1991)).
55. Mary M., 54 Cal. 3d at 218 n.11, 814 P.2d at 1350 n.ll, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 108

is dissatisfied with the court of appeals' decision on remand regarding
the municipality's liability,' it could extend immunity to police officer assaults, sexual or otherwise.57
LORRAINE A. MUSKO

n.11.
56. See inqfra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
57. Mary M., 54 Cal. 3d at 216 n.9, 814 P.2d at 1348 n.9, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 106 n.9.

